In South Asia, most of the U.S. attention is focused on Afghanistan where it is combatting terrorist and insurgent groups such as al Qaeda, ISIS, the Haqqani network, and the Taliban. But another prominent, Pakistani-based militant group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), continues to carry out attacks against Indian forces in the disputed Kashmir region and is even known to launch anti-American raids in Afghanistan. Although the U.S. State Department designated LeT as a terrorist organization in 2001, the group’s activities do not garner as much U.S. media coverage as those carried out by other regional militant groups.
The Cipher Brief’s Bennett Seftel spoke with Stephen Tankel, assistant professor in the School of International Service at American University, about LeT’s role in Pakistani society and in the broader conflict between Pakistan and India, as well as how the U.S. should view the threat posed by group.
The Cipher Brief: How was Lashkar-e-Taiba formed?
Stephen Tankel: Lashkar-e-Taiba was created around 1990 as the militant wing of the Markaz al-Dawa-Wal-Irshad (MDI) – a group formed in the mid-1980s to organize Ahl-e-Hadith Pakistanis participating in the anti-Soviet jihad. Most of the major Islamist militant groups in the region identify with the Deobandi tradition of Islam. (Deobandism began as a religious revivalist movement and is associated with the Hanafi school of Sunni jurisprudence). MDI was an exception; it belonged to the Ahl-e-Hadith sect of Islam, which is associated with the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence. Adherents are frequently described as “Salafists.”
MDI rebranded itself as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) in late 2001. As was the case before the rebrand, LeT and JuD are one-and-the-same – LeT is the militant face of the organization, whereas JuD is the above ground wing. It runs schools, mosques, and madrassas, provides other social services, and remains legal in Pakistan. Some JuD members have contested elections and the group recently announced plans to create a political party. JuD has also spun off other entities, including a relief organization. The United States has designated all of these entities as terrorist organizations and rightly pointed to the fact that they all fall under the same organizational umbrella. Keeping this in mind, I’ll use LeT hereafter when referring to the group in order to avoid confusion.
TCB: What are the organization’s objectives?
Tankel: LeT is defined by two dualities: the first is its identity as a militant group and as a missionary organization; the second concerns its military activities, namely that it is both a pan-Islamist group dedicated to waging jihad against all enemies of Islam and Pakistan’s most trusted and reliable militant ally.
Pakistani state support has helped LeT pursue two overarching objectives – one violently and one non-violently – in different theatres with near equal vigor. In Pakistan, the group pursues non-violent reformism through proselytizing, social welfare activities, and increasing participation in politics. Although a small number of LeT members have been involved in anti-state violence, the group eschews revolutionary jihad in Pakistan.
Outside Pakistan, LeT has engaged in pan-Islamic jihad to defend Muslims against non-believers and to liberate what it perceives to be occupied Muslim lands. The group has fixated on India (especially Indian-administered Kashmir) since the mid-1990s but also has sent fighters to Afghanistan and even as far as Iraq in the years since 9/11.
TCB: It has been reported that LeT received funding from Osama bin Laden during its formative years. Does LeT maintain ties to other regional terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, the Haqqani network, ISIS, or even to the Taliban?
Tankel: LeT may have received funding from bin Laden. The group claims that two Saudis made large financial contributions to help build its compound at Muridke, a city outside Lahore. According to the research I’ve done, both Saudis were acquainted with Osama bin Laden. He may have provided some seed money for the group as well, but there is no definitive evidence he contributed funding. Either way, LeT certainly had access to other Saudi donors during the 1990s.
Today, LeT and al Qaeda probably have some ties at the operational level in Afghanistan, but on balance, the two groups are ideological and strategic competitors. This is especially true in Pakistan, where the two groups are on opposite sides of the line in terms of how they view the state. Al Qaeda considers the Pakistani government and military to be apostates and has therefore executed or abetted attacks in Pakistan. LeT, on the other hand, is the military’s closest non-state ally and has helped beat back the challenge by al Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and others waging jihad against the Pakistani state.
LeT and al Qaeda also differ over their views of Saudi Arabia. On balance, LeT is supportive of the Saudi government and ulema, whereas al Qaeda views them as apostates. The two groups are increasingly competing in India as well, with al Qaeda attempting to encroach on LeT’s turf in Indian-administered Kashmir. Competition between al Qaeda and LeT can be especially intense because they are both Salafist organizations that put a premium on recruiting highly capable individuals more so than other groups that are often more interested in numbers than quality when it comes to recruitment.
