EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW — The Middle East is on the brink of a new war, after a dizzying series of events: Israel has battered Hezbollah militants in Lebanon, including the assassination of the group's leader; Iran – Hezbollah’s longtime patron – has attacked Israel; and now Israel is vowing to carry out a powerful retaliation against Iran. As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu put it, "Iran has made a big mistake...and it will pay for it."
Israel has been at war with Hamas in Gaza for nearly a year, but in less than two weeks, its war against Hezbollah has brought it to the verge of a full-scale war with Iran. And now the Middle East, for all the tensions and conflicts that have riven the region for years, is in uncharted territory.
The United States Central Command, or CENTCOM, is the American military command responsible for the Middle East, and it's where General Frank McKenzie served as top commander from 2019 to 2022. General McKenzie spent much of that time worrying about precisely the sort of conflicts and crises that are in play right now. He spoke with Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski about the options on the table for Israel, the more limited options available for Iran, and how and whether the U.S. might get involved in this fraught moment in the region.
This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
Nagorski: What’s your assessment of the Iranian missile strikes? And was there anything in the strikes or the defense against them that surprised you?
McKenzie: I think the Iranian attack was a symbol of just how desperate Iran is right now. They've been pushed into a corner. Their major ally, Lebanese Hezbollah, is on its back foot, unable to coordinate an effective strike into Israel itself. Hezbollah’s leader is gone and not coming back. Iran's in a tough spot.
I think the decision to strike Israel was an act of desperation by Iran, because they know not a lot has changed from the attack in April. This was an attack larger in scale, with ballistic missiles, but absent drones and land attack cruise missiles. There are a lot of reasons why that could be – possibly to gain surprise, which they did not gain. That's the only reason I can think of that they went with a purely ballistic missile attack. But I would assess, along with most of the people who've looked at the attack, it was largely a failure. An excellent example of Israeli effectiveness and U.S. assistance that deflected the attack almost completely.
Nagorski: It was President Biden who said, after Iran’s attack in April, that Israel should “take the win.” It certainly looks like Israel is in no mood to “take the win” this time. And they've publicly said a big response may be coming. What's changed? Why the different response now?
McKenzie: One of the key things is that Hezbollah is not in position now to coordinate a major attack against Israel. That's obvious. If they were able to do that, they probably would have contributed to the attack Tuesday. They did not. So that was always the main threat against Israel. It's never been Iranian missiles.
What we saw last night from Iran – an initial volley of a little over 100 missiles and a second volley of a little over 100 missiles – that's about all Iran can shoot at any one time against Israel, because the missiles have to be placed on tractor-erector launchers, taken to their launching site, and then launched. So Iran can't gain a larger volume of fire against Israel. So what we saw in April, and a little more now, is about an Iranian maximum effort against Israel. Iran has demonstrated their ineffectiveness twice, and I think, again, that reflects Iranian desperation.
What confronts Israel is, as you said, are they going to “take the win?” Remember, in April, they did take the win, but they also did launch a counterattack against Iran. But it was carefully circumscribed, designed to show Israeli technological dominance and Israeli restraint. Now, a larger Iranian ballistic missile attack, and the images that we all saw of missiles being intercepted over the urban areas of Tel Aviv are certainly horrific. I don't think they can afford to turn the other cheek now.
At the same time, I don't know that Israel needs to go all in with a massive counter strike. But here's the key thing: We always have said Iran typically owns the lower steps on the escalation ladder; Israel and the United States own all the higher steps on the escalation ladder. And that's where we are right now. The momentum and the initiative is all on Israel's side.
How do they cash that in? They have a lot of options. They could do just about what they want against Iran – not with impunity, but with great confidence. They could strike the nuclear program. They could strike oil production facilities. They could strike Iranian leadership. Or they could do less than that. When I was thinking about this last night, I thought, Well, they'll wait till they see what happens with the battle damage assessment. Well, the battle damage assessment from the Iranian attack tells us the results were negligible. Not a lot of casualties.
So Israel has a full spectrum of options open to them. And I think that what they want to do is probably prevent another Iranian attack, to demonstrate to the Iranians that they're not going to be able to attack with impunity. That would argue for some form of an attack.
And I believe there will be some form of an Israeli response. I don't think they're going to turn the other cheek. That's an interesting concept in game theory, but it’s not an actual practical policy in the Middle East. I think they will do something. What it is, I don't know. Remember, as Israel looks at Iran, they're also conducting significant combat operations up to the north against Lebanese Hezbollah. And in Gaza. So they will have to weigh that as they consider a possible response against Iran.
