Relations between Turkey and Europe have been tense for decades. Turkey first applied to the European Economic Community – the European Union’s precursor – in 1987. Turkey has been an associate member since 1963, but the EU still has not offered it full membership, despite the country’s membership in NATO and its role as a vital pillar to European security.
“The funny thing about the European-Turkish relationship,” says Michael Rubin, a former Pentagon official who focused on Turkey and the Middle East, “is that both sides have been faking it for some time.” Rubin, now a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, adds that “the dream among liberal Turks and Europeans about tying the two together has been on life support for more than a decade, poisoned largely by [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan’s behavior.”
In recent weeks, that behavior vis-à-vis Europe has taken a turn toward the extreme. The Turkish president has called the Netherlands “the capital of fascism” and has accused Germany of “fascist actions” reminiscent of the Nazi period. Those accusations came after Germans blocked political rallies in their country aimed at building support for Erdogan’s platform in Turkey’s upcoming constitutional referendum. This referendum – scheduled for April 16 – could bestow on Erdogan substantial new executive powers, which the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission has said would replace Turkey’s democratic system with an authoritarian one that lacks checks and balances.
Thus, Europe is wary of the referendum and of Erdogan’s tightening grip on power. The Europeans are also increasingly angry with Erdogan’s rhetoric, especially comparisons to Nazi Germany. “Those who compare us to Nazis are not welcome. That is not acceptable,” said Reiner Haseloff, a member of German Prime Minister Angela Merkel’s CDU party and the Minister President of Saxony-Anhalt state.
These latest strains on the Turkey-Europe relationship echo a long history of tension over the issue of Turkish accession to the EU. According to W. Robert Pearson, the former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey (2000-03), Turkey has historically resisted European requests to meet the governance requirements for EU accession. Instead, says Pearson, “Turkey demands entry on its own terms by portraying its quasi-Islamic political theory, based on Muslim Brotherhood governance principles, as a genuine example of democracy.”
Kati Piri, the European Parliament rapporteur on Turkey, sees little progress on this front. “Unfortunately,” Piri said on Monday, “my [recent] visit [to Turkey] did not give me reasons to reconsider the Parliament’s position on freezing [Turkish] accession talks,” which a majority of the Parliament voted for last November in a non-binding resolution.
The EU’s migrant deal with Turkey, which has significantly slowed the flow of migrants and refugees into Europe, has helped hold back some of these criticisms. However, Turkish government officials now suggest they may scrap the deal. Most recently, Turkey’s Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu threatened to “blow the mind” of the EU by ending the migrant agreement and allowing some 15,000 Syrian refugees into the EU per month. With this great bargaining chip possibly off the table, EU leaders and citizens have become even less receptive to Turkish posturing, much less the question of Turkish accession to the EU.
However, from Turkey’s perspective, European resistance to Turkish membership and new rhetoric against President Erdogan is often interpreted as yet another insult to the country’s place on the continent, if not open racism against a majority-Muslim state. The rise of populist far right nationalist parties across Europe has not helped assuage these fears.
Reacting to a growing wave of migrants and conflict refugees from the Middle East and Africa, nationalist European political parties have tapped into and fueled popular anti-Muslim and anti-migrant sentiments. From Geert Wilders in the Netherlands to Marine Le Pen in France, the firebrand leaders of such parties have risen to sudden prominence across the continent. In Dutch elections earlier this month, Wilders did not manage to unseat the moderate prime minister, but he did gain new seats in parliament. Populists still threaten major upsets at elections in France and Germany this year.
In this context, many Turks see recent Dutch and German decisions to cancel the political rallies of Erdogan surrogates – designed to win referendum votes from large Turkish expat communities in EU countries – as a bigoted attack on Turkish national pride. European news organizations like the German newspaper Bild – which proclaimed to Erdogan, “You are not a democrat! You are hurting our country! You are not welcome here!” – do not help.
At the same time, stoking this kind of tension with Europe provides Erdogan with clear domestic political benefits. According to Pearson, “Turkey’s referendum campaign has revealed the government’s nervousness.” In a tight race to shift revolutionary new powers to the presidency, Erdogan is pulling out all the stops in his campaign, branding any who oppose a “yes” vote as terrorists and deploying oppressive tactics against his opposition. Erdogan’s political strategy in Europe, says Pearson, “ is to sharpen divisions and consolidate his base with nationalistic and religious messages.”
Will Erdogan’s rhetoric ease off once the referendum is over? Probably not. If he wins, he will need to make difficult – and unlikely – concessions to repair the dismal state of Turkish-EU relations. The migrant deal does give Ankara significant leverage over the EU, but that agreement may now be void. Even if the deal survives, there is growing opposition in the EU against giving in to Turkish behavior in exchange for migration control. On the other hand, if Erdogan loses, the result could be even more dire. The Turkish president has put everything on the line for this vote, and he is unlikely to take defeat lying down. Europe – the current enemy of choice – could present an easy target for further domestic political posturing.
In either event, the future of Turkish relations with the EU, as well as NATO, is now critically tied to the Turkish referendum. Erdogan’s “one goal now,” says Pearson, “is victory on April 16. The long-term harm he may cause to Turkey’s future seems far down his list of priorities.”
Kaitlin Lavinder (@KaitLavinder) is a reporter at The Cipher Brief, and Fritz Lodge (@FritzLodge) is an international producer.
