Since his death at the hands of a US drone strike in Baghdad last week, much has been said about Iranian General Qassem Soleimani and his ties to terrorism. Iraq’s Prime Minister claimed that at the time of his death, Soleimani was in the country to take part in indirect talks between the Saudis and Iran aimed at easing tensions, and Iraq was serving as broker in the deal. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo shot that idea down earlier this week in a particularly candid, on the record moment, mockingly asking reporters “Is there any history that would indicate that it was remotely possible that this kind gentleman, this diplomat of great order, Qassem Soleimani, had traveled to Baghdad for the idea of conducting a peace mission? We know that wasn’t true.”
Soleimani’s ties to terrorism and his roles in leading and planning terrorist attacks against Americans is a far longer and more complicated story than most TV commentators have even touched on. The Cipher Brief spoke with our expert, Georgetown University and Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow professor Bruce Hoffman, about Soleimani’s long history of hate and now that he’s gone, the danger of terrorist retaliation.
The Cipher Brief: As the head of Iran’s Quds force, what was Soleimani's role in directing proxies to carry out the acts of terrorism?
Hoffman: He was a pivotal figure for decades in orchestrating Iran’s shadow wars. He was uniquely both a master strategist and a highly accomplished tactician. He cut his teeth in unconventional warfare from the start, fighting in the Iran-Iraq war and then remained engaged in all of Iran’s most significant regional interventions overseeing both Iranian irregular forces and local proxies. He was fully conversant in the core aspects of clandestine warfare and completely grasped the need to synchronize tactics with strategy. He nurtured and developed diverse levers of force application across the region utilizing an array of Iranian and Shi’a assets. Whether it’s the variety of Hezbollah organizations active in Lebanon and the Gulf, whether it's indigenous popular militia forces in Iraq today, or in years previous during the American presence in Iraq with the anti-US Badr Corps, Soleimani was at the vortex of Iranian regional force projection. In sum, he’s been a central player overseeing perhaps the most sophisticated network of irregular warfare adversaries on the globe.
The Cipher Brief: If US intelligence was correct and Soleimani was playing an active role in planning imminent attacks, how do you assess the likelihood that the new Quds force commander will continue that planning and possible execution?
Hoffman: It’s entirely possible that those plans are already well in place but have now been paused because of the days of mourning and the funeral and the “official” Iranian response, which we saw with Tuesday’s ballistic missile attacks on US bases in Iraq. In terms of the Quds force and other irregular Shi’a units, revenge may yet prove to be a dish best served cold—to be activated at a time and place of Iran’s choosing. But on the other hand, I think one does have to be a bit agnostic about the potential ongoing Iranian response given President Trump’ unambiguous declarations about US retaliation.
What is significant for me, and what has been lost in a lot of the commentary that I've been hearing or reading, is that basically for the past 40 years or so, the United States has very rarely retaliated against prior Iranian-backed, highly provocative terrorist acts. We did not respond after the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in East Beirut in April of 1983. We did not respond after the bombing of the Marine barracks in October of 1983 or after the US embassy in Beirut was again bombed the following year. We took no retaliatory action after the hijacking of a TWA passenger aircraft in 1985. Nor when a US Marine colonel serving with United Nations peacekeeping forces in Lebanon was kidnapped and executed in 1990.
What's significant is this is really the first time that the United States has militarily responded to Iranian provocation. So, it’s indeed conceivable that this spectacular act of retaliation may have some deterrent effect on future Iranian-sponsored violence or terrorism. And in that respect, having never made good on previous threats of military retaliation, I suppose if one decides finally to do something, it better be something of significant impact and enormous consequences. So, looking at the long trajectory of Iranian sponsorship of terrorism, and the long history of serious provocations and attacks that have often gone unaddressed or un-responded to, the killing of someone like Soleimani makes sense.
The Cipher Brief: Do you think Soleimani's replacement is going to think twice about leveraging terrorism in the way that his predecessor did, given what just happened?
Hoffman: Well two things: his replacement will never have the power Soleimani did. So, whoever that is and whatever he does or doesn't have will be completely dependent upon Ayatollah Khamenei. Soleimani’s successor will not be as independent of an actor as his predecessor uniquely was—which is why taking out Soleimani was so enormously attractive, because he was quite unique in the pantheon of Iranian external operations commanders. In that regard, Soleimani was a powerhouse in his own right and had the authority to act on his own initiative that others lacked. For instance, Soleimani used to claim that he had more authority than foreign minister Zarif. Or the fact that he likened himself to the stature of a senior American field officer akin to General David Petraeus, when he was commanding coalition forces in Iraq. I have no idea what the motivations of the White House or the NSC may have been for doing this now. In any event, there’s hardly been a time in modern US political history when demonstrating resolve and toughness in responding to terrorism hasn't been an electoral issue. It’s no different in many other Western countries.
