OPINION — On Oct 6th, Hamas was ready to launch an audacious attack. It was complex, involved thousands of fighters, and aimed to kill, capture, and rape Israelis on a massive scale. Israeli intelligence collected signs an attack was in the works, but senior intel and military officials dismissed them. The result was 1,200 Israelis killed in a Hamas invasion, followed by a year of horrific urban and subterranean war.
In contrast, Israel was deeply aware of the threat on their northern border: Hezbollah. After 2006, when Israel invaded Lebanon and lost more than 120 soldiers to Hezbollah’s military apparatus, Israeli intelligence decided they were underprepared to fight this determined adversary. Hezballoh posed a real threat: capable, committed to Israel’s destruction, and fully armed by Tehran. In response, Israel devoted massive intelligence resources to understanding the threat and preparing for another round of war. The result was a stunning tactical success: over the course of six weeks, Hezbollah has been gravely, perhaps mortally wounded.
It is a tale of two fronts: a horrific intelligence failure to the south, and in the north a stunning intelligence success. Israel was right about Hezbollah but woefully wrong about Hamas. Why? As with any tremendous failure, there are many causes, but one central reason. In this case, the reason was cognitive bias clouding judgement, with disastrous effects.
Understanding the facts but not the significance
Israel’s Gaza-based collection resources worked, in a way. At least a year before the attack, Israeli intelligence had collected a copy of the attack plan, nicknamed “Jericho Wall.” The plan indicated “a methodical assault designed to overwhelm the fortifications around the Gaza Strip, take over Israeli cities, and storm key military bases, including a division headquarters,” according to a New York Times report. The plan included shockingly detailed assessments of Israeli security procedures, suggesting the intelligence collection on the other side was quite good and that Hamas had red teamed its own plan. The Israeli policymaker reaction was to dismiss the plans as “aspirational.”
Then, three months before the attacks, an analyst at Unit 8200, Israel’s signals intelligence agency, identified a day-long Hamas training exercise that seemed to match the outlines of Jericho Wall. She wrote it up for her supervisor, but he downplayed her concerns.
More evidence was amassed: IDF’s Gaza Division prepared a document based on the Unit 8200 report warning that Hamas was preparing a large-scale invasion, including planning to take 250 hostages. The “Red Team Unit” issued four warnings in September and October that Hamas was planning for a confrontation. Egypt’s intelligence service flagged for Israeli leaders that “something big” was in the works, including a phone call from Egypt’s intelligence minister to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in late September. Finally, the night before the attack, security services saw dozens of Israeli SIM cards activated.
Each of these data points alone could be explained away. Intelligence services should have been pulling them together into a bigger picture, however, and red flags should have been flying. There were many, many opportunities for a warning to land with resonance and for a policymaker to take action. It will take years for the many inquiries to sort out who knew what and when, and who could have acted but did not. The key point, though, is that at every turn, someone discounted Hamas’s capability or dismissed a warning as not specific enough to prompt action.
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Hizballah Blinders
In stark contrast, Israel’s intelligence on Hezbollah was comprehensive, apparently accurate, and the military acted on it to preempt a Hezbollah assault. First, Israel pulled off an intelligence operation for the record books when over 3,000 pagers exploded simultaneously in the hands of Hezbollah fighters. At one stroke Israel removed thousands of fighters from effective duty and severed a critical part of Hezbollah’s communications network. The next day, in a second wave, walkie talkies exploded. An operation like that would require months or likely years of delicate intelligence work and deft covert operations.
Then, over 10 days, Israel struck more than 1,600 Hezbollah facilities and weapons sites and killed four more Hezbollah leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah. A ground offensive followed soon after, along with strikes on more military capabilities and Hezbollah’s banking structure. In six weeks, Hezbollah lost the bulk of its leadership structure, its financial infrastructure, and its military defenses in the south.
IDF leaders told me that their intelligence was good—extremely good—labeling facilities down to the meter in many cases. The information they collected showed both capability and intent to carry out a similar invasion plan to Hamas, using the Radwan forces and sophisticated tunnel infrastructure along the border. The IDF believed the intel, and they created extensive plans to preempt or, worst case, defend.
Bias, Surprise, and Recovering from Strategic Failure
The difference in the intelligence pictures and corresponding action is stark. In the south, Israel knew Hamas had the intent and the plan, but did not believe in their capability to execute. In the north, Israel believed Hizballah was planning and capable. The core reason for the discrepancy is a pair of cognitive fallacies: anchor bias and confirmation bias.
We “anchor” our beliefs to early, perhaps irrelevant information. Then, we are more likely to believe new information that fits with our existing belief than information that challenges them. Humans take these mental shortcuts because it helps us deal with a complex world. We can’t constantly revisit our belief systems, particularly not when a predator stands feet away and we must pick fight or flight. But in a modern context, we ignore important, new information to stay in our mental comfort zones. We do not want to believe we have been wrong, or that things have dramatically changed for the worse. Recognizing this kind of bias and correcting for it is a core skill of an intelligence service, which must see around corners to potential impending disaster.
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Nothing in national security is simple, and there are other reasons for the vast difference in the north and south. For example, Hezbollah may have been a slightly easier military target because they used fixed positions, military-style organization, and kept more infrastructure above ground. One senior Israeli military official told me that “Hizballah acts like a real military, thankfully.” Hamas, on the other hand, drew Israel into a three-dimensional war, spanning urban streets, high rises, and subterranean mazes, all surrounded by millions of human shields who could not escape Gaza’s confines.
Further, Israel had been contemplating a preemptive strike on Hezbollah, but October 7 forced both their hands. Had Hezbollah attacked at the same time as Hamas, Israel was likely to have seen the prep and taken it seriously, given their focus on defending the northern border.
The Israeli intelligence services have a gut-wrenching process ahead: they must view themselves with brutal honesty and reevaluate their operational culture. They must find a way to welcome naysayers and take structured analytic techniques more seriously. Going through the motions is not enough: leaders at every level must be humble about their own biases and open to new information coming from undervalued personnel, like the young woman in Unit 8200.
Further, when that new information comes in, they must check their confirmation bias and carefully evaluate whether this new detail changes the picture. One of the best techniques to accomplish this is to ask, “I would change my mind if I saw…” and walk through the indications and warnings that could indicate disaster. Another is a “What If” exercise, where you assume the worst and tell the story of how we got there. This can highlight the points along the path that already are lit and blinking red.
These lessons are vital for intelligence professionals but important for business leaders, too. Anyone operating with uncertainty in a complex environment should take heed: Assumptions define success. A blind spot created is not easily erased. A deep and abiding confidence that you know your enemy and are fully aware of your operating environment is a recipe for dangerous complacency. The fresh eyes of a junior partner or a senior leader willing to be proven wrong can do what that young woman in Unit 8200 tried to do: warn that things have changed, and the time is now to react. One warning taken seriously can avert disaster.
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