The Cipher Brief’s Bennett Seftel sat down with Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution, to discuss how the results from last Friday’s Iranian presidential election could impact Iranian domestic and foreign policy moving forward.
The Cipher Brief: Leading up to the Iranian presidential election, polls showed incumbent President Hassan Rouhani and main hardline rival Ebrahim Raisi competing in a tight race. How surprised were you by Rouhani’s decisive victory after he obtained 57 percent of the vote compared to Raisi’s 38 percent?
Suzanne Maloney: The campaign itself was a surprising one overall. As recently as a few months ago, it seemed unlikely that Rouhani would face any serious competition. The conservatives historically have failed to mobilize behind a single figure, and in any case Rouhani could claim a comfortable measure of both popular support and establishment confidence. In that sense, Raisi’s rise was the real surprise: he had never engaged in the electoral process previously, unlike Rouhani, who was elected five times to the parliament. Just as another hardline favorite, former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, seemed to quickly lose steam as soon as the 2013 campaign formally began, it was not obvious that Raisi would remain competitive through a relatively grueling schedule of appearances and lengthy televised debates.
Unlike elsewhere in the world, in Iran, the independent pollsters managed to get it right; they predicted the margin of victory almost dead-on. However, the wild card was always the question of ballot rigging, and there were some signals that the system was prepared to ensure a Raisi win, including the suggestion by news agencies affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard that the polling favored him. But it became clear over the course of the day’s vote that the outcome was moving in Rouhani’s favor – which means that the system chose not to manipulate the outcome. That is a relief to all Iranians, especially those who prefer to continue on the course of engagement and economic reform that Rouhani has pursued in his first term.
TCB: What does Rouhani’s reelection mean for Iranian foreign and domestic policy moving forward?
SM: In the short term, I expect very little change. There is a natural temptation to view Rouhani as strengthened by the election’s resounding outcome. Unfortunately, that’s unlikely. In fact, the fiercely fought campaign exposed the deep polarization within Iranian society. Some substantial proportion of the electorate harbors deep resentment toward not just the leadership but the “four percent,” as Qalibaf described that segment of Iranians who have prospered as a result of their proximity to power. They are susceptible to populist promises, and view the economic and diplomatic openings with trepidation rather than relief.
Friday’s vote tally improves upon Rouhani’s original election four years ago, when he barely reached a plurality. However, Raisi’s nearly 16 million votes suggest that the conservative base has not expanded much over the course of the past four years, but neither has it diminished. The guardians of orthodoxy within the Islamic Republic can count on a sizeable blocking minority. More importantly, they have levers beyond the ballot box at their disposal, including the leadership of the security forces, the judiciary, and a willingness to use any means necessary.
In addition, Rouhani faces some other familiar problems. In veering left, he surely helped secure strong turnout—74 percent—and probably swayed many of those who grew disappointed with what the nuclear deal has delivered. However, he also committed himself publicly to making progress on issues where he has only the most tenuous authority and where Khatami, aided by a reformist parliament, ultimately failed to generate meaningful change.
For this reason, his second term begins with an even stiffer challenge than his first. Dashed expectations among some proportion of the public after his first administration threatened his reelection; Rouhani will have to maneuver skillfully to avoid an even more dramatic disconnect between public demands and government achievements over the course of the next four years.
At his first post-election news conference, Iranian journalists burst into applause when a questioner advised him to continue behaving as he had during the final week of the campaign. Nonetheless, Rouhani responded exactly as he has governed for the past four years: judicious, risk-averse, focused on discrete, achievable goals rather than broad transformational initiatives. My guess is that he will focus on economic reforms, particularly for the banking sector. That is where he has support within the parliament to continue making progress, and ultimately, a large dimension of how the Iranian population will judge the success or failure of his presidency relates to whether he is able to improve their day-to-day living standards.
TCB: Raisi was touted as a potential successor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. How could this electoral loss impact that potential? Could Rouhani possibly be considered as a successor to Khamenei?
SM: For the foreseeable future, I think the election necessarily diminishes or even derails the prospects of Raisi succeeding Khamenei at any time. Institutions matter more than individuals in Iran, and it would represent a demotion of the perceived authority of the supreme leader if the office were to be assumed by someone who had been rejected decisively by Iranians at the ballot box. Perhaps Raisi was not the heir apparent, or perhaps Khamenei is confident that he will have another opportunity to elevate him. Ayatollah Khomeini died in office at the age of 86; Khamenei may envision a similarly long life.
However, it’s notable that Raisi has signaled, through his somewhat resentful round of complaints, of perceived violations of electoral procedures, that he does not intend to shrink quietly back to the seminary. He could seize the opportunity provided by the campaign, which has vastly enhanced his name recognition and public standing, to take on a more prominent national voice, presumably in opposition to Rouhani’s agenda. That could conceivably rebalance the odds for his eventual ascendance to the role of leader.
I’m very dubious about Rouhani as a prospective successor. He does not have the theological credentials that would be expected, although that has not always proven a barrier. Still, while Rouhani is a cleric, he has sought to have influence via the government bureaucracy rather than in the seminaries. I see it as unlikely, but ultimately the opacity of the succession process means that there can be no certain bets, or even confidence around the pool of candidates.
TCB: Prior to the election, it seemed that Khamenei supported Raisi and even took jabs at Rouhani. Does this election have any impact on the power and influence held by the Supreme Leader?
SM: Not in the near term. Structurally, the office of the supreme leader has become somewhat invulnerable. As a result of the 1989 Constitutional changes and the assiduous cultivation of patronage networks since that time, it would be nearly impossible to reduce the authority of the office without the consent of the leader himself.
There were moments of friction during the short campaign; Rouhani’s rhetoric also cut dangerously close to the bone for the system’s legitimacy. That will surely not be forgotten, particularly at a time when the prospect of succession looms large. The tensions between these two offices, and between the processes for their selection, is perennial. Rouhani has managed his relationship with Khamenei more carefully than any of his predecessors, and at least to date, more successfully. However, every Iranian president has run up against the constraints of his office during his second term, and I expect Rouhani to be no different.
TCB: In his victory speech, Rouhani said, “The Iranian nation has chosen the path of interaction with the world, a path which is distant from extremism and violence.” Could this election have any impact on Iran’s support for U.S. designated terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas?
SM: No. Iran’s leaders want interaction with the world on their own terms. Rouhani has very artfully dangled the notion of additional sanctions relief, even going so far as to imply that he would be prepared to negotiate with Washington to achieve that. However, he included several caveats, hinging such a step on popular demand and the will of the leader. In other words, he is passing the buck, accurately, as it happened. The Iranian people are welcome to demand more sanctions relief, but Khamenei is ultimately responsible for deciding whether pursuing that is in the national interest. Khamenei has made his position on this – dogmatic opposition – very clear. Iran’s relationships with Hezbollah in particular, and to a lesser extent with other terrorist groups such as Hamas, serves a strategic purpose for the regime, and there is no real driver for relinquishing these assets at present.