What I think has also been lost in a lot of the commentary about why Soleimani was targeted is that he was the person who was partly responsible for Bin Laden’s survival between the September 11, 2001 attacks and his killing in Abbottabad 10 years later. In their authoritative account of Bin Laden during this time, British journalists Catherine Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy recount in their book, The Exile, Iran’s role and Soleimani’s specific responsibility for overseeing the sanctuary and protection afforded both to Bin Laden family members and senior al Qaeda operatives following the US invasion of Afghanistan after 2001. Scott-Clark and Levy interviewed Bin Laden’s wives, his sons, except for Hamza, other family members, as well other intimates to really build one of the most detailed pictures of how Bin Laden, and especially Al-Qaeda, were able to survive, even during the darkest days after Operation Enduring Freedom and the invasion of Afghanistan. What becomes very clear from that book is that Iran was just as important, just as critical to Al-Qaeda’s survival as Pakistan was. And in that sense, Soleimani was the main player. That further underscores how Soleimani was at the vortex of so many of this century’s key developments in international terrorism. Indeed, he was so revered by Bin Laden’s children that they reportedly referred to him as “Hajji Qassem” (Uncle Qassem).
In this context, Soleimani was also responsible for longstanding Al Qaeda mastermind Saif al-Adel’s presence in Iran, including when in 2003, Saif al-Adel orchestrated the short-lived Al Qaeda terrorist campaign in Saudi Arabia. Obviously, with the approval of Soleimani. It’s been reported that Saif al-Adel, Abdullah Abdullah and other senior Al-Qaeda operatives have been hiding in Iran for the past 18 months at least—which, if true—shows how the relationship between Soleimani and key Al Qaeda operatives may have continued. So, these are all significant dimensions of international terrorism that Soleimani had his fingers in. And in that sense, I think if we just narrowly look at him as the Quds force commander, the person who was responsible for organizing and orchestrating PMF and its activities in Syria and Iran, we're missing a bigger part of the picture that probably put him on that number one target list in the first place and may also have influenced the decision to strike at him now.
As mercurial as the decision-making process to target Soleimani at this moment may have been, I can imagine that when the President was given a rundown of Soleimani’s terrorist curriculum vitae, it was understood that he was a very key player where in fact, his absence, because he had this unique personal power, could make a difference. These are aspects to Soleimani’s background that haven’t been sufficiently discussed and might perhaps shed additional light on why him and why now.
This does cut both ways, unfortunately. In a sense that, it may justify the reason for killing him but it also perhaps raises the risk to us. Don't forget, just this past month a man named Ali Kourani was sentenced in New York for being a Hizballah operative convicted of basically scouting potential landmarks and other city targets for attack. But the fact that just last month when we're all focused on the Middle East a senior Hizballah operative is arrested and convicted here in the United States for conducting surveillance in support of terrorist operations, would likely connect back to someone like Soleimani who was also believed to have been the mastermind behind this 2012 plot against the Saudi Arabian ambassador. So I think there has been a lot missing thus far from the story. And I just wonder how this will continue to unfold and what new things we'll learn.
The Cipher Brief: Were you surprised by the demonstrations and scenes of ‘mourning’ over Soleimani that filled the streets of Iran after his death?
Hoffman: Well the Iranians are a very proud people and he was their best known, most accomplished and widely celebrated field commander. It's interesting too, that when Imad Fayez Mughniyeh was killed a decade ago, who was not an Iranian but was a chief of Hizballah, who was also a very prominent associate of Soleimani, that there was also mourning, not quite to this extent, but then he wasn’t a general. But we have to remember all but one of five Iranian attempts at retaliation failed. There were lots of threats, and lots of demonstrations but through international cooperation and vigilance, terrorist plots in Azerbaijan, Turkey, Kuwait, and Cyprus were all foiled. A suicide bombing attack five months after Mugniyah’s death in Bulgaria against a group of Israeli tourists tragically did succeed. The time lag itself demands continued vigilance about the danger of terrorist retaliation.
The Cipher Brief: What was Soleimani’s vision and purpose for confronting ISIS, and what is the likelihood that Iran will be able to continue that pressure?
Hoffman: Well he was very central in mobilizing the Iraqi popular militia forces against not just ISIS but also the Sunni population. The PMF were, at least allegedly, also extremely ruthless and brutal in their suppression of the ISIS threat and repression of any Iraqi Sunni support. So clearly, Soleimani had a role in suppressing ISIS, of that fact there is no doubt, especially at a particular period in time when the Iraqi security forces weren’t performing very well.
What does it mean for the future? Well everything is completely up in the air now. This is the kind of chaos, uncertainty and upheaval that ISIS and Al-Qaeda thrive in and derive great satisfaction from. If they can see their enemies divided, if they can see the overall umbrella effort, however tenuous it was, directed against them crumbling, both groups see opportunity and time to re-group and re-organize amidst this myriad of distractions. In this respect, one thing about the killing of Soleimani remains clear. Whether it proves in the long run to be a positive or negative development, it has likely helped as an ancillary effect to foster an environment amenable to other terrorists in groups that have nothing to do with Iran, like ISIS and Al Qaeda, who are either struggling to survive or seeking the time and space when attention is not focused on them, to rebuild.
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