Nearly one year since Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to ISIS, its threat to Nigeria has changed, though still remains. “Clearly, the snake has been injured and weakened, but not killed or defanged,” Ona Ekhomu, President of the Association of Industrial Security and Safety Operators of Nigeria (AISSON), told The Cipher Brief about the insurgent group. As a renowned security expert, Ekhomu outlined his recommendations for how private industry and government can address the Boko Haram threat, advising that defeating Boko Haram will come from a brilliant strategy, not brute force.
The Cipher Brief: How does the Boko Haram threat affect private industry in Nigeria? What is the role of private security firms in protecting against this threat?
Ona Ekhomu: The Boko Haram (BH) threat has had a negative effect on the private security industry, as it has had on everything else in Nigeria—particularly in the northeast region. The terrorist attacks have claimed a large number of lives of security workers, closed down businesses in which industry members worked, and private security personnel have been negatively affected by the economic hardships, which BH attacks have created in Nigeria’s tri-state northeast region.
BH fighters have tended to be equal opportunity killers. Yes, they sometimes carry out targeted killings. However, the majority of their tens of thousands of killings have been indiscriminate.
When they set off IEDs in markets, transportation centers, churches, and mosques, they do not differentiate their targets between private security personnel and others murdered. Since their campaign of violence began in July 2009, BH fighters have killed roughly 30 thousand people, and at least five percent of them are likely members of the private security profession.
Combating the BH terrorists has been the responsibility of the Nigerian military. In some cases, joint military task forces have been set up to combat the terrorists. At the beginning of the violent conflict, it was assumed that the BH threat would quickly be overcome. Events have proven otherwise. The police agency did its best to combat the terrorists but failed. BH jihadists killed many police personnel. Eventually, the military took over the fight.
Private security has been on the front lines of the war on terror. For example, the massive car bombing of the UN Building in Abuja, Nigeria on August 26, 2011 claimed the lives of several private security operatives, who were manning the reception at the UN building. Several other terrorist attacks resulted in the death of security operatives, because they worked at targeted facilities.
Private security has four major roles in combating BH:
- Security Operations: Guard Services, vehicles searches, package searches, manning CCTV surveillance centers, and operation of Explosive Vapor Detector (EVD) have contributed to preventing terrorist attacks. Terrorists have been deterred from carrying out some attacks because of the vigilance of private security operatives.
- Training and Development: Private Security Consultants have conducted training in explosive detection, terrorist profiling, threat detection, risk assessments, and vulnerability assessments.
- Public Enlightenment: Key players in Nigeria’s private security industry have created considerable public enlightenment about suspicious packages, detection of suspicious behaviors, workplace bomb search, etc. The thrust has been to harden citizens against the threats of terrorist attacks.
- Policy Intervention: Private Security experts have also provided policy advice to political and military elites on how to counter the actions of terrorists. For example, private security experts have called out the various fraudulent dialogue initiatives embarked upon by the governments of President Goodluck Jonathan and the new President Muhammadu Buhari.
TCB: What is the Association of Industrial Security and Safety Operators of Nigeria (AISSON)? How does it contribute to the enormous security challenges facing Nigeria?
OE: AISSON is a private security industry association incorporated in 2007 with the goal of providing a platform to drive security professionalism for both users and vendors of security services. It is also an industry association designed to protect the rights of individual members.
AISSON contributes to the security challenges facing Nigeria in many ways:
- Annual Security Conferences: Through its annual conferences—usually held in Lagos—AISSON has raised the level of security discourse in Nigeria. The security narrative in Nigeria has tended to be infantile, superficial, and unsophisticated. The AISSON conferences have introduced a new and more robust, as well as rigorous, narrative. This has contributed to knowledge needed to tackle Boko Haramism in the country.
- Synergy and Networking: The Annual AISSON Conferences have greater synergy among Nigeria’s public security agencies that have tended to have a silo mentality. The conferences have involved army, navy, air force, police, civil defense, immigration, intelligence, and other security agencies. They have worked together and interacted in a non-threatening networking and learning environment. This has fostered cooperation and collaboration among security agencies normally engaged in petty rivalries.
- Dissemination of Information: AISSON has continued to put out influential news releases on important security issues. This has helped harden members of the public against incessant terrorist attacks, as well as provided more policy options to government officials/elites and military strategists.
- Recognition Awards: AISSON has given several recognition awards to government officials, military executives, law enforcement personnel, private security executives, academics, and other deserving individuals to encourage them in security problem-solving excellence.