Nagorski: You mentioned an escalation ladder in terms of Iran, the US, and Israel. What's a low-end rung for an Israeli response, and what would be an example of the highest end they might go for?
McKenzie: A low-end response would be something akin to what they did in April. Go in, operate along the Tehran-Isfahan corridor. Go in, in a way that strikes lightly at some targets just to demonstrate your ability to do so. Something that continues the narrative of Israeli technological superiority. I think that's very important. It has a very deterring effect.
Then you could look at perhaps limited strikes against some oil infrastructure targets. I think that's certainly possible. Apparently the Iranians were trying to strike Mossad headquarters; I think that would make every Iranian intelligence organization vulnerable to an Israeli strike. You could go against them.
At the higher level, you could go against the nuclear program. I think that's a very, very difficult target. It would be a very difficult target for the United States. It would be a very difficult target for Israel, requiring a vast expenditure of resources. I've studied that problem for a long time, so I speak as an expert on it. And then you could consider leadership targets. I don't think they would consider that, but I don't know.
So that's the rising ladder. But here's the thing: all of these options are open to Israel. Initiative right now is squarely on Israel's side. Iran looks weak, and ineffective. They don't have a lot. If Israel hits them again, the Iranians aren't going to come back with some “crushing” attack, as they said. They can't do better than they did Tuesday, with their ballistic missiles. They can launch drones, they can launch cruise missiles, but they were defeated.
In the last attack in April, they could call upon their proxies in the region to attack U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria. It is possible that Iran could do that in response. And then they could choose to attack their Arab neighbors along the southern end of the Arabian Gulf. They would have more effect with their missiles against those targets. But that would widen the war and certainly not to Iran's benefit.
Nagorski: What does a wider war mean in this context?
McKenzie: I would argue that perhaps we're in the wider war now. If your country has been attacked by 200 ballistic missiles and you're an Israeli citizen, you'd probably say, well, this is a wider war. So we continue to redefine what a wider war is, as each step is crossed. I think we entered a period of “wider war” back in April, when Iran attacked Israel directly. We've been in that period since then, and it's only growing. So I think you will see more Iranian attempts to strike at metropolitan Israel.
I think you'll see them try to bring in their proxies. I think you'll try to see them bring in Lebanese Hezbollah, although again, I'm not sure Hezbollah can coordinate an attack on Israel right now. All of these things will happen. The Houthis will jump in, although their ability to attack Israel is quite limited. Their ability in the Bab-El-Mandeb is significant; their ability to strike Israel, quite limited. So that's what you'd see from the Iranian side.
Israel has a lot more options. They have a lot more combat capability that they could deploy against Iran, and they could choose to do that. They could go after some of the targets we've mentioned – oil infrastructure targets, nuclear targets, government infrastructure targets, and of course the leadership itself.
Nagorski: And can the Israelis prosecute and sustain what effectively now are three wars, or three fronts – in Gaza, in Lebanon and against Iran?
McKenzie: I would argue that they can. They've had great success in Lebanon. But remember, the key metric for Israel and Lebanon is that they've got to stop the attacks against the northern tier of Israeli kibbutzim, cities and villages. They've got to prevent Lebanese Hezbollah from continuing these relatively low-tech rocket attacks that have pushed 70,000 Israeli citizens out. That's the metric of success in that war. And they have not yet achieved it. I suspect they will, but it requires putting ground forces into Lebanon, which they have done, and I've already seen some reporting on Israeli casualties there. Those Israeli casualties are going to grow as they go north. It will not be an air war, as we saw early on in this campaign. Now your infantry, armor, artillery – the men and women, they're going have to get very close to the enemy.
Nagorski: What do you foresee in terms of the United States role in any response to Iran’s strikes, and whatever happens going forward?
McKenzie: Our intelligence relationship with Israel is broad and deep. I'm sure we're sharing intelligence information. I don't know that we would undertake any more right now, anything kinetic in this Israeli response. I think the Israelis are probably perfectly capable of responding on their own. I think we are committed to the defense of Israel. We saw that last night. What we call BMD (ballistic missile defense) shooters, those destroyers down in the eastern Mediterranean, they fired very effectively against some of those ballistic missiles that were striking Israel.
So I think that will continue. Our support for the defense of Israel will continue. But I would expect that a potential Israeli response against Iran would be executed by the Israelis themselves.
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