MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT — Since Donald Trump's victory in the November 5 election, The Cipher Brief has covered the potential implications a second Trump term for various national and global security issues. As we have said, it's an almost unprecedented array of challenges on those fronts that will be piled high in the president-elect's inbox.
We also have reached out to our network of experts for their thoughts on what the priorities ought to be for the second trump administration. Our ask was straightforward: If you were given the opportunity of a short visit with the president during his first days in office, what message would you want to deliver?
Given their different backgrounds and areas of focus, the answers cover a broad range. In this installment of Memos To 47, Ambassador Patrick Duddy, a diplomat with extensive experience in the Western Hemisphere, says the region has suffered for too long from poor policies or neglect by the United States. And for all of Donald Trump's promises to shut down illegal immigration to the U.S., Ambassador Duddy says there is much to do beyond deportations and the building of a wall.
For his Memo to 47, Ambassador Duddy urges the president-elect: Don't forget our backyard.
Mr. President-elect:
During your campaign for the presidency, Latin America and the Caribbean got short shrift. Indeed, most discussions of foreign affairs, even concern over China, the Russia/Ukraine war and the Middle East, tended to be perfunctory. This was not surprising; most U.S. elections focus overwhelmingly on domestic concerns. That said, serious discussions about foreign relations will be unavoidable after January 20, and as you know, some have already begun.
In the Western Hemisphere, you will have to deal with a particularly frustrating set of problems. During the campaign, the issues of undocumented migration and our southern border were analyzed mainly as domestic problems – including your understandable insistence that the presence of so many undocumented and unvetted migrants in the U.S. posed a potential national security threat. Still, these are as much foreign policy problems as domestic problems. And the way you move to make good on your campaign promises will set the tone for relations with the Western Hemisphere.
Let’s start with Mexico
You’ve made clear from the moment you launched your campaign to return to the White House: restoring law and order on our southern border would be an early priority. And you’ve been categorical about a determination to deport undocumented migrants. Halting the flow of migrants across our shared border with Mexico is a goal that a majority of Americans now support, including those in the Latino-majority border counties of Texas, all of which voted for you on November 5. For now, Mexico’s new president, Claudia Sheinbaum, has indicated her intention to maintain her predecessor’s policy designed to keep migrant caravans from reaching Mexico’s northern frontier; this might prove difficult for Mexico to sustain if deportations from the U.S. surge as expected, and if the deportations are not carefully handled.
You should consider working with Mexico on returning third-country migrants to their countries of origin even if they entered the U.S. from Mexico. And you should bear in mind that some of the undocumented migrants you deport may be accompanied by American citizen family members. You will want to show some sensitivity to their situations. Bridging support for departed migrants, especially those with young children who are U.S. citizens, might soften Mexico’s objections, although it would not mollify those who object to U.S. border policy. The bottom line is that the way your administration handles the border and deportations could set the tone for U.S. relations with the region for the the immediate future.
You’ve also said you would consider closing the border completely if Mexico doesn’t cooperate. Such a move is unlikely to yield whole-hearted cooperation and would punish the U.S. as much as Mexico – which is now this country’s largest trading partner. More to the point, Mexico is as much a market for U.S. goods and services as it is an exporter to the U.S. All of which means your administration will need to consider carefully what to ask of Mexico, and be prepared to incentivize rather than coerce. An adversarial relationship with Mexico is not in the U.S. interest — but an open border isn’t either.
Beyond Mexico
You should then be prepared to look further to the south.
When it comes to the issue of returning migrants to other nations in the western hemisphere, you will face greater difficulties securing the cooperation of the relevant governments. Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua are all struggling with severe domestic problems, and depend heavily on remittances sent by their citizens in the U.S.
El Salvador has finally gotten violent crime under control and so, for the moment, is not generating migrants at the pace it did in the past. But El Salvador has a large population in the U.S., which contributes substantially to the homeland via remittances. Many of these Salvadorans have had Temporary Protected Status (TPS). What happens to them if the circumstances in El Salvador no longer justify TPS? What impact would a massive influx of returnees have on the country’s recent progress? How would El Salvador replace the income they currently receive from their U.S.-based diaspora? How would Honduras do the same?
These are all questions your administration will need to consider.
Why Venezuela stands apart
Venezuela has proven a particularly difficult problem for four consecutive U.S. administrations. Once a flawed but thriving democracy, Venezuela is now unapologetically authoritarian. Resource rich with the world’s largest proven petroleum reserves, the authoritarian socialist governments of Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro have eviscerated the private sector and beggared most of the population. The ruthless repression of the opposition, widespread human rights violations and rampant corruption, in combination with an incompetently managed economy, have compelled nearly eight million Venezuelans to abandon the country, creating one of the world’s largest refugee crises. And it’s about to get worse.
