The shrinking ice cap in the Arctic has opened up new opportunities and security challenges for the nations surrounding the region. Arctic policy debates in Washington usually revolve around three issues: a race for Arctic resources, the need for new icebreakers, and a resurgent and aggressive Russia. In Moscow, policy discussions focus on tangible actions to exploit its Arctic resource base and defend its territory and resources from intrusion and interference.
In the past four years, Russia has steadily renewed its icebreaker fleet, added new ice-hardened commercial ships, reorganized its defense establishment in the Arctic, rebuilt bases on its northern periphery, opened a major oil field in the Barents Sea with two oil and gas fields coming on line south of the Kara Sea in 2017, and revised its submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for an extended continental shelf in the Arctic.
A key question is how Russia’s aggressive developments may impact U.S. national security. The answer is in the details of Russia’s plans to develop and defend its Arctic resource base.
The fuel for Russia’s economic engine
Russia’s Arctic extends across northern Eurasia, from its border with Norway to its maritime boundary with the United States in the Bering Strait. Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula is host to civilian shipping and Russia’s Northern Fleet and is a gateway for trade and development to the rest of the Arctic.
The development of hydrocarbon and mineral resources in the Arctic is the key to Russia’s goal for the region to become a major driver for its economy. Russia’s Arctic is estimated to hold $20 trillion worth of oil and gas and may account for 20 to 30 percent of the country’s oil production by 2050. The 2008 opening of an offshore terminal in the Pechora Sea brought large oil tankers into the ice covered Arctic. The Prirazlomnoye oil field, also in the Pechora Sea, began commercial production in 2013.
Two large developments south of the Kara Sea are nearing commercial operation: the oil field at Novy Port in the Gulf of Ob and the Yamal Gas development on the Yamal Peninsula. Fifteen double-acting ice-hardened LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) tankers with 80,000-ton capacity will open Asian markets for Russia’s Arctic hydrocarbons. Farther east, Dudinka on the Yenisei River ships nickel, cobalt, and platinum group metals from the Norilsk complex to the Kola Peninsula using a fleet of ice-hardened cargo ships.
Before the west imposed economic sanctions on Russia in 2014, ExxonMobil collaborated in the exploration of hydrocarbon deposits in the Kara and Laptev Seas. The imposition of sanctions brought ExxonMobil’s role to a halt, but Russia remains optimistic about its eventual development.
There is more limited development in the eastern Arctic, including renewed evaluation of oil fields in the Laptev Sea and construction of a floating nuclear power plant at the port city of Pevek. On Russia’s far eastern coast, Arctic-like conditions apply technology used in the Arctic to exploit hydrocarbon resources at Sakhalin Island and in the Sea of Okhotsk.
Ocean and coastal infrastructure in the Arctic could be vulnerable to disruption in times of heightened east-west tension. With Arctic development essential to its national economic strategy, Russia is matching its investment in development with investment in its military capability in the region.
Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic
The most prominent security actions in the Arctic have been the establishment of a joint Northern Command and two Arctic brigades and the reestablishment of six military bases on Russia’s Arctic islands and coasts. Recent military exercises have demonstrated mobility of forces in arctic conditions. Less visible have been the development of emergency response and rescue centers and an increase in Coast Guard responsibility in the Arctic.
The string of bases on Franz Josef Land, Novaya Zemlya, Severny Zemlya, Kotelny Island, and Wrangell Island provide observation posts that cover Russia’s Arctic EEZ and provide year-round, multi-purpose support ranging from air defense to emergency response. A Podsolnukh E “over the horizon” radar is being installed on Novaya Zemlya that, with a range of about 200 nautical miles and capability to detect stealth aircraft, can substantially extend time to identify and respond to intrusions or attacks.
Russia is also enhancing its capability for subsurface and space-based domain awareness. A network of acoustic listening stations (MGK-608M SEVER) may be placed on the continental shelf with autonomous sources where they can track submarines far from the coast. The Arktika satellite network will add high latitude weather, observation, and communications capabilities.
These advances can significantly improve maritime domain awareness and enhance command and control in the Arctic. They could help Russian ballistic missile submarines evade American submarines as they leave port for their stations under the ice and identify and track American submarines, ships, and aircraft in Russia’s EEZ. They could also enhance emergency response and regulatory activities required under international and domestic law.
Conclusions
Despite high costs and western economic sanctions, Russia remains aggressive in developing economic and military assets in its Arctic. At the same time, Russia has abided by the Law of the Sea Convention, collaborated with other Arctic nations, and respected its boundary agreements with Norway and the United States. By itself, Russia’s aggressive approach to economic development and security in the Arctic is not a threat to American economic interests, but there are two developments that could impact U.S. security interests. First, the development of the Yamal Gas project will provide access to non-European markets outside the reach of western economic sanctions, blunting their effectiveness in responding to Russian activities in Crimea or Ukraine. Second, improved Arctic domain awareness, combining long-range radar, satellite observation, and seabed detection systems, may constrain efforts to monitor Russian military systems, limit the effectiveness of U.S. submarines in the Russian EEZ, and undermine the effectiveness of “stealth” aircraft approaching Russian territory.
On the other hand, there are lessons to be learned from Russia’s security developments in the Arctic that may aid the U.S. and Canada in developing their own security and safety infrastructure for the North American Arctic. In some cases, especially regarding Arctic domain awareness, Russia, Canada, and the U.S. could benefit from collaboration through the Arctic Coast Guard Forum to advance maritime security and safety across their Arctic waters.
Over the coming months, The Cipher Brief, in conjunction with the Stimson Center, will be publishing a Natural Security Series featuring articles on the convergence between environmental and national security issues. Be sure to check in next month for the next part of the Natural Security Series.
