As President-elect prepares to take office, the new administration has an opportunity to adjust U.S. foreign policy direction with key allies. After a recent meeting with Prime Minister Abe, Trump has begun to outline how he envisions the U.S. relationship with Japan. The Cipher Brief spoke with Thomas Cynkin, Vice President of the Daniel Morgan Academy to discuss what could change and what could remain the same.
The Cipher Brief: President-elect Donald Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently met in New York. How has this meeting been received in Japan, and how far did it go to assuaging some of Japan’s feelings about a Trump presidency?
Tom Cynkin: Prime Minister Abe, through gumption and fortuitous timing, was the first foreign leader to visit with President-elect Trump. Hierarchy-conscious Japanese could not help but be pleased. More informed Japanese observers are surely aware that this timing was more random than meticulously planned. Opinion polls in Japan show that public concern about a Trump Administration runs high. This is understandable, given the strong Japanese preference for stability and predictability – that is, more of the same. However, once the Trump Administration’s specific intentions about renegotiating aspects of the U.S.-Japan relationship become clear, uncertainty will be abated and Japanese anxiety should be assuaged to a considerable extent. Of course, the specifics of U.S. policy will have a major impact on Japanese attitudes, as well.
TCB: Donald Trump recently doubled down on his pledge to withdraw the U.S. from TPP. How would the scrapping of U.S. involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership by a Trump administration affect Japan? Would the absence of TPP create opportunities for China?
TC: PM Abe stated publicly that a TPP without the U.S. isn’t worth pursuing, and he may be right. Economically, it is widely considered that TPP would benefit Japan more than it would the U.S. The question from a U.S.-Japan perspective, therefore, is whether TPP could be renegotiated to redress that or whether the time has come to move past TPP and revert to a focus on bilateral trade agreements.
From the strategic perspective, the TPP construct was aimed at presenting Asian countries with a U.S.-led alternative to gravitating into China’s economic, and thereby political, orbit. China hasn’t even been included in TPP negotiations.
With TPP now on the shelf, the Chinese alternative – the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – has been gaining momentum and attracting renewed interest from China’s regional neighbors. China’s RCEP already includes ASEAN plus Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India — accounting for nearly 27 percent of global GDP. The mirror image of TPP, RCEP does not include the United States.
Absent a regional trade framework, the Trump Administration should consider working vigorously to forge bilateral trade agreements with Asian countries that are appropriately accommodating to U.S. economic interests. This would avoid yielding the field to China and allowing Beijing to exert disproportionate influence, including rulemaking, on Asia trade.
TCB: Mr. Trump has made comments about allies not paying their share of the cost of keeping U.S. troops stationed in their countries. This is not true in the case of Japan. What does Japan provide for the continued presence of U.S. troops in its country?
TC: Under the five-year host nation support agreement which came into effect this past April, Japan spends roughly 189.9 billion yen a year, or about $1.6 billion, to support U.S. military forces in Japan. This includes a share of expenses for facilities improvement, Japanese base workers, utilities, and training relocation, inter alia.
TCB: What would the United States stand to lose if it withdrew its forces from Japan?
TC: The U.S. deploys roughly 53,000 troops in Japan (roughly 11,000 of which are at sea at any given time) at around 85 facilities. Over half of these troops and roughly a third of all facilities used by U.S. Forces Japan are located in Okinawa, the chief U.S. forward logistics hub in the Asia-Pacific region, which supports U.S. power projection capabilities in East Asia and beyond. In return, the U.S. guarantees Japan’s security. Removing U.S. forces unilaterally would mean Japan receiving most of the benefits of the U.S.-Japan alliance, while being relieved of most of its contributions to the alliance.
U.S. forces that were removed from Japan could be relocated to Guam, Hawaii, or the West Coast but would be in a less strategically advantageous position from a U.S. national security perspective and would lose the major benefit of Japanese host nation support, i.e. $1.6 billion/year.
But the real question is not whether to remove U.S. forces from Japan. Rather, it is whether the host nation support arrangement could be renegotiated on more favorable terms to the U.S., which clearly it could be. There is ample precedent; for example, under the George HW Bush Administration, then-Secretary of State James Baker famously pursued greater “burden-sharing” by Japan.
TCB: Are there any other factors we should be aware of for the sake of the alliance’s future?
TC: The Trump Administration is widely predicted to be interested in renegotiating the U.S.-Japan economic relationship and direct Japanese host nation support for U.S. forces in Japan. In addition, the U.S. should consider renegotiating the broader parameters of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.
After many years of steady U.S. persuasion, during which Japan gradually expanded its roles and responsibilities under the alliance, PM Abe began to take major steps to make Japan a full-fledged security partner of the United States. Ironically, senior officials of the Obama Administration appear to have viewed the initiatives of Abe’s administration in this regard with suspicion – limiting them, rather than encouraging them.
That said, a significant milestone in U.S.-Japan security relations was the October 2014 agreement to revise the defense guidelines, for the first time since 1997, to enhance security coordination in areas including logistics support, space and cyberspace, intelligence sharing, peacekeeping operations, international humanitarian assistance, and civilian evacuation operations.
With a more proactive and forward-leaning approach, the Trump Administration could work with Abe to negotiate greater progress in U.S.-Japan alliance relations, including by revisiting the defense guidelines. The positive atmospherics of the first meeting between the President-elect and the Prime Minister is an encouraging sign that both countries will be able to work cooperatively in this regard, which would be in the national interests of both the U.S. and Japan.
