Despite years of forecasts predicting implosion, partition, revolution, Iranian absorption and other apocalyptic scenarios, there were generally more good events in 2018 than bad in Iraq, still Iraq's challenges in 2019 are significant.
The good events were only “mostly” good. A new government formed (mostly). ISIS was defeated (mostly). Security improved countrywide (mostly). The economy grew (mostly), and even the iconic International Zone opened to citizens (mostly). With good reason, leaders are wary of taking this (mostly) calm climate for granted, as backsliding is possible and secondary challenges could rise to perilous levels.
None of those secondary challenges are new to long-term Iraq watchers. The familiar list of continued worries includes the ongoing cancer of corruption, an increasingly sclerotic government bureaucracy, a growing wealth gap between a burgeoning economy in Baghdad and a stagnant standard of living elsewhere, deterioration of both the infrastructure for, and delivery of, essential services around the country, and an increasing anger at what is perceived to be an uncaring central government. Oil output and prices, the motive force behind government revenue, remain volatile. Spillover of regional and international disputes, particularly between the U.S. and Iran, may be unhelpful (or worse). Any of these issues could metastasize into far greater problems for the al Mahdi government.
Add to this list the consequences of the anti-ISIS campaign. Billions are required to rebuild the infrastructure that existed before ISIS destroyed it, resettle the displaced, and heal the victims. Tough choices on the future of the victorious armed militias, outside the control of the government, but inside the political sphere, cannot be avoided. The inter-sectarian compromises necessary to unify the country against ISIS may backslide as reconciliation is no further along than pre-ISIS. Decisions on the future of foreign forces in Iraq, while not immediate, will eventually come to the forefront.
Recent discussions with five high-level Iraqi and U.S. leaders in Iraq provide interesting and varied priorities. Here is a look at what they each believe the most important issues will be in 2019.
Senior Iraqi Diplomat: The government’s ability to provide essential services.
The Basra riots this year came as a shock to Baghdad. Years of deteriorating infrastructure, corruption, mismanagement by local and national authorities and a cognitive dissonance between a historically wealthy province and its current condition should not have been a surprise to anyone. Nor is this unique to Basra. While Baghdad shines and sunlight reflects off the windows of new construction projects, outside of the capital, potholes still cover the roads, electricity (aside from generators) remains unpredictable, and cities around the country are unable to guarantee steady employment, clean water, medical care and other essential services. If significant provincial and national resources are not earmarked for infrastructure programs around the country, the Basra riots may be a harbinger of multi-province instability.
Senior US Military Commander: Defeating ISIS.
There was a bit of black humor during the countrywide “Victory over ISIS” celebrations on 8 December coinciding with reports of stepped-up ISIS counterattacks on the Iraq-Syria border and in Diyala province and ISIS’ regaining of ground previously taken by anti-ISIS forces. Iraq still faces a viable and active threat from ISIS with a consensus that continued pressure will be necessary in 2019. Estimates of remaining ISIS forces number in the tens of thousands, little changed from the ISIS vanguard which crossed the Iraqi-Syrian border in 2014. While the will to fight remains strong within the Iraqi political and security establishment, there is concern over conflicting signals emanating from Washington.
Senior Iraqi cleric and a Senior Iraqi government official: Self-Reliance.
While the cleric and the government official are two different people from different sects and dissimilar backgrounds, they both felt that in 2019 the state need to focus inward. They both see the Iraqi state as having weak institutions, unable to deliver capable governance, and overly reliant on outside actors. In their view, the only solution is for Iraq to become a strong, stable and sovereign nation, able to stand on its own and direct its own destiny without outside powers setting the agenda. They acknowledge this has been the consistent post-2003 U.S. policy and the irony is not lost on them. They acknowledge this is a multi-year program, but without beginning a program post-ISIS, Iraq will stay weak, remain dependent and do little more than muddle through. In the minds of the senior cleric and the government official, Iraq must be strong enough to acknowledge foreign influence, to accept foreign assistance, but to reject foreign interference.
Senior U.S. government official: Iran, Iran and Iran
The contradiction between an Iraqi desire for self-reliance and a U.S. priority to subsume Iraq into an element of U.S.-Iran policy is noteworthy. Many in Washington openly disparage Baghdad as a vassal of Tehran, while Administration policy publicly espouses “pushing back on Iran”. If a “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran is the policy, Iraq is ideally located to apply that pressure. On Iran, Iraq maintains a bipolar relationship, dependent upon it for natural gas, welcoming hundreds of thousands of religious tourists annually, and beholden to Iranian-trained and equipped militias that have been essential to the anti-ISIS campaign. Yet, a significant majority of Iraqis view Iran warily. Few believe that Iran’s intentions in Iraq are benevolent, and foreign interference was a key issue between Shia political parties in recent elections. Muqtada al Sadr and his party won the most seats in parliament, in part because his message of foreign interference resonated with voters. If the United States intends to use Iraq as a major component in its anti-Iran efforts, great care should be taken to craft a nimble plan that minimizes significant blowback in Iraq.
This tension between external assistance and external interference, while important, will probably rank below internal concerns over bad governance, corruption, and faltering public services. Revenues will be stretched among a bloated government bureaucracy, a need to placate governance failures throughout the country and demands to hasten rebuilding and resettlement in post-conflict zones. International assistance will be critical, but insufficient, as more serious conflict needs exist in Yemen, Syria and a host of other crises in the region and worldwide.
Iraq ends 2018 with mixed grades. Challenges are manifest and there are no guarantees that 2019 will be as (generally) placid as 2018. The only assured outcome will be the degradation of ISIS to just another feral terrorist group. All the other challenges remain partially or fully unresolved. If there is progress made on other key concerns – improving essential services, strengthening the state, rebuilding Mosul, improving wealth distribution, increasing confidence in governance and no backsliding in the areas that are doing well – Iraq may have another year. Given more than a decade of bad report cards, if 2019 – like 2018 – is “mostly” good, it will earn a passing grade.
Read more from Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt (Ret.), here...
