When President Barack Obama came to Ottawa as part of the “bromance” with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, he said that the world needed “more Canada,” but he also pointed out that Canada should contribute its fair share on defence. This was a significant call to action from Canada’s most important ally and defence partner. Canadians resent being told that they are a free-rider on defence spending. Comparisons on defence spending often ignore qualitative differences or things like purchasing parities and currencies distortions. Yet, although our forces are second to none when engaged in an expeditionary operation, our paltry .95 percent of GDP spending on defence barely meets the Nils Orvik criteria of “defence against help” – that is preventing the U.S. from taking over our defence completely.
Still, Canada’s defence relations with the U.S. are solidly grounded in joint training exercises, personnel exchanges, strategic policy discussions, and operational cooperation. The consultative architecture, going back to the 1940’s, is rock solid and translates into a combined defence plan within a tri-command framework. Canada is also a key partner in U.S. efforts to prevent and reduce illicit trafficking through detection, monitoring, and tracking drug traffickers. Maritime interoperability between Canadian, U.S., and Mexican forces in response to regional maritime threats has gained from the creation of North American Maritime Security Initiative.
Interoperability is critical for continental defence, and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) provides its foundation, although, as I wrote in the 2016 Strategic Outlook for Canada, “with NORAD having a decade of experience in maritime warning,” it can be argued it is “time to undertake a reassessment on the maritime domain awareness situation facing both countries,” with particular reference to the Arctic. Similarly, Canada has been procrastinating needlessly about joining the U.S. ballistic missile defence system (BMD).
Canada and the U.S. have always considered NATO to be the cornerstone of the trans-Atlantic security and defence relationship, and they provide it with an increasingly critical strategic depth.
Under a Hillary Clinton presidency, Canada would have received the occasional rap across the knuckles for its insufficient defence expenditures but would have taken on some legitimizing UN missions; NAFTA would have carried on untouched; TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership trade agreement) would have survived weak promises of demise; softwood lumber would have lingered; and Keystone KL Pipeline would have been buried for another four years.
With President Donald Trump, uncertainty prevails; hence Canada’s delaying the shipping of the promised 600 peacekeepers in Africa. It will not take long for Canada to be “told” to join BMD, irrespective of Mr. Trump’s views on Russia. Canada might decide “on its own” to do so in light of growing fears about Kim Jong-un’s North Korea. The “deal-maker” will have no compunction in pressuring Canada in paying more for the defence of our common shore and the U.S. umbrella. Canada will be asked to heed Mr. Trump’s calls on burden-sharing within NATO, no matter how “obsolete” it may be in the eyes of the President. British Prime Minister Theresa May, hailing from one of the few European countries which meet the two percent commitment, will chime in with scant regard for Canada’s “plight.”
While the integrated Canada-U.S. defence structure is unlikely to change, Russia’s posture in the Arctic, whose resources represent 20 percent of Russian GDP, will pose new defence challenges, as President Trump charts an uncertain path with his Russian “friend.” Canada is very vulnerable on defence of its huge Arctic territory.
Canada’s 2008 “Canada First Defence Strategy” was an underfunded procurement list. The new government punted the renewal of its fighter fleet for five years by deciding to procure 18 Super Hornets to supplement its aging fleet of F-18s. While Mr. Trump lambasted the F-35, it will be the aircraft of the future. Thus the U.S. Administration may well consider the Super Hornet purchase by Canada as a delaying tactic to avoid effecting the necessary investment to fully renew its fleet. That may not sit well with the U.S. government, all the more so if the cost of the F-35 is brought down significantly by the “deal-maker.” One can only hope that Canada will not stand to lose on the industrial benefits side as it continues to support the development of the aircraft.
But defence procurement is more than the F-35. Mr. Trump’s protectionist, “Buy-America+” utterances could affect what is a very productive commercial relationship between our two countries in the defence field. Reassuring words were spoken by Mr. Trump’s strategic and policy council chair, Stephen Schwarzman, at a Canadian Cabinet meeting, but there are too many unknowns. How much the conditional approval of Keystone - “subject to renegotiations”- could entail in NAFTA compensations.? For example, would the U.S. demand in exchange for it that Canada abandon some of its restrictive liquor board practices or managed trade mechanisms or worse, increase unilaterally its stumpage fees on softwood lumber?
Canada-U.S. relations are usually free from linkages across sectors or issues in large part because of the depth and complexities of the relationship. The Trump approach could reverse that trend, with the U.S. dictating the terms. Defence procurement will be entangled in the broad mix. The Government of Canada is not fully prepared for the onslaught, but it seems that Canada has understood the importance of the military relationship with the U.S. However, “continental” defence cost may come at the expense of Canada’s multilateral ambitions. The recent delays in the Mali peacekeeping mission may portend difficult debates in the future.
Thus, from a broad security perspective, Canada is coming to the table somewhat naked, inasmuch as the Trudeau government launched early on a Defence Policy Review – yet to be released – without the benefit of either a National Security Strategy or a Foreign Policy review to underpin its choices for defence. Canada, therefore, remains unprepared for some of the key decisions that the new U.S. Administration will inexorably take in terms of defence, In this day and age, Canada’s piecemeal approach to defence will simply not suffice.
