There can be no doubt that over the past ten years, Russia has honed its active measures operations – or covert action in U.S. intelligence parlance – into strategic tools to be taken seriously. A great deal of time and effort has been focused on the specific methodologies used by Russia: trolls, bots, cyber intrusion teams with names like Fancy Bear, fake Facebook accounts, and so on. It is critically important to understand the nuts and bolts of how the intelligence services controlled by Russian President Vladimir Putin are running these complex, multifaceted operations.
But while better analysis of the technical aspects of the Russian operations is important, understanding the strategic goals and the reasons for them is equally, if not more important. The Kremlin may favor a particular candidate in an election – say, Donald Trump or Marine Le Pen – but his primary goal is to delegitimize and disrupt democratic processes in the West. As Germans prepare to go to the polls, it is worth reviewing Russia’s overarching goals – not just the how, but also the why of the attacks on Western democracies.
In the aftermath of the French elections earlier this year, which culminated in the election of Emmanuel Macron, it is clear Russia supported Macron’s opponent – right wing politician Marine Le Pen. When her campaign ran low on funds, Le Pen’s National Front party secured about 11 million Euro from Russian banks, all of which at the end of the day are controlled by Putin. Not coincidentally, Le Pen supported Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, as well as the European Union sanctions that resulted. Le Pen also vowed to withdraw France from NATO, if elected. Other themes in Le Pen’s campaign tracked well with Putin’s positions, such as nationalism/populism and concerns over Muslim immigration.
In addition to funding Le Pen, Russia appears to have conducted at least two additional operations: the French language version of RT, a Russian propaganda tool, was supporting pro-Le Pen/anti-Macron political themes, and a second, WikiLeaks-style dump of information critical of the Macron campaign just prior to French voting. American intelligence services and lawmakers provided as much advance warning as they could to French authorities prior to the elections. Despite the Russian attempts, Macron won the elections.
Most Americans are far more versed in how the Russians attacked the U.S. electoral system in 2016. Most understand that like Le Pen, candidate Trump was the better candidate for Moscow than any of his competitors. Like Le Pen, Trump did not criticize Putin for annexing Crimea during his campaign, and also like Le Pen, Trump injected doubt as to whether sanctions against Russia were the right thing to do. Candidate Trump also expressed his displeasure with NATO, opining that the alliance might be obsolete. Russia’s operations in the U.S. prior to the elections have a great deal in common with its actions in France: the Russian hack of the Democratic National Committee and the subsequent leak of information via WikiLeaks damaged the campaign of Hillary Clinton. RT, Sputnik, and other Russian propaganda mechanisms were also active, and it is now emerging that hundreds of Facebook accounts advocating political positions in the U.S. had links back to Russia. Certainly the Trump team’s business ties to Russia were strong – see Michael Flynn, Paul Manafort, Carter Page, Roger Stone, and importantly, Trump family members Donald Trump Jr. and Jared Kushner. Unlike in France, however – and probably to the Kremlin’s surprise – their preferred candidate won.
The Germans can and should take the possibility of an attack on their electoral process quite seriously. Angela Merkel is running for a fourth term as Chancellor, and during Merkel’s tenure, Germany has taken a leadership role in Europe, standing up to Putin’s actions over the past several years. Unlike both Trump and Le Pen, Merkel and her government have been highly critical of the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s continued destabilizing and lethal actions in eastern Ukraine. Despite taking significant domestic political heat, Merkel continues to support liberal immigration policies, also in sharp contrast to Le Pen and Trump. Germany can therefore expect to see Russian tactics similar to those used in France and the United States, including propaganda from the usual Russian suspects such as RT, Sputnik, and the like, in an attempt to undermine elections. If the past is any indication, the Germans should also be expecting additional cyber attacks from Moscow – and indeed, the German security services have already detected several such attacks. Recently, Merkel’s party, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany, suffered thousands of cyber intrusions originating from Russian IP addresses.
In the final analysis, Russia’s specific active measures methodologies – which are important to understand and identify – are less critical than understanding Putin’s broader goals in Germany and elsewhere. Propaganda has been around in Russia at least since Vladimir Lenin named the first official Soviet newspaper “Pravda,” or Truth. The tactics have evolved, and the beginning of the modern era of active measures arguably began for Russia about ten years ago, with cyber attacks against neighboring Estonia. The subsequent cyber attacks on Georgia, propaganda efforts in support of Crimean annexation, and the continuing active measures in eastern Ukraine have completed the evolution of modern Russian active measures.
But to understand Putin’s goals and true intent, one must first understand how Putin views Russian interests in Western elections and politics. First and foremost, given that modern Russia is an autocratic state, Putin must seek to weaken any force threatening autocracies anywhere. The most obvious force Putin fears is democracy and open society, and the possibility of their spread. So while the Kremlin will most certainly try to influence Western elections that could result in a candidate with favorable views towards Moscow winning, this is mostly tactical.
What Putin really wants to accomplish is the undermining of democracy itself. This is why elections, a part of the DNA of any democracy, are a particularly attractive target. Even if the Moscow-leaning candidate does not win - a la Le Pen – questions about the legitimacy of the elections themselves cast doubt in the minds of voters. If citizens believe the vote will be rigged or meddled with, due to either domestic or foreign actors, they may choose not to participate. Likewise, if another building block of democracy – a free press – is discredited, voters will be less informed and less able to accurately identify foreign election disruptions of all types. If democratic governments are seen as inept and corrupt to the point of being unable to defend themselves against foreign cyber attacks, the confidence of citizens in their governments is eroded, and they may be less likely to become involved in civic life. As a bonus, Russian citizens will be encouraged to positively compare the Russian system of government – despite it being authoritarian plutocracy – to the Western democracy, with the conclusion being that the Russian system is no more flawed than any other. Finally, the general chaos, confusion, and distrust sown by active measures take a toll on all parts of the democratic system, from politics to trade to immigration policy. All of these outcomes are desirable and beneficial for the Kremlin.
In this chaos lies the greatest potential for reaching the key goal of autocrats like Putin: weakening democracy worldwide and dividing the West. The upcoming elections in Germany provide Putin an opportunity to further erode democratic principles and international law. Weakened Western democracy enables and encourages Putin and others of his ilk to do things like annex portions of independent nations, and threaten war in countries that begin to lean to far towards the West. In Vladimir Putin’s mind, Western democracy represents a direct threat that must be removed at all costs.