On September 21, 2014, a group of Algerian jihadists, named Jund El Khilafa (The soldiers of the Caliphate) kidnapped Hervé Gourdel, a 55-year-old French nature guide, in Djurdjura National Park in northern Algeria. Jund El Khilafa’s leader, Khaled Abu-Suleiman, had pledged allegiance to ISIS earlier that month, and three days after Gourdel’s abduction, the group published a video of his decapitation, stating that their act was in retaliation for France’s involvement in the war against ISIS in Iraq. Two months later, in November 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr El Baghdadi accepted Jund El Khilafa into his fold and officially announced, through an audio message, the creation of wilayat el Djazair, ISIS’ province in Algeria.
Faithful to its famous slogan, baqiya wa tatamaded (remaining and expanding), the Islamic State (ISIS) prioritizes expansion to new territories. One of the reasons that ISIS has targeted Algeria is due to the fact that the country has served as an important U.S. and European ally in the fight against terror in North Africa since 9/11. In addition, Algeria has a history of jihadism; hence, the group thought it would be an easy-access and easy-recruitment base.
Yet, ISIS seems unable to gain a foothold in Algeria. The only attack that the group perpetrated is the killing of Hervé Gourdel. Since then, Jund El Khilafa has published propaganda videos in which they have exaggerated their capacities. ISIS’ Algerian branch does not have the manpower or resources to represent a serious threat to the country. In fact, ISIS’ stagnation in Algeria can be attributed to the country’s high level of security, its competition with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the trauma of the black decade in the 1990s that remains fresh in the memory of the Algerian people.
A key reason for ISIS failing to make progress in Algeria is due to Algeria’s tough, modern, and experienced security forces that have acquired substantial counterterrorism capabilities during their decade-long fight against jihadist groups (1991-2001). This period came to be known as Algeria’s civil war or the “black decade.” During the war, the Algerian military (PNA) faced threats from various jihadi organizations, including the Islamic Armed Movement (MIA), the Movement for an Islamic State (MEI), the Islamic League for Da’awa and Jihad (LIDD), the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). As the most formidable group, the GIA “liberated” entire villages, and subsequently applied Sharia law and acted as a “parallel-state,” where it served as the provider of justice, administration, social services, tax collection, and protection. Algerian security forces fought back and eventually retook control of the “liberated areas.”
Today, Algerian security forces have been able to keep the number of Algerians traveling to Iraq and Syria relatively low and have also worked to confine local jihadists – that are believed to number around 1,000 – in specific regions, such as the northeastern mountainous region of Kabylie and areas bordering Libya and Mali. When, for instance, Jund El Khilafa announced the execution of Hervé Gourdel, the Algerian military killed the emir of the group, Abdelmalek Gouri, and two of his lieutenants two months after the death of the hostage. Less than 5 months later, Gouri’s successor, Bachir Kherza, was killed with 25 of his men in a military operation in Bouira. The PNA was able to keep a tight control over jihadist groups, nip the group in the bud, and prevent it from structuring itself in the country.
In addition, Algerian authorities closed their borders with six of their neighbors (except Tunisia), and the military has beefed up security on its borders that stretch over 6,385 km. They have been relatively successful in securing them with the exception of the attack of the gas facility in Tiguentourine in January 2013. The PNA regularly conducts operations to stop jihadists from leaving the country or fighters from entering, as well as to stop drug and arm traffickers and smugglers in the most sensitive places in the South (Ain Amenas and Djanet) or in the East and Southeast (Tébessa and El Oued). Because of the recent setbacks ISIS is experiencing in Libya, Algerian authorities have intensified their operations along their Eastern borders, as it is believed that ISIS may be attempting to send fighters from Libya to Algeria.
ISIS gains in Algeria have also been impeded by its rivalry with AQIM, a well-established Salafi-jihadist organization that has been active in the country for more than a decade, has developed an extensive network, and has shown a high level of adaptation and resilience. On several occasions, AQIM has rejected ISIS and its call for all jihadists to swear allegiance to Al Baghdadi. In an official statement released on July 15, 2014, AQIM reaffirmed its allegiance to al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri. Even Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar, a jihadi leader who defected from AQIM to establish his own organization, remained faithful to Zawahiri and refused to pledge allegiance to Baghdadi.
On the ground, AQIM’s capacities are far more dangerous than ISIS. The group has been able to extend from his northern front to the Sahel and since its inception in 2007, has perpetrated more than 600 attacks against Algerian targets, ranging from guerilla-style raids, bombs, ambushes, and kidnappings.
The mass trauma of the black decade and a young generation that seems harder to lure and more attracted to Daawa salafiya (quietist Salafism) poses another obstacle for ISIS in Algeria. With the past experience of a civil war in mind, the population seems less likely to support groups, such as ISIS, as had occurred with the GIA in the 1990s. Additionally, the makeup of the Algerian population is 99 percent Sunni, making it difficult for ISIS to play on the sensitive spot of the Sunni-Shia divide.
In short, ISIS’ capacities in Algeria appear quite limited as the group lacks the resources and following to conduct numerous, or large-scale attacks. As explained by a high-ranking member in the Algiers police, “The risk from ISIS remains low in our country, so low that I think using the word ‘threat’ is an exaggeration. The plots that we managed to deter were not going to lead to any prominent attack,” he continued. “But that does not mean that we do not take it seriously, it only means that we are confident because we have the power to crash them.”
Yet risks still do exist. It should be noted that various AQIM members and factions, including the El Ghuraba brigade and Katibet El Ansar, released audio messages detailing their defections from AQIM and pledges to ISIS. These releases are aimed at creating the illusion that AQIM fighters were defecting in blocs and that the ISIS ranks were more important and powerful.
While ISIS may not currently have the resources to pull off a large-scale attack in Algeria, the country’s security forces must remain on high alert, as ISIS members are more likely to find easy targets and attempt a low scale/high impact attack like the one against French national Hervé Gourdel.
