After North Korea threatened to withdraw from the upcoming face-to-face summit between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, some media outlets reported that Trump was becoming concerned about the political risks if the talks were to fall through—and considering not going ahead with them.
Many experts believe North Korea’s recent warning it would pull out of the talks is a shift in rhetoric fully consistent with past attempts at serious dialogue with the Hermit Kingdom—and demonstrate it is unwilling to negotiate in good faith. But is there reason to believe this time will be different?
The Cipher Brief asked its experts to weigh in:
Amb. Joseph DeTrani, former U.S. Special Envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea:
Does North Korea’s behavior in the lead-up to the summit—especially in the last few weeks—seem similar to past negotiation cycles, or not? Is there reason to believe the diplomatic environment is substantively different “this time,” and if so, why?
In past negotiations with North Korea, agreements made with their negotiators were always contingent on obtaining their leader's approval. For the Six Party Talks, it was the father of Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Il, who made all final decisions. Currently, it's Kim Jong Un who's doing the direct negotiations, first with President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and in June, with President Donald Trump. Thus this is an unprecedented set of negotiations for the U.S. It's also the type of negotiation North Korea had requested for decades – a meeting of their leader with the U.S. President, claiming that all issues could then be resolved expeditiously. So, we're in uncharted waters for the upcoming summit between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un.
Past negotiations with North Korea have always been protracted and difficult. What was required was patience, perseverance and a principled approach to seeking a just resolution to the nuclear issue with North Korea, knowing that North Korea wanted to be accepted as a nuclear weapons state while also establishing a normal relationship with the U.S. Only when the North realized that nuclear dismantlement would facilitate the establishment of normal relations with the U.S., thus realizing that they would never be accepted as a nuclear weapons state, did we finally get agreement on a (September 19) 2005 Joint Statement, that also addressed North Korea's demands for security assurances, a peace treaty to end the Korean War, economic development assistance and a path to a more normal relationship with the U.S.
What we now could be witnessing is advisors to Kim Jong Un arguing for their leader to make the case for North Korea to retain some nuclear capability, at least until the North receives security assurances, peace treaty, economic development assistance and normalization of relations with the U.S. It appears that Kim Jong Un had made a strategic decision to dismantle his nuclear arsenal, in return for the myriad of economic and political deliverables he wants, which would then permit him to focus on rebuilding his economy and gaining international recognition as a normal sovereign state, attracting international investment and other benefits from membership in the international community. Some of Kim Jong Un's advisors may now be encouraging Kim to work harder at getting both: security assurances and an eventual normal relationship with the U.S. and acceptance as a nuclear weapons state, at least for an interim period, which could then eventually become de jure recognition as a nuclear weapons state.
How does Trump’s recent withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal impact his efforts with North Korea?
I doubt that the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal has any impact on North Korea's approach to negotiations with the U.S.
A North Korea with nuclear weapons is not Iran. And what the Iran nuclear deal provided to Iran, primarily with the Sunset clauses, is not what we are proposing for North Korea, with Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons facilities.
Would you advise the president to proceed with the summit? If not, what should be done instead?
President Donald Trump should proceed with the June 12th summit with Kim Jung-Un. It is likely the President will be able to convince Kim Jong Un to make the strategic decision to dismantlement his nuclear weapons program in return for security assurances, peace treaty to end the Korean War, economic development assistance and a path to normalized relations with the U.S. I believe the President can make this compelling case to Kim Jong Un, who appears willing to move in this positive direction.
Amb. Richard Boucher, former Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia:
North Korea is posturing to frame the talks: the pre-negotiation negotiation. Their objections to exercises involving nuclear capable aircraft push their idea of what "denuclearization" means. Dissing the South Koreans shows they only see the South as a vehicle to get to the U.S. — the real talks are yet to come.
Normally I'd say withdrawal from the Iran deal would give others concerns about signing agreements with us, but in this case I'm not so sure. If Iran and Europe stick to the deal and figure out how to do OK without us, it may lead Kim Jong Un to conclude if he gets a peace treaty and the support of China there will be little the U.S. could do by tearing up a deal with him.
Should Trump go to the summit? Yes, but with a clear idea of what he needs—and what he'll give.