LeT opposes ISIS for many of the same reasons it differs with al Qaeda. Its relationships with the Taliban and Haqqani Network, however, are more complex. The latter two groups are Afghan and Deobandi, whereas LeT is a Pakistani Ahl-e-Hadith organization. The sectarian divide was historically a barrier to close relations. LeT was the only major Pakistani jihadist group that did not regularly contribute fighters to the Taliban’s campaign against the Northern Alliance during the 1990s.
Although the sectarian divide has not disappeared, it has shrunk since 9/11 thanks to a shared interest in fighting against coalition forces in Afghanistan and a similar position vis-à-vis the Pakistani state. All three are state-allied organizations that receive Pakistani state support. LeT is probably closer with the Haqqani Network, largely as a result of the fact that the Haqqani Network is a more trusted and reliable ally of the Pakistan military than the Taliban is. However, LeT has also coordinated with the Taliban when fighting in Afghanistan.
TCB: The organization carried out the horrific Mumbai attacks in 2008, but it does not seem to have captured much international attention since then. What is the threat level that the group currently poses in South Asia?
Tankel: LeT definitely laid low for a little while after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, but it still has the capabilities to pose a major threat in South Asia. The group has also shown itself capable of calibrating its violence and holding its fire when directed to by Pakistan’s intelligence agency known as the ISI.
LeT has been increasing its activities in Indian-administered Kashmir since 2013. Members of the group, along with militants from another Pakistani organization (Jaish-e-Mohammad), executed three high-profile attacks against hard targets in India between July 2015 and September 2016. These operations were not nearly as lethal or dramatic as the Mumbai attacks, and this was probably on purpose. The Pakistani security establishment is undoubtedly wary of catalyzing a conflict with India. Nevertheless, New Delhi has responded with increasing tactical assertiveness. After the third attack, the Indian government decided to launch and then to publicize commando raids across the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir. Both sides increased crossline firing, including the use of artillery, but neither has escalated further. However, the potential for escalation still exists, especially if LeT were to execute another terrorist attack along the lines of Mumbai.
TCB: How will the recent death of LeT leader Abu Dujana impact the group?
Tankel: I’m not sure his death will have a huge impact. Open source reporting indicates he had been compromised by Indian intelligence and was on the outs with LeT by the time he left the group to try to start up an al Qaeda affiliate in Kashmir. He probably hoped his initiative would appeal to some of the Kashmiri youth who are more drawn to al Qaeda’s global jihadist cause than to establishment organizations such as LeT, which are sometimes seen as compromised because of their long association with the Pakistani state. LeT leaders may be somewhat concerned about losing high-end talent and they need to maintain a baseline level of support in Kashmir, but the group has proved highly adaptive in the past and still has more than enough recruits. It is also savvy about working through indigenous actors.
TCB: LeT’s above ground organization (Jamaat-ud-Dawa) recently announced it was launching a political party. What do you make of this?
Tankel: This issue has been kicking around for some time. It’s interesting because LeT historically has been opposed to elections on theological grounds. Yet this position was not uniformly shared within the organization – some of its above ground leaders have been interested in contesting elections independently.
Strategically, there are also questions as to whether the party will be able to win many seats. These organizational dynamics need to be considered alongside concerns in Pakistan about how to handle the group over the long term, with some officials pushing for mainstreaming as a way to move LeT away from militancy.
I’ve thought for some time that this is the most likely way that the Pakistani establishment would deal with the group if it ever wanted to. However, there are two outstanding issues. First, it is unclear whether LeT leaders can bring most of the group’s militants with them into politics. Second, it is also unclear whether the Pakistan military and ISI are ready to reduce and one day to end support for LeT as a militant organization. There’s no evidence as of yet that this is the case. So it is true that mainstreaming offers a potential way to decommission militants. However, as of yet, the authorities have not forced the group to choose between domestic political involvement and pan-Islamic jihad.
TCB: In your 2013 testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, you mention that LeT “has been actively attacking U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan since 2004-2005.” How much of a presence does LeT maintain in Afghanistan? Has the group inflicted significant casualties on U.S. forces there?
Tankel: LeT has a small, but highly capable cadre operating in Afghanistan. It has inflicted casualties on U.S. forces, although nowhere near on the scale of the Taliban or Haqqani Network.
