Members of Congress have expressed deep concern over the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign in the 2016 election. They have even taken some action, most notably voting in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 to dramatically broaden the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) mandate to include countering propaganda and disinformation from state actors like Russia.
“First and foremost, Russia is our adversary, not our ally. Period. End of story,” Rep. Will Hurd (R-TX) says. The United States needs a counter-covert influence strategy to take on Russian disinformation efforts, the former undercover CIA officer told The Cipher Brief.
While the Pentagon and the CIA handle parts of this mission as well, there has not been a government lead or larger strategic framework focused on this national security threat. Congress has now tasked out that overarching responsibility to the GEC, but the U.S. is still far behind its adversaries on this. The Cipher Brief’s Mackenzie Weinger spoke with Hurd, who serves on the House Intelligence Committee, about Congress’ role in facing off against Kremlin information warfare.
The Cipher Brief: What would you identify as the biggest threat Russian disinformation and propaganda poses to the United States?
Rep. Will Hurd: The biggest threat is that they have been, and are, attempting to erode trust in our institutions. I would say Grizzly Steppe [the name U.S. intelligence agencies gave to the Kremlin’s hacking operation associated with the 2016 election] is going to go down in history in Mother Russia as the greatest covert action campaign, not because of the winner, because we all know that was fair and square, it was because they were attempting to drive a wedge between the White House, the intelligence community, and the American public. And so they are continuing to try and push that narrative.
We are lacking as a government in a counter-covert influence strategy. Everybody kind of has their roles. State Department has a piece. When it comes to overseas, our intelligence services have a piece. But when it comes to countering disinformation here in the United States of America, that is something as a government I don’t think we’re organized and prepared to do. And it’s something that can’t be done just by the government alone.
TCB: What needs to be done to create a more cohesive strategy? Do you think Congress is doing enough on that end?
Hurd: These are some of the conversations we’re starting to have. Who is responsible? Disinformation is a type of covert action. Covert action in the United States of America, it is the role of the Central Intelligence Agency. But the National Security Act of 1947 makes it very clear the CIA cannot do activities in the United States. And when the CIA does covert action, they’re always worried about blowback into the U.S. population. So when you have disinformation campaigns being waged in English on airwaves in the United States, whose responsibility is it to counter it? That’s a big question. I think it’s important for the press to have a role. I think it’s important for academia to have a role. I think it’s important for the State Department to talk about, hey, this is not true.
And let’s use Ukraine as an example. Eastern Ukraine, people are still calling that, or the fact that we ever called it, a separatist activity — it’s not separatist. There are Russian tanks and Russian military officers in Eastern Ukraine, so the fact that we would call this a separatist movement, that is playing into the hands of these Russian disinformation operations. This is a Russian attempt to steal land in Ukraine, end of story.
Those are some of the tools that Vladimir Putin is using in order to achieve what his goal is, and that’s reestablishing the territorial integrity of the USSR. When we see those kinds of activities, we need to counter it, and we need to make sure that we’re calling a spade a spade.
TCB: How would you hypothetically prep a memo to the National Security Council, this administration, and lay out the problem and how to tackle it? Is there any practical advice you would highlight or examples from the European context of what has worked or what hasn’t, and how it can be applied to the United States?
Hurd: We need to look to our friends in Estonia, in Ukraine, in Poland. I’m starting to develop a theory that the closer you are to Russia, the less likely you are to believe their nonsense. But the converse of that is true, too. The farther away you are, the more susceptible you are to that narrative. Let’s start looking at our allies who have been dealing with this a lot longer than we have. How have they been successful?
We can also look back to the U.S. Information Agency during the Cold War and how they were able to operate. How do we translate and update that into the social media world that we live in now, the interconnected world? We have to look at examples where we or our allies have dealt with this problem, and then start there and figure out how we map that to our current environment — and then who are the right agencies that should be in the lead. I do believe that this is something the National Security Council is focusing on and talking about.
And Congress, we need to continue to shine a light on the problems and identify whether there’s immediate legislation needed. That I don’t know. But the oversight role of Congress is important, because you can shine a light on these problems and make sure people are talking about them.
TCB: What are your biggest concerns moving forward with Russian disinformation? What does the U.S. public need to understand about the Kremlin’s efforts?
Hurd: First and foremost, Russia is our adversary, not our ally. Period. End of story. That is the first thing we have to know. And the American people need to realize that Vladimir Putin does not operate like we do. He uses the press to mislead and manipulate information. Stuff that is coming from Russia should always be looked at with a very critical and suspicious eye. It is a lever of government that the Russians are willing to use in order to achieve their strategic vision — and that’s the reestablishment of the USSR, and Russia being a hegemon in that part of the world.
TCB: Obviously, this is not a new approach from Russia. Tactically, though, there are some new things on the table, with social media, bots, and automation. Have you noticed anything new or any unexpected connections that you would pinpoint for people to have their eyes attuned to?
Hurd: Your point is 100 percent correct — the tactics, techniques, and procedures of disinformation have been the same since Alexander the Great. It’s now just, what are the tools used to execute it? And in today’s world, that’s social media. It’s existing platforms that we all use, whether it’s Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, you name it. Or, it’s leveraging messaging in existing press — so planting stories and things like that. Those are the tools that they’re using. We’ve got to be mindful of it, and that’s why we should always be suspicious of anything that comes from the Kremlin or is talking about the Kremlin. And if you don’t know the qualification of the person you get the information from, think twice.
