BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT – Over the last few weeks, hardly a day has gone by without a fresh pledge from a European nation to boost its military spending. And nearly every day, a question is raised in a European capital that would have seemed unimaginable not long ago: When it comes to its defense and security, can Europe go it alone?
Ever since the early post-World War II years, Europe has relied on the United States as the bulwark of its security, and the U.S. and its European allies have been knitted together via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and an increasingly strong and intertwined economic and trade relationship. Now, in the course of just two months, many of the core assumptions undergirding those relationships have been called into question. The Trump administration has pivoted sharply towards Moscow and issued derogatory statements about NATO and various European nations. Leaders of those nations are no longer sure of an American commitment that had been ironclad for eight decades. It is in the wake of these sudden changes that several European nations – and NATO and the European Union as a whole – have moved to sharply boost spending on their militaries and defense systems.
THE CONTEXT
- The European Commission is proposing to borrow up to 150 billion euros to lend to EU governments for rearmament efforts. The Commission has also proposed exempting defense spending from annual spending limits on EU governments. The exemption would allow 1.5% of GDP of extra spending every year. If used to its full extent, this could generate 257 billion euros per year in extra EU defense spending. Divisions remain over debt burdens and what is defined as defense investment.
- Germany’s parliament approved a law that exempts defense and security spending from the country’s debt brake, which had limited new borrowing to 0.35% of GDP. This easing removes the constitutional ceiling on defense spending and applies to all defense spending over 1% of GDP. Germany has also approved 1 trillion euros in new defense and infrastructure spending.
- Britain is spending an additional 2.2 billion pounds ($2.8 billion) on defense in the next fiscal year. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has said British military spending will increase to 2.5% of GDP by 2027 and eventually target 3%.
- French President Emmanuel Macron has called on Europe to increase annual defense spending to 3-3.5% of GDP. France currently spends 2.1% of GDP on defense. France is dealing with one of the largest budget deficits in the EU, which complicates Macron’s defense push.
- Poland, now NATO’s top defense spender, plans to double its army to 500,000 and train 100,000 civilians by 2026 in short-term courses. Polish President Andrzej Duda has also proposed enshrining defense spending of at least 4% of GDP in the constitution.
- Sweden pledged an increase in defense spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2030. Swedish defense spending is projected to reach 2.4% of GDP this year and 2.6% in 2028, but Swedish officials say the country needs a faster defense boost amid concerns about the U.S.
THE EXPERTS
The Cipher Brief spoke with experts from four countries – Toomas Ilves, former president of Estonia; Lieutenant General Ben Hodges (Ret.), a former Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe; Liana Fix, Fellow for Europe and a Germany expert at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Nick Fishwick, a former senior member of the British Foreign Office. In each interview, Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski asked for assessments of the changes and answers to that core question: Can Europe go it alone?
Their comments have been edited for length and clarity.
Fishwick: Would I have expected Europe to be asking itself questions about going it alone, ever in my lifetime? Certainly I wouldn’t have expected that, but what we did expect of the Trump presidency was the unexpected. We know he’s unpredictable. That is not easy for allies. However, we’ve got to remember that the United States, whether it’s run by Trump or anybody else, has had a very strong point for many years, which is that European countries have had the luxury of contracting out their security to the United States and enjoying post-Cold War savings dividends.
Defense spending and the size of military forces across Europe have reduced significantly over many years. I was looking at the amount of GDP that the UK devoted to defense in the year that I was born, and it was something like 8.5%; it’s now going up to 2.5%. That gives you some sense of the change over the last 60-plus years.
So I don’t blame the American government, whether it’s Trump or anybody else, having said for quite a long time, you guys have got to step up. But I am glad that European countries have caught that ball that’s been chucked to them. They are committing themselves to stepping up the amount of payment. That’s a good sign, and it’s important.
The bit that I’m not so comfortable about is statements about Europe going “independent.” I don’t want that to happen – ever. I’m not sure it is necessarily going to happen. Let’s remember that we are still completely dependent on lots of forms of military cooperation and assistance from the United States. So to talk too blithely about independence is good in getting in the right mindset, but I don’t want people to start assuming that we’ve given up on the relationship with the U.S. For me, that’s pretty much close to a worst-case scenario.
Militarily, we’ve got tens of thousands of American troops in Europe. I would say: please don’t go. The longer those guys stay, the less likely our enemy, Russia, is to play games with the borders of European countries.
There are very close relationships between U.S. senior military people and Europeans in NATO, and it would be a tragedy to lose that. There’s also the Five Eyes intelligence relationship. We know that the Americans are huge providers of intelligence used by the other Five Eyes countries, including the UK. We really don’t want to lose that. So it’s intelligence as well as military support. And despite all this nonsense about Canada as the 51st state, which frankly I find bizarre and offensive, I assume that the Five Eyes will survive, possibly in a slightly different form, if the U.S. is producing less intelligence on Russia. Perhaps it’ll have less to share, but we’re still going to need it because I think America is still going to produce high-grade intelligence on Russia and we need access to that.