TCB: In your testimony, you also discussed the Pakistani intelligence service’s (ISI) level of influence over LeT, saying “Pakistan’s security services are believed …. to put pressure on LeT to refrain from striking Western interests abroad.” Do you think ISI could use this same leverage to pressure the Taliban and the Haqqani network to refrain from striking Western interests? If so, why have they not? If not, what are the differences between the ISI’s relationship with the different groups?
Tankel: In my testimony, I was referring to ISI pressure on LeT not to launch terrorist attacks in Europe or the United States. This is a red line that the ISI recognizes and that LeT appears to respect for the reasons I outlined earlier. It is probably a safe bet that if the Taliban or Haqqani network were to consider out-of-area attacks against the United States, the ISI would restrain them too.
Supporting the Taliban-led insurgency against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan is unfortunately a different animal. The Pakistan military remains committed to shaping the future Afghan government in order to make it friendly to Pakistan and reduce India’s presence and influence in Afghanistan. Widespread Pakistani perceptions of Indian and Afghan support for anti-Pakistan groups based in Afghanistan reinforce the military’s policy of backing the Taliban and Haqqani Network. Ending support and safe haven for them would not only sacrifice a powerful instrument for shaping the endgame in Afghanistan, but could also lead to increased attacks in Pakistan. In other words, this is not merely a question of the ISI’s relationships with the groups, it is about Pakistan objectives, which are existential in Afghanistan.
TCB: How much of a threat does LeT pose to the U.S.?
Tankel: LeT is arguably the most capable South Asia-based group when it comes to international terrorism. Its ability to threaten the U.S. homeland directly, i.e. to execute its own terrorist attack, is probably higher than any other group in South Asia. The question that continues to be debated is LeT’s intent. The United States fits within LeT’s ideological target set. However, from a strategic standpoint, executing an attack against the U.S. homeland would come with major costs for Pakistan and for the group. LeT not only benefits from state support in terms of its ability to wage jihad against India and in Afghanistan, but it is also able to operate relatively openly when it comes to pursuing its mission of non-violent reformism. LeT leaders also enjoy the freedom of movement and protection that other jihadists do not. For all these reasons, the group has calculated that attacking the United States is not worth the potential costs. The danger is that this calculation could change at some point.
LeT certainly poses a threat to U.S. citizens in India and to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. It’s important to put these threats in context. LeT members are among the most capable fighters operating in Afghanistan, but they are also there in much smaller numbers than the Taliban and Haqqani Network. The group might pursue more blended attacks like Mumbai, where it targeted Westerners as part of a larger operation against India. We cannot ignore this possibility. However, the greater threat may be to U.S. interests because LeT is more likely than any other group to spark an India-Pakistan war that could cross the nuclear threshold.
TCB: How should the U.S. fashion its counterterrorism approach vis-à-vis LeT?
Tankel: The United States should do four things. First, continue working with India to deepen counterterrorism cooperation. The U.S.-India Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative and establishment of the Homeland Security Dialogue in 2010 provided a solid foundation and there’s been some good progress made since. There’s still more to be done. Continuing efforts to increase information sharing, joint training programs, and cooperation on terrorist designations, for example, could help reduce the utility LeT provides to Pakistan and put pressure on Pakistan regarding its ongoing support for the group.
Second, no realistic incentives are likely to convince Pakistan to stop supporting LeT. It’s questionable whether coercion would work either, especially given other U.S. interests in the region. This does not mean accepting the status quo. Current assistance packages are too large and the conditions placed on them are unrealistic. Congress should transition to the more targeted use of positive conditionality on smaller aid packages in order to encourage Pakistan counterterrorism efforts that, although do not target LeT directly, could create conditions for future action against the group. If U.S. policymakers want to impose costs, they should consider escalatory coercion tied to specific demands regarding LeT.
Third, the United States should continue to pursue actions necessary to degrade LeT’s international networks and contain its operations outside of South Asia. This includes engaging in counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing vis-à-vis LeT with allies in Europe and also working with partners in the Persian Gulf where the group also has important networks.
Fourth, the United States must ensure it is deploying the necessary intelligence resources to track any possible LeT plots against the U.S. homeland and to be on the lookout for warning signals that the group’s calculus with regard to executing an attack here has shifted. Where resources permit, exploring different ways in which the group might evolve would be prudent. For example, it could move away from jihad and toward armed politics in Pakistan, or splinter with some members pursuing a more global orientation and others remaining locally focused. There are various permutations, and the United States would do well to consider these different pathways and their implications.
