U.S. policymakers seeking an end to North Korea’s nuclear program often point to Beijing’s leverage over Pyongyang as the key to securing a binding disarmament agreement and peace on the Korean peninsula. However, China’s key interests are maintaining stability along its shared border with North Korea and limiting U.S. military influence in the region. Despite steadily worsening relations between Beijing and Pyongyang, China has been reluctant to use its vast economic leverage to compel North Korea to return to negotiations. The Cipher Brief’s Will Edwards spoke to Yun Sun, senior associate at the Stimson Center’s East Asia Program, about China’s complex relationship with North Korea, changes since President Donald Trump took office, and possibilities for future nonproliferation negotiations.
The Cipher Brief: China and North Korea have been allies for decades, and the relationship has seen its ups and downs. From an outside perspective, it would appear that relations have grown strained recently. How does the current state of the relationship compare to years past, and are there any new dynamics we haven’t seen previously?
Yun Sun: I think there are some new things, especially since the beginning of the Trump Administration. In one sense, we see that North Korea’s provocations have endangered China’s national security. That’s not new, but what is new is the Trump Administration’s reaction to the North Korean provocations. [That] raises the question, whether a military conflict would be imminent, given the nature of the North Korean provocations and the Trump Administration’s intolerance of such provocations. I think China’s cost-benefit analysis on North Korea is always nuanced, but because of the new situation between North Korea [and China], China’s cost-benefit analysis has changed. It has not fundamentally shifted — meaning that I don’t think China has drawn the conclusion that it needs to abandon North Korea to fully cooperate with the United States, but I think it does translate into a needed policy or a perception in China that it needs to put more pressure on North Korea in order to force North Korea back to the negotiating table.
Another issue that has changed since the beginning of this year is the dynamic between the U.S. and China. The Chinese have felt that they need to somehow show the Trump Administration that they’re willing to work with the U.S. So, for the health of U.S.-China relations, North Korea is one issue where China sees itself as having to make some concessions to show sincerity and good will on its part to work with Trump.
TCB: China is changing its calculus on North Korea. Is this something we’ve really only seen since the Trump Administration began, or was that happening before Trump became President?
Sun: I would say that the most dramatic moves on China’s part have happened since the inauguration of the Trump Administration. First, China has ceased coal imports from North Korea. Second, in the past, China issued strongly-worded criticisms of North Korea, but this time it was so strong that the North Korean government media came out pointing their finger at China directly for the so-called betrayal that Pyongyang seesaaa. Previously, they had only referred to China as “some major power.”
I think China’s efforts to pressure North Korea have increased. People have raised [the question] whether what China has done has really changed North Korean behavior. So that implies that China has not done enough. I think that’s a question that’s subject to debate. Is China doing more than before? Yes, but is it doing everything the United States wants to really push the North Korean government toward the edge of collapse or implosion? I don’t think China has, and I don’t think China will, because that is not in China’s interests.
TCB: Is China taking concrete steps to really enforce sanctions? For example, in the past China has not strictly enforced UN sanctions at times or has not insisted that Chinese firms abide by sanctions on North Korea.
Sun: It depends on which sanction items we are looking at. With coal imports, we know that there have been no coal imports in March, April, and May. I think China is implementing sanctions [on coal], but on the other hand trade between China and North Korea—at least in the first quarter—has increased rather than decreased. China has increased imports of North Korean iron ore and North Korean seafood. Although the UN sanction resolution does not prohibit trade with North Korea, Article 32 of UN Sanction Resolution 2321 has a clause that specifically says that all member states shall not provide financial support for trade with North Korea.
TCB: China has stopped coal imports from North Korea. China is less and less dependent on coal in general for its power needs. Is the relationship between China and North Korea becoming more one-sided? Is China moving to a position where it doesn’t need economic ties to North Korea, but North Korea continues to rely on its ties with China?
Sun: The dependence between North Korea and China—at least in terms of economics—is not mutual. North Korea has a lot of trading partners, but China has been the largest, for sure. China also provides humanitarian aid, especially food and energy aid, to North Korea. Those [forms of aid] are regarded as the life support of the North Korean government. On the other hand, I think China’s strategy is that, since we’re providing so much stuff to North Korea anyway, we would like to get as much as possible in return. That explains the investment in mining businesses and the opening of special economic zones in North Korea. China wants to use these economic channels to send signals to the North Korean government that economic reform does not have to jeopardize its regime’s legitimacy. There are multiple layers of motives on China’s part, but to put it in simple terms, North Korea needs China economically, but China does not necessarily need North Korea economically.
TCB: I wanted to turn to Pyongyang’s perspective for a moment with a question that is a little hypothetical. It seems that the Kim Jong-un regime, and previous regimes as well, know that there is a line they cannot cross in terms of irritating China too much. At this point, what are some actions that North Korea could take that would cross that line and alter that relationship? Are there any actions North Korea avoids because it knows those actions would really upset China?
Sun: The answer is no, because if you look at the past record, North Korea has already conducted five nuclear tests, despite strong warnings from China. The North Koreans missile tests have not been stopped by Chinese opposition. I don’t think there is a line that China draws that says, “at this point in your development, we’re going to sever this relationship.” That’s not what it takes, but the variation from that stream of thought is that if North Korea makes a preemptive strike against South Korea, or Japan, or tries to target the U.S. base in Guam, or targets Alaska —which North Korea probably has the capability to do — then that is going to raise the question of whether China still wants to maintain relations with North Korea when North Korea is clearly completely responsible for military conflict with the United States. And that is a variation, but that’s not going to change China’s policy probably; it is going to change China’s perception of Pyongyang.
We know that North Korea has had dialogues with the Americans. China has this exclusion anxiety. China is afraid that if North Korea and the U.S. somehow reached a secret deal and China is not included in it, then all the strategic interests China is striving to keep and to protect will evaporate. I think that’s also a scenario that would change China’s calculations significantly.
TCB: Looking forward to the remainder of 2017 or the next couple years, where do you see the relationship among China, North Korea, and the U.S. going?
Sun: I think in the future, unless something significantly changes inside North Korea or between North Korea and the United States, China is going to keep its policy the same. China’s policy now is to facilitate dialogue. [Chinese leaders] call it dual-track or double-suspension, for the U.S. and South Korea to suspend their military exercises and for North Korea to suspend its missile development, nuclear tests, and missile tests. I actually think that we are at a place where the positions of the U.S., China, North Korea, and South Korea are getting closer to negotiations towards double-suspension. If North Korea is capable and eventually reaches such a deal with the international community, with the U.S., South Korea, and China, then that will open up a lot of possibilities. That probably means that international aid to North Korea will resume and the U.S. can negotiate a peace mechanism with North Korea, and the strategic pressure of China will be significantly reduced. That means that China will have less constraints in terms of its relationship with North Korea,
On the other hand, if North Korea decides to launch an ICBM and tensions are driven up again, then China will have to agree to another round of tougher UN resolutions, and that is going to limit the scope of what China can do with North Korea economically.
