The publication on February 25 of the 2016 Defense White Paper by the Australian government highlights Canberra’s response to evolving trends in the Asia-Pacific region. The white paper, released by the government of Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull after a long gestation, outlines an ambitious modernization program for the Australian Defense Force. It includes the acquisition of 12 diesel attack submarines; nine new anti-submarine warfare frigates; 12 new offshore patrol vessels; seven additional P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft; MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial vehicles; modernized mine countermeasures capabilities; a new deployable land-based anti-ship missile capability; 72 F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters; 12 E/A-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft and a new electronic warfare support aircraft; upgrades to the Australian Army’s mechanized and amphibious capabilities; as well as investments in space and cyber capabilities. To pay for these capabilities, Australia will increase its defense spending to two percent of GDP by the end of the decade.
The 2016 White Paper is but the most recent signpost in the evolution of a security policy that has evolved in response to Australia’s geography, geostrategic orientation, regional setting, and alliances.
First, Australia’s security policy has been shaped crucially by its geography. Australia has continental geographic scope and depth and is rich in natural resources, but it has a population of only 23 million that is concentrated mainly in cities on its southern and western coasts. Its remoteness has traditionally lent a sense of security but also requires a significant force projection capability, even if only for self-defense.
Second, Australia’s strategic geography has shaped its geostrategic outlook. Although girded by the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and possessing a capable navy for part of its history, Australia’s outlook has historically been continental rather than maritime. Indeed, as the Australian strategic thinker Michael Evans has argued, Australia has historically lacked a maritime consciousness to guide defense policy.
Third, Australian defense planning has over time oscillated between the need to defend Australian territory and its approaches, and the reality that Australian forces have historically fought far from Australia’s shores. On the one hand, it makes perfect sense that Australia should care more about its immediate neighborhood than developments farther afield. On the other hand, Australian troops have seen action not only in Australia’s neighborhood, but also Europe and the Middle East in World War I, North Africa in World War II, in Northeast Asia during the Korean War, in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.
Fourth, Australian defense planning has depended crucially upon a great power ally. From the founding of Australia to the fall of Singapore, that ally was Great Britain; since then the United States has filled that role.
Current trends have thrown these considerations into sharp relief. First, the growth and spread of precision strike, cyber, and space capabilities in general, and China’s development of force projection capabilities in particular, have reduced Australia’s ability to isolate itself from threats. Second, the growth of air and maritime threats in Australia’s neighborhood has increased the need for Australia to invest in naval capabilities, which amounts to roughly one-quarter of the funding called for in the 2016 defense white paper. Third, Australia in the future will need not only the ability to defend itself, but also to project power in an increasingly contested environment.
Fourth and finally, the growth of Chinese power in the face of American retrenchment has led some Australian thinkers to question the enduring value of the U.S.-Australia alliance. These views represent a distinct minority, to be sure, and polling by such respected institutions as the Lowy Institute show consistently strong support for the alliance. Indeed, other Australian strategists have called for a strengthening of ties between Washington and Canberra. In addition, Australia has in recent years deepened its relationships with other regional powers, in particular Japan and India. It has also improved its links with Indonesia. Such efforts are only likely to increase in the face of the shifting military balance in the region.
