India and Pakistan have experienced numerous militarized engagements and three wars over the disputed territory of Kashmir. Of particular note is that India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear status has not resolved the security challenges of Kashmir; in fact, it has continued to be a flashpoint for open conflict between the two nuclear powers. New episodes of tension provide an opportunity for reflection on the risks of crisis escalation in South Asia.
The latest crisis episode between India and Pakistan over Kashmir emerged following months of significant unrest in the Kashmir Valley. On September 18, militants attacked an Indian Army base in the Uri sector of Kashmir, which resulted in the deaths of 19 soldiers. Arguing that the militants originated from Pakistan, India accused Pakistan of supporting cross-border terrorism. Amidst a cacophony of media voices and strategic analysts calling for an aggressive response, India began reviewing punitive diplomatic and economic options.
Then, on September 29, India surprised many by for the first time publiclyclaiming to have conducted surgical strikes on terrorist launch pads across the Line of Control (LoC) in parts of Pakistani-held territory. This move carried escalatory potential especially in an environment of poor information, compressed decision making, and strong incentives for action to appease domestic audiences. However, Pakistan appeared to deflect these pressures by denying that such surgical strikes ever occurred, choosing not to respond and allowing the potential crisis to subside.
American support for India’s position just before the publicizing of surgical strikes may imply at least tacit acceptance. However, it also urged restraint and likely worked behind the scenes to dissuade either side from making a “third move.”
Most American policymakers tend to neglect competitive dynamics in South Asia until a crisis erupts bringing the nuclear-armed rivals to the brink of war. Although American attention quickly returns to other priorities after the abatement of a crisis, there are always lessons to be gleaned before the next inevitable cycle. In this recent case, some features are encouraging for crisis stability, while others could prove troubling in the future.
Encouraging Features of the Uri Episode
The first encouraging feature is that the current tensions between India and Pakistan fit into a familiar background. Crises are most dangerous when a product of unexpected events. In the case of Uri, however, India and Pakistan have experienced the scenario of cross-border terrorism against hardened security force targets numerous times. This history gives both actors familiarity with perceived escalatory thresholds in conjunction with an awareness of the script for possible moves and proportional countermoves. The recent tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats and an uptick in cross-border artillery duels are both routine enough to avoid spiraling out of control.
New features may result in future crises being mismanaged, however. Less familiar future backdrops could include a cross-border terrorist attack on the Indian heartland (as opposed to a border region like Kashmir), proxy attacks on each others’ consulates in Afghanistan, or incidents at sea amidst rising naval competition and expansive exercises.
Second, India carefully calibrated a response. Prime Minister Narendra Modi first sought to pressure Pakistan through diplomatic, political, and economic moves. This manifested in the diplomatic embarrassment of Pakistan by most South Asian countries’ decision to drop out of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit, scheduled for November in Islamabad. Other moves by India were to publicly condemn the Pakistani government for its failure to crack down on internationally recognized terrorist organizations, raise the threat of economic consequences through rollback of most favored nation trading status for Pakistan, and threaten the interdiction of Pakistan’s water supplies within the bounds of the Indus Waters Treaty. Though still provocative, these non-kinetic actions are relatively restrained, because they do not threaten an adversary with significant, immediate harm that generates an intense pressure to respond.
Third, although India opted to take cross-border kinetic action, a number of scholars and even a former Indian National Security Advisor argued that the limited time, scope, and targets of the strikes suggested they fit within a paradigm of “strategic restraint.” Specifically, the military response remained confined close to the LoC and principally targeted militants about to infiltrate into Indian-held territory. The operation could be characterized more as one of interdiction to pre-empt and deny militant objectives rather than as an aggressive strike against Pakistan.
Finally, Pakistan’s refusal to publicly acknowledge the Indian “surgical strikes” lowered escalatory pressure for it to respond with a kinetic cross-border response. Public acknowledgement of the attack by the Pakistani government would have created enormous domestic pressure to respond, especially considering decades of blustery rhetoric and past precedent. This form of backstage crisis management fits into an established pattern of states refusing to acknowledge the actions of an adversary to avoid escalatory pressures, such as the American refusal to publically acknowledge Soviet airpower in the Korean War.
Some Troubling Features of the Uri Episode
At the same time, a number of features of the Uri crisis episode portend continued risks and escalatory dangers in the future.
First, India and Pakistan have done little to address fundamental factors that facilitate the continuation of crises between the two countries. Whether by design, lower prioritization, or capability gaps of the Pakistani state, anti-India militant groups continue to operate within Pakistan. Regrettably, India continues to leave itself vulnerable to these sorts of attacks, both in terms of weak defenses and an unwillingness to seriously confront the political disaffection and abuses in Kashmir. Both factors create incentives and opportunities for terrorist attacks.
Second, India’s public trumpeting of its “surgical strikes” creates additional escalatory dangers. On the one hand, publicity can in theory send a deterrent signal to Pakistan that plausibly deniable asymmetric attacks will be met with unpredictable kinetic action. The flip side, however, is that publicity also sets a precedent for a kinetic response. Even if a non-violent response were best suited for a future cross-border attack against India, increased publicity has arguably made the course of kinetic restraint much more difficult with increased expectations of military action by the Indian public. Increasingly jingoistic media landscapes on both sides will not help matters.
Finally, the heightened alert status that occurred on both sides suggests a risk of misinterpretation of offensive preparations by either side. Pakistan conducted air defense drills, scrambled fighter jets, announced target sets, and raised the alert status of its troops. For its part, India began evacuating citizens residing near the border, placing forward air bases on high alert, conducted major air exercises, and moved troops towards the LoC. All of these moves, even if just signaling, strongly indicate the uncertainty that characterizes crises. If India and Pakistan continue to posture so strongly, such escalatory moves within a future crisis could trigger accidents or be (mis)perceived as preparations for war.
Continuing Dangers
For the time being, the odds of future crises emerging in South Asia remain high.
Militant groups continue to operate out of Pakistan, and Indian mismanagement of Kashmir creates further opportunities for cross-border violence. Despite India’s best efforts to isolate it, China and Russia are building new modalities of cooperation with Pakistan. While American and European reliance on Pakistan for both counterterrorism and objectives in Afghanistan is declining, Pakistan will remain important enough for the foreseeable future to generate restraint from both actors.
Although the Modi government has calculated that capability gaps and the risks of escalation make a disproportional response not worth the potential costs, the recent public precedent has likely made kinetic restraint much more difficult in the aftermath of a future attack. Although Pakistan appears to have backed down in this episode, it may not be able to resist a military response to future cross-border surgical strikes.
When it comes to overt or covert military engagement, there is no template for perfect calibration. American policymakers called to manage future South Asian crises have to be attentive to the evolving incentives for kinetic action by both India and Pakistan as well as the accompanying risks of misinformation, miscalculation, and inadvertent escalation.