In July, Venezuela held a presidential election. Despite systematic attempts by the Maduro regime to intimidate voters, the opposition won by an overwhelming majority – an outcome documented by both opposition poll watchers and international election observers, including the Carter Center. Maduro ignored the vote and had himself declared the winner. The international reaction by the democratic west to Maduro’s obstinacy was outrage, but none of the major powers within the region, including the U.S., has come up with a strategy for forcing the regime to concede and begin a transition. In the meantime, the regime has doubled down on repression of the opposition.
In the absence of hope that Maduro’s power grab will be reversed, another wave of Venezuelan refugees is already taking shape. Many have expressed the hope that they can make it to the U.S. This second mass exodus will likely further aggravate anti-migrant sentiment in the U.S. as well as in South and Central America. Moreover, the documented crimes of the Venezuelan gang, Tren de Aragua, are eroding sympathy for the substantial number of Venezuelan refugees already in the U.S.
What should the U.S. do? The Biden administration lifted sanctions against Venezuela in October 2023 when Maduro agreed to hold free and fair elections – and reimposed them when it became clear the regime wasn’t living up to its pledges. But the U.S. has continued to issue licenses to Chevron and other oil companies to resume their work in Venezuela – offering an economic lifeline to the regime. Your administration should consider coordinating a new approach to sanctions and overall Venezuela policy with Brazil, Colombia and Mexico – while putting the regime on notice that the oil licenses will only be renewed pending concrete progress toward the restoration of democracy and recognition of the election results.
The crisis in Haiti
In Haiti, gangs continue to operate largely with impunity. In July of 2023, after nearly a year of negotiations, the United Nations authorized a Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) and Kenya pledged to lead the mission and send 1000 police officers. Subsequently Jamaica, Chad, Benin, Bangladesh and Barbados also committed to contribute personnel to the mission. Fewer than 500 total foreign police and troops have deployed to the country. The MSSM has so far managed to keep the recently installed interim prime minister alive (though this week he was effectively fired from his post) but has not been able to halt or even significantly diminish gang activity. In desperation, Haiti’s interim government asked the United Nations Security Council to transition the MSSM to a fully authorized peacekeeping mission. The UN rejected the idea.
In the meantime, the Dominican Republic began a massive deportation effort, expelling as many as 11,000 Haitians in one week in October. This seems certain to make the already dire situation in Haiti worse and should concern the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. If things do not get better, and the Dominican Republic is closed to Haitian refugees many will seek to go elsewhere especially to the U.S.
This is only a sampling of the challenges facing your new administration from this hemisphere. The U.S. will not be able successfully to address them unilaterally. Mexico’s cooperation will be critically important to the new administration’s campaign to get the situation on the border under control. You will need to consult closely with the Caribbean nations on Haiti. Brazil, Colombia and Mexico will all have a role to play in addressing the crisis in Caracas.
You and Vice President-elect Vance have made clear your wish to avoid using military force wherever and whenever possible. That probably means greater use of sanctions. But sanctions are not particularly effective if we are the only country imposing them. In Venezuela, for instance, the regime can still count on China, Russia, Iran and, maybe, Turkey and others to help them survive economically. This suggests the U.S. will need to rely on diplomacy and partners to advance its agenda in the region.
Addressing these issues will be even more difficult for your team than it has been in the past. This is partly because so many of Latin America’s largest countries are decidedly less inclined to take guidance from the U.S. today. Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico are all led by presidents from the left whose default position is to be wary of the U.S. no matter which party holds the White House. It is also true that the region has other partners and has opened new markets. (Trade with China, for instance, has eclipsed trade with the U.S. in Brazil, Chile, Peru and elsewhere.) Beyond these changes, moreover, the Ukraine-Russia War, Israel’s expanding conflict with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, the genocidal internal conflict in Sudan, China’s attempt to bully its way to preeminence in the South China Sea will all absorb much of your administration’s attention for the next several years at least.
The list of foreign affairs crises awaiting the new U.S. administration will be long. It will doubtless be tempting to focus on the biggest and most obvious during the first weeks and months of 2025. It would be a mistake to think that the issues emerging in the western hemisphere can be ignored or dealt with only episodically. We already know developments in this hemisphere can directly affect the United States domestically. You will need to engage here with the same seriousness as you do elsewhere.
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