- Security Designations: AISSON has awarded the Certified Security Professional (CSP) designation to deserving security experts. The CSP is an industry designation based upon testing and certification. The association has developed a new fellowship program—the AISSON honors program—which serves to recognize top executives who have contributed to the industry in Nigeria and abroad.
TCB: How do President Buhari’s efforts to combat Boko Haram differ from his predecessor? Has Buhari been effective?
OE: President Buhari campaigned on a platform of defeating BH and releasing the Chibok girls (the 219 school-aged girls who were kidnapped by BH in October 2014). He has differed in some significant ways from his predecessor.
For one, Buhari has prioritized regional cooperation with neighbors in the fight against BH. He has successfully enrolled neighbors as equal partners in the war. Armies from neighboring countries often cross into Nigerian territory in hot pursuit of BH elements. Former President Jonathan did not give such freehand to neighbors.
Additionally, during his inaugural speech on May 29, 2015, Buhari ordered the relocation of the Military Command and Control (MCC) from Abuja to Maiduguri, the epi-center of the terrorist attacks. The move has boosted the morale of the troops and sharpened their fight against the terrorist. I personally disagreed with this decision, because I felt that it exposed the military high command to a BH attack. This is still developing.
Another controversial difference was the issuance of a deadline for the defeat of BH. Buhari, while swearing in new service chiefs, issued a deadline of December 31, 2015 for the defeat of BH. When Dec. 31st rolled around, the Federal Government said that because BH had now been contained in Sambisa Forest, they had been “technically defeated.” The government officials said that the fact that BH did not control any local governments was also evidence of the victory. However, BH has continued to carry out deadly terrorist attacks. On January 27th, BH suicide bombers killed 15 people in Chibok. Clearly, the snake has been injured and weakened, but not killed or defanged. It has still continued to deliver lethal venom, albeit on a smaller scale.
Finally, Buhari has put considerable premium on international cooperation. He has courted the U.S., UK, Germany, China, France, and many others in the fight against BH. There have been pledges of cooperation here and there. U.S. authorities have said that the Leahy Act would be lifted regarding Nigeria so that arms could be sold to the Nigerian military.
TCB: What more needs to be done by private industry and the government to combat the Boko Haram threat? How can the Nigerian government and private industry work together to combat Boko Haram?
OE: The BH jihadi war has moved from a high profile state to that of a war of attrition. A new security architecture needs to evolve to combat the ongoing threats.
The Nigerian military has recovered almost all of the territories previously held by BH. However, there is a mutation of threat. BH has lost the territorial battle but is still winning the war of pure terror attacks by deploying suicide bombers, roadside bombs, and improvised explosive devices, such as vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIEDs), tri-cycle borne IEDs, and home borne IEDs (HBIED). The terrorists also attack rural communities, kill residents, and kidnap women, who are often married off to BH commanders or sold as sex slaves. IED prevention initiatives would educate citizens on how to recognize IEDs and how to react when suspicious packages, individuals, or vehicles are detected.
The point here is that Nigerians have not been sufficiently educated on threat detection and mitigation. Private security has knowledge of how to structure the initiative. Working with government, they can better protect citizens against the IED threat. At present, the Federal Ministry of Information and Culture is running an advertising campaign on how to detect a suicide bomber. This does not go far enough and the advertising campaign is limited only to the government-owner Nigerian Television Authority.
Private security experts can also conduct research of BH attacks and produce usable knowledge on risk and vulnerability assessments. Private security knows how to help in strategic threat assessments and threat/vulnerability integration. It will take enormous critical thinking skills and problem analytic skills to solve the complex and messy problem of BH terrorism in Nigeria.
Private Security can assist government forces with training in intelligence gathering, intelligence analysis, threat assessments, and other soft skills that public section security officials need to combat BH. At present, there is too much reliance on foreign know-how, which is not adapted to our local circumstance. Private security industry has been on the forefront of threat and risk prevention and vulnerability identification. This experience and know-how can be shared with the government to increase its capacity to combat this existential threat.
The private security industry in Nigeria has impressive knowledge and capabilities in technical/ technology services. For example, it can help deploy drones to locate and target BH fighters; it can install CCTV equipment in urban areas to surveil public places; it can install intrusion devices in public building to detect intruders; and it can install fire alarm equipment to detect fire in incipient stages in schools, district head palaces, and other such targets that BH often destroys with arson attacks.
A general cooperation among all security agencies and private security will aid in the fight against BH. At present, there is a silo mentality among the various security agencies. Working together in a program—“Operation Cooperation”—would enable better synergy among security agencies and therefore expedite the defeat of BH. At the end of the day, defeating BH will be a product of brilliant strategy and not brute force.