On the other hand, in terms of going it alone, we’ve got to remember: the Russian economy is nothing compared to the European economy. Russia’s got a very small GDP compared to ours. And they spend about 10% of their budget on military matters. Without having to spend anything like what Russia spends on its defense, if we can’t increase what we spend and also use our superior technology for military purposes to keep us safe, then we don’t deserve freedom.
If I was in government now, I’d be planning for the worst, but assuming, if not the best, then something pretty reasonable — that the intelligence relationship will continue, that military cooperation will continue, that there’ll be loads of people in the American administration, the intelligence community and Congress who will continue to share the values that we and our European colleagues share, and not want to go rushing off into an abrupt volte-face where suddenly President Putin is our best friend and we don’t like the new Prime Minister of Canada. I’m just assuming that’s not going to be happening, despite the rhetoric that comes out of the White House.
But I think it’s right to prepare for activities, statements, policies from the United States that are going to be unwelcome. I don’t think that we will have to give up on the relationship, but it’s unpredictable and we’ve got to be prepared for bad things to happen.
Lt. Gen. Hodges: I'm actually optimistic that European nations will eventually coalesce around some ideas that will increase defense production, increase their levels of readiness, and perhaps even – which will be very powerful – come together to create a ceasefire implementation force, if the discussions about Ukraine actually do get to the point where everybody agrees to a real, full-up ceasefire. Europe can provide that sort of an implementation force.
If you add together the economies of just the European Union, the UK and Canada and Norway, these economies dwarf Russia's economy. If you combine the armies, navies and air forces of these countries, they're equal to or better than anything that the Russians could put out there. Obviously, in terms of nuclear warheads the Russians have thousands more, but you don't need to match warhead for warhead to have a deterrent. And I think the French could conceivably be that nuclear deterrent if that were necessary as well.
I don't believe the U.S. at the end of the day is actually going to just pull away, because we would be screwing ourselves. It's in our economic interests that Europe is stable and secure, because American prosperity is tied to Europe's prosperity. Our biggest trading partner is Europe. So it's in our interests that Europe is stable and secure. There are hundreds of thousands of Americans that live and work over here. You've got thousands of U.S. businesses over here.
So it seems to me very unlikely that the president would just say, Bad luck for all you guys, we're leaving. I do think he is using things like this to exert pressure on European countries to do more, because we really do – as several presidents have said – need Europe to have a much larger role in the defense of Europe, because of what [the U.S.] has to do in the Indo-Pacific region. I think that's the strategic direction.
The holes in Europe will be, at least initially, American air power, which is best in the world. A lot of that would be needed in the Indo-Pacific region, so I don't know how much air power would stay behind. The nuclear deterrent that the U.S. has always provided, I don't see a reason that would have to leave. And the intelligence contribution that the U.S. makes to collective intelligence collection and analysis in Europe, that's pretty significant. We depend so much on our allies and partners, and not just the Five Eyes; we have very good bilateral intelligence-sharing relationships with most countries in Europe. That's something that would have to be compensated if the U.S. were to pull out.
European leaders need to have the political will to do what needs to be done, and I see increasing evidence that they do. This is not a straight-line smooth thing for sure, but there is increasing evidence. The German Bundestag finally passed legislation that allows hundreds of billions of euros in spending. That is historic, and it sends a signal to everybody else.
There is no doubt that Europe is trying to grow its own defense industry. And there is real concern that if they have a total reliance on the United States, and if the [Trump] administration doesn't like a country anymore, that could be disrupted. The F-35 [fighter jet], for example, that's the one I hear about the most. Some countries are reconsidering that. I think that would be a huge mistake for them. I also think that if countries are concerned that they would be somehow left out of updates for U.S. weapons, then they will start looking for other options. So this is where U.S. policy could have a long-term damaging effect on the U.S. defense industry.
This is what presidents going way back have been clamoring for the Europeans to do. It's not just about spending 2%; it's about building up your own capability so that you don't have to have as much U.S. air force, army or whatever in Europe. So I think this is appropriate, that they would be thinking about how to grow the size of their land forces, their naval capability. And they have to look at how you recruit enough young women and men to serve. These are choices that all the nations [in Europe] are having to make.
President Ilves: Basically you have an 80-year tradition since 1945 saying that this is the world that we live in – and if [the U.S.] is pulling the rug out from under it, I think we should all be disoriented at this point. Where are we going? That’s certainly what has led to this dramatic acceleration of European defense spending, by Germany and at the level of the EU. It’s more than a sea change. We’re living in a different world today, when it comes to security at least.
Personally, I have always been a transatlanticist. That’s the label that has been put on me for the past 35 years – that he’s one of those pro-Americans. I’ve had a Damascene conversion given the events here, and there is no solution to our security in Europe without a complete change in our approach to it.
