Few things are more hotly debated in Washington and other capitals than the question of how to defeat the Islamic State. Ideas are all over the map, but a starting point for strategy has to be acceptance of the realities we face. Here are six:
First, the context is totally different than any previous Middle East crisis. The region today is torn by no fewer than five dimensions of conflict: Persian vs. Arab; Shia vs. Sunni; democrats vs. authoritarians; terrorists vs. regimes; and terrorists vs. terrorists. Maneuvering through all of this requires unprecedented agility.
Second, ISIS possesses at least five advantages that Al Qaeda never had:
- Territory – now more than half of Iraq and Syria
- Money – probably somewhere between $500M and $1B, according to US Treasury officials
- Access – with about 3,500 fighters from Western countries (out of a force of about 30,000), many can move back into the West without visa restrictions
- Narrative – slick propaganda riding on social media and showcasing a tangible “Caliphate” that tempts alienated youth with offers of jobs and a sense of belonging
- Governing Experience that includes more than brutality — ranging from hospitals to tax collection and administration of justice (in ways that sometimes contrast favorably with people’s experience under Syrian or Iraqi rule). Al-Qaeda never came close to this.
Third, time matters. The longer ISIS enjoys these advantages, the deeper its roots and the more reconciled populations will become to its reality and rule. The timetable keeps slipping on plans to retake ISIS conquests, such as Ramadi or Mosul.
Fourth, Iraq and Syria are a “package.” It is the alienation of abused Sunnis (70 percent of Syria and 25 percent of Iraq) that is the underlying architecture of the ISIS drive. Until their grievances are met by transition to more inclusive government in Damascus and stronger evidence of such in Baghdad, the ISIS beast will keep growing (reportedly at a rate of about one thousand per month).
Fifth, Iran and Russia will be players. Tehran already has “boots” on the ground. It has partnered with Shia militias that are doing much of the anti-ISIS fighting in Iraq — while its Hezbollah proxy does the same in Syria; Moscow wields influence with Syria’s President Assad, to whom Russia supplies money and weapons. There have been some hopeful diplomatic signs lately. Iran has encouraged cease fires in parts of Syria. Moscow has reached out to Saudi Arabia – seemingly to explore Saudi flexibility on Syria. The Syrian intelligence chief has visited Saudi Arabia for talks.
Sixth, air power will not be enough. Having access finally to Turkey’s Incirlik airbase has vastly improved air access and strike timeliness — and airpower (manned and unmanned) has degraded ISIS leadership. But ISIS is well organized with a seemingly deep leadership bench. ISIS is primarily a ground-based phenomenon that blends terrorist and conventional army tactics in ways that demand it be confronted directly on those terms. Based on public reports, we’ve trained fewer than two percent of the number of anti-ISIS fighters we want to throw into Syria.
This array of realities defies simple strategic formulas. Experts have put many ideas on the table: more heavily arming the Kurdish Peshmerga, probably the region’s fiercest and most reliable fighting force; sending US Special Operations Forces and targeteers far forward with Iraqi troops to bolster leadership and combat effectiveness; speeding up the training of anti-ISIS fighters for Syria; broadening, manning, and protecting more robustly a “Safe Zone” for anti-ISIS forces, especially in Syria.
All of these ideas have merit, but their proponents are united on another proposition: that defeating ISIS will take a very long time–if it can ever be done. Even the President has all but acknowledged that the “ultimate defeat” of the ISIS will be up to his successor.
In situations like this, when dozens of ideas are swirling about with no consensus, it is useful to ask the classic “paradigm shift” question: what is it that–if it could be done–would move the problem closest to solution? In this situation, there are two things that together would crack through the largest number of problems.
The first, not surprisingly, is taking back substantial territory from the Islamic State. To have ISIS on the run and in retreat would undermine its narrative, diminish its territory, erode its image of invincibility and embolden cowed populations now under its sway.
This will require a ground force, and it will probably have to come from within the region. One of the things lacking in the current strategy is a visionary “big idea,” and it might be time to push hard for a pan-Arab regional security organization to do the job. A book could be written on why this would be impossible, but to think so is to essentially acknowledge that containment of ISIS is the best we can hope for–and therefore that ISIS has essentially won. Read Dean Acheson’s post WWII memoir, Present at the Creation. Now, as then, we need some big ideas.
The second thing that would cut through many of the obstacles is a Syria settlement that would assuage the concerns of the country’s long-suffering majority Sunnis. This is a more challenging diplomatic feat even than the Balkan settlement of the 1990s, in part because the US, Iran, Russia–and Saudi Arabia–would have to find some way to bring their interests into sufficient alignment to see Assad to the door and create a more pluralistic government.
It is easy to say this cannot be done. But to accept that, as Assad becomes progressively weaker–now controlling only about a sixth of the country–is to increase the probability of the ultimate nightmare: another failed state in the Middle East, possibly with the ISIS flag flying over Damascus.
