SUBSCRIBER+EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW — The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is holding its Board of Governors meeting this week, just days after the agency reported that Iran is closer than ever to producing a nuclear weapon.
The IAEA’s confidential report – obtained last week by the Associated Press – said Iran had increased its stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium, and that its so-called “breakout time” to produce weapons-grade uranium had shrunk.
IAEA director-general Rafael Grossi told the Board of Governors Monday that his agency “has lost continuity of knowledge” of multiple areas of the program, and that “public statements made in Iran regarding its technical capabilities to produce nuclear weapons and possible changes to Iran’s nuclear doctrine only increase my concerns.”
As The Cipher Brief reported last week, the latest IAEA findings landed at a moment of domestic uncertainty, just days after the May 19 helicopter crash that killed Iran’s president and foreign minister, and during a period when Iran’s military proxies – in particular Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis – have roiled tensions across the Middle East. Gen. Michael Kurilla, the head of U.S. Central Command, recently warned the Senate Armed Services Committee that if Iran became a nuclear power, it would “change the Middle East forever.”
Successive U.S. governments have vowed to ensure that never happens, while taking markedly different policy approaches. The Obama Administration and several European nations negotiated a landmark 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran, under which Iran agreed to limit uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent purity – well below the 90 percent required for weapons-grade uranium – and to allow IAEA inspections of its facilities in exchange for sanctions relief.
In 2018, the Trump Administration pulled the U.S. out of the deal, and a year later Iran began violating its terms. Two former cabinet members in the Trump White House, former Vice President Mike Pence and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, argued earlier this year for bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Today, Iran is believed to have at least 27 times more enriched uranium than was permitted under the 2015 deal. The latest IAEA report found that as of May 11, Iran had 142.1 kilograms (313.2 pounds) of uranium enriched to 60 percent – more than ever documented previously. Uranium enriched at the 60 percent level is only a small technical step away from being enriched to the weapons-grade level of 90 percent.
Norman Roule is a Cipher Brief expert who has followed Iran for decades, having served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing several programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from 2008 until 2017. Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski spoke to Roule about the IAEA report, its potential impact, and the implications for U.S. policy. Roule said that Iran will continue to “test, test, test” the U.S. via its proxies and the nuclear program, and he suggested a possible paradox in Iran’s thinking: that the country’s interests may be better served by being close to obtaining a nuclear weapon than actually having one.
THE CONTEXT
- July 2015: Iran, U.S. and others signs the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The deal significantly restricts Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.
- May 2018: President Donald Trump withdraws from JCPOA, reimposing economic sanctions on Iran.
- May 2019: Iran says it will not be bound by stockpile limitations in the JCPOA and threatens to restart other nuclear activities restricted by the deal. Iran has since abandoned all limits in the deal and accelerated enrichment.
- February 2021: The IAEA finds uranium traces at undeclared sites in Iran.
- June 2022: The IAEA’s board of governors votes to censure Iran over Iran’s failure to provide “credible” explanations on the uranium found at undeclared sites. Iran responds by removing 27 U.N. cameras monitoring nuclear activity.
- September 2023: Iran bars several IAEA inspectors from monitoring the country’s nuclear program.
- May 2024: A confidential IAEA report finds that Iran has steadily increased its stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium. The report also says Iran has not reconsidered its September 2023 decision to bar IAEA inspectors. Tehran maintains it has “done its utmost” to enable IAEA monitoring and verification activities.
THE INTERVIEW
The following excerpt of this interview has been lightly edited for clarity.
The Cipher Brief: What were your reactions to the IAEA report?
Roule: My first comment is that Iran's nuclear program looks exactly like what a country would undertake if it sought to gradually build a nuclear enterprise capable of achieving weaponization, including the production of multiple nuclear weapons. This strategy allows it to assess international red lines and create a new normal for its nuclear efforts.
My second point is that the latest IAEA findings are consistent with previous reports in that they document not only noncompliance with IAEA requirements but underscore the IAEA's diminishing ability to say that Iran's nuclear ambitions are peaceful.
Next, Iran’s refusal to cooperate with the IAEA is longstanding – and that history is important. In June 2004, the IAEA adopted a resolution unanimously that reprimanded Iran for following the same pattern of noncompliance. Iran's engagement with the IAEA and the international community on nuclear issues has consistently shown that it believes that a mix of diplomatic promises, lengthy negotiations, tough rhetoric, and ultimately defiance will enable it to achieve its nuclear ambitions without incurring any regime-threatening economic, political or security consequences. Its latest actions have contributed to an international diplomatic environment in which sanctions enforcement on Iran’s oil sales is at an all-time low.
Ironically, the objections to increasing pressure on Iran at the time were identical to much of what we hear today. Opponents of pressure argued that Iran’s hardliners would respond to tough action by accelerating its nuclear program and perhaps initiating weaponization, reducing cooperation with the IAEA, and even withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These same voices argued that pressure would inevitably lead to a conventional war in the region. Instead, these voices argue for diplomacy, insisting that if diplomacy fails, all options would be on the table, including the use of military force. These advocates also contend that diplomacy is also useful to build a coalition of partners for tougher action.
Unfortunately, these efforts have shown that Tehran is uninterested in permanent constraints on its enrichment program and that relentless diplomacy becomes endless diplomacy lacking any coercive element. This brings about the worst of all worlds: Iran’s nuclear program expands, the international community loses credibility, and advocates of diplomacy eventually argue that the expanded program makes a military option unworkable.
The Cipher Brief: Do you think at heart the Iranians’ end game here is to possess a nuclear bomb? Or that their endgame now is to use this as a lever to achieve a reduction or an elimination of all sanctions?
Roule: I think it's more – and less – than that. The intelligence community continues to state in its public reporting that Iran has not made the decision to finalize a nuclear weapons program. At the same time, Tehran does use the diminishing distance to a weapon as a shield against pressure from the West and other areas. Even retired intelligence officers should avoid forecasting the future, but it is likely that the issue for Iran’s current policymakers is probably less “Should we get a bomb?” – but rather “If we get a bomb, do we lose out on the diplomatic advantages we have with a nuclear program that is close to a bomb but has not yet initiated weaponization and possibly risk a military attack?”
The Cipher Brief: It looks like the French, British and Germans are going to recommend or request an IAEA censure of Iran – how does that work, if the U.S. is opposed?
Roule: It depends on what is being put into the text. Up front, the Biden administration will strenuously avoid a breach with the EU, let alone an election-year narrative that it is softer on Iran than Europe. I think in the end, tough language is probably the best you will get out of this. Even this will be tough. Russia and China are likely to oppose any censure of Iran for noncompliance. The Russian delegate to the IAEA, Mikhail Ulyanov, is a difficult individual who has consistently and loudly protected Iranian equities.
The Cipher Brief. What would an IAEA censure entail?
Roule: The question is whether the IAEA will refer the Iran problem to the UN Security Council. My sense is that this isn’t going to happen, and here again history is our guide. The June 2004 IAEA resolution against Iran included harsh and direct language. The issues will sound similar: Tehran’s cooperation was incomplete, and Iran had denied the IAEA access to key elements of the program. Nonetheless, the IAEA did not state that Iran was in non-compliance, because that would've meant turning the report over to the UN Security Council.
The Cipher Brief: If the Iran nuclear issue does go back to the UN Security Council, I gather snapback of sanctions would be in play. Can you explain what “snapback” means?
Roule: Snapback refers to a provision in the 2015 agreement which would reimpose any UN nuclear sanctions that were lifted during the nuclear deal. The requirement is a determination that Iran showed significant non-performance of nuclear commitments under the JCPOA.
To be clear, this means Iran’s harsh human rights oppression, support for militias, or provision of drones to Russia wouldn’t count. At the same time, snapback would reinstate the now-expired UN conventional arms embargo against Iran, as well as bar Iran from exporting missiles and drones.
Most important, the Iranian nuclear activity allowed by the nuclear deal would be forbidden. This would include enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water work. Iran would also be barred from conducting ballistic missile activity related to missiles capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Travel and financial restrictions on Iranian persons, organizations, banks involved in Iran nuclear program would return.
An essential element of the snapback process is that it can’t be blocked by any member of the UN Security Council. U.S. and EU policymakers recognized that Moscow or Beijing might try to protect Iran, so the process means that once a member calls for snapback, sanctions are restored within thirty days unless the Security Council passes a resolution to continue to waive sanctions. Since all Security Council members have a veto, this means we would simply veto any proposal to block sanctions.
All involved in this process understand that Tehran would defy these restrictions, and this would raise the specter of military action. Some will argue that even the idea of IAEA pressure on Iran will sharpen hardline control over the country in the upcoming elections. Tehran understands that there is no international appetite for military action against Iran.
The Cipher Brief: You wrote for us recently, on the day that we learned about the helicopter crash that killed Iran’s president and foreign minister. To what extent are their deaths relevant in the discussions we're having right now?
Roule: Up front, the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi will have negligible impact on the framework of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Ali) Khamenei is the ultimate arbiter on that issue. But this answer is a bit shallow.
Although Khamenei does define the ultimate goal of the nuclear program, and thus the limits of any concessions, he leaves it to the president and foreign minister to negotiate the best possible deal within that construct as well as how to exploit the talks to obtain non-nuclear sanctions relief and diplomatic gains in other areas (without allowing actual negotiations on these issues). Just as Western negotiators aim to exploit progress in nuclear talks to moderate other Iranian behavior, Tehran uses the prospect of progress in nuclear talks to seek relief on non-nuclear issues important to the regime.
As we saw in the 2014 nuclear talks and every Iranian engagement with the IAEA, Tehran promises cooperation, insists the U.S. is making too many demands, and threatens to walk away.
One last point on the upcoming Iranian presidential election. Inevitably, some in the U.S. and EU will argue that since the election (will) include candidates perceived as amenable to some degree of diplomacy, any significant diplomatic pressure at this time would only help hardliners, and thus would be counterproductive.
The Cipher Brief: What do you think the United States and the international community should do?
Roule: First, we need a consistent and bipartisan policy that includes harsher consequences that directly punish those involved in Iran’s most aggressive and lethal actions. We should be clear that this means military action against Iran’s operatives abroad, at least to the point where we let Iran know that we will treat their personnel with the same aggression that they direct against us.
The policy should be coordinated with Europe and Iran’s neighbors but not be hostage to those advocating for endless diplomacy. This is important because Iran will test our fortitude once we act, and will use the threat of regional or nuclear expansion to deter policymakers.
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