You can see this in the decisions by countries like Portugal and Denmark to reevaluate purchasing U.S. weapons. In other words, what we’re seeing is more than just the anti-European rhetoric that we were so shocked by at the Munich Security Conference from Vice President [JD] Vance. We see a complete reevaluation. People like myself who were saying, Well, it’s rhetoric, are now saying, Well, it’s real. And so that is changing at a really fast clip.
The real problem is how fast can we in Europe get ourselves back up to speed. I think the damage done even to the U.S. defense industry will be enormous, because the amount of distrust now is huge.
Speaking for Estonia, our government decided to boost our defense expenditure for next year to 5% of GDP. Right now we’re at 3.6%, which is way above the EU average. We were actually one of the very few countries that had already hit 2%, 13 years ago. And Latvia and Lithuania have also been spending a lot of money [on defense]. And you have to put Poland in there as well, which is probably the biggest spender right now. Poland has bought or will acquire some 800 main battle tanks, which is a larger number than all of the rest of Europe. That shows how serious people are.
The public is willing to put up with the spending. So far, we haven’t had any great rumbles based on decreasing social expenditure, which is a necessary thing to do. And of course in our neighborhood, we also have Finland and Sweden and Denmark, which are all increasing their defense expenditure as well as their attention to all kinds of issues such as the hybrid or so-called gray-zone warfare attacks that we’ve seen in the Baltic Sea — cutting undersea cables, and we’ve had arson that has been directly tied to the Russians.
Overall, I’d say that there is a high awareness, some anxiety, but also a willingness and a rational response that we just have to do more.
The problem is gearing up. As a result of the so-called peace dividend of 1989-91, and a lack of defense spending since the end of the Cold War, the defense industry [in Europe] has languished. When any of these countries bought anything, the go-to country was the United States. So to get the defense industry here up to speed, to be able to produce munitions or other material and kit, is going to take time. It’s not something that you just do overnight. I guess it’s something equivalent to what the United States did from 1941 to 1945, which was just a complete change.
The money is there now. The Chancellor-elect of Germany has basically changed the constitution in order to bypass the restrictions on spending, to go over their limit. The EU is passing a law that would commit €150 billion for EU defense spending, with the assumption that the rest of the countries would kick in their part, which would amount to €800 billion. So this is such a big change for Europe.
Fix: Big decisions have already been announced [in Germany], even before the coalition government has been agreed upon, to put Germany back on the map of European and transatlantic security. The potential coalition partners agreed, for example, that Germany will loosen its famous “debt break” – which means Germany has basically unlimited defense spending in the future. There's no ceiling. It’s a historic change for German defense.
The shock of the U.S. elections, and the statements by Donald Trump [led] to a situation where Germany, which has always positioned its foreign policy after 1945 in alliance with the United States and the West, now suddenly thinks, Well, we don't even know if the West still exists. So perhaps this is the time to invest in defense spending beyond 2 percent and to assume a big role in European security.
[For Europe as a whole,] this is a long-term project, and I think that's the honest answer that European politicians also have to give to their citizens. It will take at least five to ten years of massive defense spending, massive buying, and investment in the European defense industrial base until Europeans are able to fill the vacuum left by the United States.
That honest answer would be: We will live in a period of reduced security in Europe, in the event Donald Trump withdraws from NATO or continues to be perceived as an unreliable actor by the Europeans. And at the same time, the Russia threat continues. So this is not a happy message; it's a tough message to communicate to your people – that we are investing, we're trying to do this, but there is a real risk that it takes too long and that a crisis might take place in between those within those five to 10 years.
There are a couple of gaps that will be hard for Europe to fill. We've seen that, for example, during the Libya campaign in 2011, when Europeans really relied on the United States. Strategic enablers that the United States provided to keep everyone going logistically in the battlefield, to provide fuel, to refuel while flying and so on. And the other huge vacuum is in air defense, especially Patriot [missile batteries] from the United States. Air defense is in very high demand now in Europe. We have other countries that are producing air defense systems — Norway for example — but many of the Patriots and especially the missiles have also been given to Ukraine right now. So that's going to be a huge gap that Europeans will need to fill.
I think what really keeps Europeans on their toes is the continuous sequence of shocks that they receive from the U.S. From the Munich Security Conference and the speech of the vice president making an ideological claim about Europe, to the Zelensky-Trump meeting in the White House, and now to the new tariffs that have been announced. That is really something which makes it difficult for Europeans to lean back, and think perhaps it's not as bad as we thought.
On the one hand, it's obviously overwhelming, this continuous series of shocks for Europeans. But on the other hand, it's also good because it keeps the pressure going. It's difficult for Europeans to come together — this is not a nation state — to agree on security and defense, but a continuous shock from the U.S. does help to keep up the urgency. Of course, I wish that the relationship would be in a better shape, but at least we'll hopefully see some positive outcomes of that for Europe.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief
