The January 14 attack in Jakarta that left four civilians and four terrorists dead serves as a reminder that Indonesia remains vulnerable to groups that would resort to violence and terrorism to achieve their Islamist aspirations.
The previous major terrorist attack in the country had been the twin bombings that struck the Marriott and the Ritz Carlton hotels in Jakarta in 2009. Since then, there have been instances when police say they foiled plots, including an attempt at the life of then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and another to blow up the House of Representatives building.
Inevitably, when police let something slip past them like the January attack, questions are raised about Indonesia’s counterterrorism capabilities.
The suicide bombing, followed by gunfights with the police in a Starbucks outlet in Central Jakarta that January afternoon, quickly drew comparisons to the terrorist attacks in Paris in November and raised the specter of the Islamic State (IS) movement making its mark in Indonesia.
The attackers may have copied the Paris terrorists, but the small number of fatalities compared to more than 200 dead in Paris, and the amateurish way they executed their plan, cast doubts about their real intention and about the nature of the IS connection. None of the four perpetrators had been to Syria, where the IS operates.
Nevertheless, the episode tells us that the Indonesian authorities need to get their act together. It reminds us of U.S. President George W. Bush’s adage that the government needs to get it right 100 percent of the time, while terrorists only need to get it right once. Indonesia cannot afford to make the smallest of mistakes.
The country with the world’s largest Muslim population has always been vulnerable to terrorist attacks from radical Islamic groups. Most are home grown, and they predated the terrorist organizations in the Middle East. Any connection they have with the likes of al Qaeda and the IS are more for reasons of convenience, such as securing funds. But they work and act independently.
The aspirations of turning Indonesia into an Islamic state are as old, if not older, than the republic that gained its independence in 1945.
Most fight for their goals today through the democratic political processes. A small minority stays underground and from time to time would launch their campaign using violence. They are the ones the security authorities have to watch out for.
Indonesia’s counterterrorism capability has come a long way since the 2002 devastating suicide bombing struck the holiday island of Bali and killed more than 200 people by a group affiliated to al Qaeda.
The creation of the police’s Special Detachment 88 Force, combined with better intelligence capability, have led to the arrest of hundreds of terrorist suspects.
Those arrested were given due process of law, tried, and convicted. Three perpetrators of the Bali bombing were executed, and many of the top leaders of the terrorist groups now linger in the high security Nusakambangan Prison Island off the southern coast of Java. The government also runs a deradicalization program for convicted terrorists before they are released.
No less important in defusing the terror threat is the more democratic environment Indonesia has today that allows those with Islamist aspirations to express them openly and to take part in elections to win political representation. The economic progress Indonesia is making, lifting millions out of poverty, has also prevented radical groups from converting and recruiting more people into their cause.
Still there will always be a small group of people in Indonesia who would resort to terrorism to achieve their political goals. This makes monitoring their activities that much easier. Intelligence capability is the most important tool in counterterrorism.
The IS threat, while serious, should not be exaggerated.
As of last December, police say around 700 Indonesians have gone to Syria to fight with the IS, though as many as 400 of them are women and children. For a country with more than 220 million Muslims, this number is proportionally insignificant compared to the number of young Muslim men in Europe who have joined the IS.
Most known, dangerous terrorist leaders are in jail, including the spiritual leader Abu Bakar Basyir. One man remains illusive: Santoso, blamed for the attacks on police officers in the past few years. He has pledged his allegiance to IS.
Police launched a massive manhunt for him starting in October but did not find him. Around Christmas and the New Year holiday, the National Intelligence Agency raised the terror alert to the highest level to suggest that Santoso’s group was planning to launch a massive terrorist attack.
Security checks in malls and office buildings throughout Indonesia visibly increased during the holiday period. They were relaxed one week after the New Year. Then on January 14, Santoso’s men struck.
Police later learned that one of the four perpetrators had just been released from prison a year before, and that he had refused to join the deradicalization program. He, of all the people, should have been an obvious target for constant monitoring.
The fact that police let him slip through goes to show the smallest mistakes can be fatal.
