The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) was established on May 22,1964 through the Fort Lamy (now N’Djamena) Convention to ensure equitable and sustainable management of Lake Chad, while preserving the ecosystem and promoting sub-regional integration, peace, and security in the basin. In the last decade, the LCBC’s member states—Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Central African Republic, and Libya—have experienced varying degrees of insecurities ranging from armed conflicts, environmental stress, and dwindling water resources, to terrorism and illicit transnational trafficking.
The epidemic of insecurity in this sub-region is traceable to the nature of politics, structure of the state system, social composition, and the geo-demographic dynamics within the sub-region, which stimulates and sustains recurring instability. Political exclusion and weak institutions of governance have led to violent conflicts and political uncertainties in countries, like Central African Republic, Chad, Nigeria, and Sudan. Meanwhile, Cameroon, Egypt, Libya, Niger, and Nigeria have emerged vulnerable to radicalisation and violent extremism, and have active presence of extremist groups affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
Boko Haram in Transition
Following ISIS’ acceptance of Boko Haram’s allegiance to the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in March 2015, ISIS’ spokesman Abu Mohammed a-Adnani told foreign fighters wishing to fight for the group that they need not travel to Syria but could help build the new caliphate in Nigeria. Support for the newly formed ISWAP (the Islamic State’s West African Province) was considered necessary in light of intensified counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations against the group by the Multi National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which involved troops from the LCBC, notably Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.
There has since been a continued decimation of Boko Haram’s assets, but the group has changed tactics from direct confrontation with security agencies and holding territories—especially in Nigeria’s northeast—to attacks on soft targets, such as public gatherings, using mostly suicide bombings. Several mosques and market places in Borno state have so been attacked. The group further expanded its assaults beyond Nigeria to neighbouring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger in the Lake Chad Basin area, which hosts thousands of Nigerian refugees fleeing from Boko Haram aggression.
Since July 2015, Cameroon’s Far North region, with headquarters in Maroua, has experienced over 10 different incidences of suicide bombings. Boko Haram also engaged in kidnappings of foreigners and locals, attacks on critical infrastructures, attacks on towns and villages, and radicalisation of vulnerable people in Cameroon. Cross-border attacks by the group in Niger and Chad began in February 2015 with attacks on Niamey and Diffa in the Republic of Niger. These were accompanied by raids on a military camp and the village of Ngouboua. The group had earlier threatened in a video message to attack Chadian territory in retaliation for its involvement in the MNJTF. The group’s ability to execute cross-border attacks may have demonstrated its credentials as a suitable ally of ISIS.
New Strategic Danger
The new Boko Haram threat is heightened by the group’s affiliation to ISIS and subsequent change of name to the Islamic State of West African Province. There now exists speculation that as allied powers intensify assaults against ISIS in the Middle East, the Lake Chad Basin areas and Africa in general, could experience an influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs).
Certain intrinsic features uphold this conjecture. First, Egypt and Libya—which share observer status and full membership of the LCBC—both have active brigades of ISIS represented by the Ansar Beit al-Maqdisin Egypt and the Islamic State of Libya or Ansar al Sharia. Second, following airstrikes by Russia, France, and other Western countries on ISIS-controlled territories and assets in the Middle East, the Daesh (the Arabic name for ISIS) command ordered fighters and new recruits to move to Libya and other parts of Africa.
The importance of Libya to ISIS’ strategy in Africa is connected to the volatile security situation, which arose from the absence of effective governance infrastructure since the October 2011collapse of the Gadhafi regime. The grievance of Gadhafi’s clansmen in Sirte against the overthrow of the former Libyan leader—and their willingness to resist perceived alien subjugation by the anti-Gadhafi alliance and its proxies—fuels this. Additionally, the anticipated economic prospects from the control of Libya’s oil field following Russian air raids on ISIS-controlled oil assets in the Middle East, offers ISIS a good source of income to sustain its existence.
Finally, Libya possesses a geo-strategic advantage for ISIS in the Maghreb and Africa’s Sahel belt. This is because Libya shares boundaries with Tunisia and Algeria, which host cells of Jund al Khatifa (affiliated with ISIS), and Egypt, where the Ansar Beit al-Maqdis is based. Libya also shares boundaries with Chad and Niger, which are neighbors to Nigeria, from where Boko Haram emanated. Bearing in mind that Boko Haram operates in Cameroon and Chad (Central Africa) and Niger and Nigeria (West Africa), ISIS’ alliance with ISWAP spreads its reach in Africa and therefore is considered of strategic importance. Meanwhile, the present security realities in Libya provide a window to consolidate and maximise the opportunities inherent in the alliance.
On the one hand, it is anticipated that West and Central Africa could witness an influx of foreign fighters affiliated with ISIS; on the other, Libya and countries of the Maghreb with ISIS cells will continue to experience the influx of recruits from Sub-Saharan Africa for radicalization and associated training. The August 2015 arrest of ISIS cleric Ahmed Al Assir at Rafik Harari International Airport in Beirut on his was to Nigeria, is instructive, bearing in mind that for any one crime discovered, several others remain undiscovered.
In conclusion, while there exist indications that the assets of the ISWAP and its capacities to launch audacious attacks in Nigeria and larger Lake Chad Basin areas seem continuously depleted, it is not yet Uhuru (victory), as several recruits and local fighters could have left for training in ISIS sanctuaries in Libya. In addition, the flight of ISIS members from Iraq and Syria to the Maghreb could be a springboard through which foreign fighters infiltrate ISWAP territories in West and Central Africa—especially in the Central African Republic, where recurrent hostilities between Christians and Muslims attract extremist radicalisation, recruitment, and terrorism. It is against this background that addressing the political and security situations in Libya is crucial to combating radicalisation and violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin area.
