Iran’s Supreme National Security Council is taking retaliatory steps after President Donald Trump announced on Monday that the U.S. will designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a ‘foreign terrorist organization’. Iran now says it will designate U.S. Central Command as a ‘terrorist organization’.
The IRGC designation will impose economic sanctions, visa restrictions and legal penalties against those who provide support to the group.
Some former U.S. officials have warned against the imposing of sanctions the U.S., warning that it could move the U.S. closer to war with Iran.
The Cipher Brief talked with the former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI, Norm Roule, about what the designation means and what other likely responses to expect from Iran.
The Cipher Brief: Frame the issue for us and help us understand the latest moves against the IRGC and what they mean for the relationship between Iran and the U.S.
Roule: Let’s start by going back to the first days of Iran’s revolution in 1979. In those chaotic months, Iran's leaders had a tremendous distrust of the army, which they saw as a tool of the Shah and a reactionary threat to the revolution. Many army officers were being purged. At the same time, hundreds of armed groups had formed as revolutionary elements, often associated with individual mosques and neighborhoods. So, the regime wanted to bring these groups together under some form of control. These groups became the IRGC. From its inception, the IRGC was not meant to be a regular military. Article 150 of Iran’s constitution states only that the IRGC’s duties are to protect the revolution, its accomplishments, and other duties which will be assigned later. Iran’s regular army, on the other hand, is assigned in Article 143 the job of protecting the territorial integrity of the country.
So, in essence, you're looking at a praetorian guard, not a regular military force, but one that is now about 125,000 strong - larger than the military force of some countries. And it does have many characteristics of a regular military. It has ground forces, an air force, missile, drone forces, and naval units. We recently read about its navy when its small boats harassed our vessels in the Gulf. The IRGC also absorbed Iran’s vast militia forces. The IRGC in many ways, looks like a traditional military, but it's ideologically grounded very deeply. Its leadership is either selected or approved by the Supreme Leader himself, so the group’s overall loyalty to the Supreme Leader and the revolution is quite strong.
In the early days of the revolution, the IRGC took on internal regime opponents, such as the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and unrest in Kurdish and other ethnic areas. In addition to fighting in the Iran-Iraq war, the group also received the authority to conduct commercial activity in Iran to help sustain itself. Initially, this work focused on reconstruction from war damage but, as the Secretary of State has noted, this has grown to the point where today the IRGC plays a major role in about 20% of the overall economy.
The IRGC’s subordinate element - the Quds (Jerusalem) Force – is responsible for extraterritorial actions, which we see as terrorism, the creation of militant militias, counterfeiting, and its brutal treatment of the Iranian people. The Quds Force has operated across the Middle East as well as Europe (especially Eastern Europe), Africa, Afghanistan, and Latin America.
The Cipher Brief: Why does the Trump administration believe that IRGC deserves this designation now, when many former Administration and DoD officials have cautioned against it?
Roule: Overall, this is part of the Administration’s plan to maintain pressure on Iran and to continue to discourage businesses from working in Iran. There's no question that the Quds Force has been involved in terrorism and the deaths of Americans. The broader IRGC itself has been involved in proliferation activities, has supported the war criminal Bashar al-Assad and has played a role in Iran’s now-shuttered nuclear weapons program. For all of these reasons, the IRGC and the Quds Force have been sanctioned by the current and past administrations repeatedly. I believe the IRGC has been sanctioned in the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, the Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010, the Iran Threat Reductions, and the Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, the Countering American Adversaries through Sanctions Act of 2017, as well as a series of executive orders.
The Cipher Brief: Can you help us understand why some people are opposed to this particular designation of a ‘terrorist organization’?
Roule: Having been a part of these discussions for years, I can think of six reasons. First, there’s no question that the IRGC has been involved repeatedly over the years in a series of actions that violate international norms and laws. But because it is also a traditional military, that means we are, for the first time, naming a formal part of a government a ‘terrorist group’ and there are tens of thousands of personnel who have daily duties which are not dissimilar to those of a regular military. Second, although Iran’s parliament - which has plenty of members who served in the IRGC - will certainly declare some element of the U.S. military as a terrorist group, I would be more concerned about what this precedent means for other countries. Say, a country like Venezuela (where I don’t think we have diplomats at present) deciding it wants to use the same designation against JSOC, CIA, or even our military attache. Next, those opposed will say that it might compel Iran to strike our forces. I think this is unlikely, at least initially, and it sets a bad precedent if we allow ourselves to be dissuaded simply because we fear Iran might respond tactically. Fourth, the designation will also promote a “rally around the flag” situation in Tehran and makes Iran’s already unlikely return to negotiations even more unlikely. Then, others will say this sort of designation is hard to reverse and some will say that this is an effort by the administration to make sure this isn’t easily reversed by the next administration. Finally, some will say this makes war with Iran likely. That last one is hyperbole. Certainly, it makes confrontation more likely, but there is a long way between such a designation and war. Hezbollah has had such a designation and plenty of American blood on its hands, and that didn’t lead to a war.
The Cipher Brief: The U.S. did not enjoy great support from its allies when President Trump made the decision to pull out of JCPOA. Do you think that allies will be more on board to support the U.S. sanctions?
Roule: If you’re talking about Europe, I don’t think so. First, I should say that there is no question that all of our partners and allies would agree with the crimes that the administration has laid out that have been perpetrated by the IRGC. Likewise, they would certainly agree that there needs to be a sanction against elements of the IRGC. But I think you need to look at how Germany has refused to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, because they recognize its non-terrorist aspect. I think you're going to have Germany and other countries focusing on the military-like components of the IRGC, and worried about the precedent that this could present for their own forces.
But if you’re talking about U.S. allies in the region, such as Israel, Jordan, or the Gulf States (with Qatar and Oman being the outliers), they will just ask why it has taken us so long to do this. The Iran problem is seen through many perspectives and passions, but for the countries in the region, they see themselves as ignored victims of Iranian aggression and can’t understand why no one else seems to understand. The last thing any of them want is another regional war but they don’t believe existing sanctions do much to protect them and the facts are their side on that point.
The Cipher Brief: So what would be the benefits of this designation?
In fairness to the administration, this does lay the foundation for further diplomatic pressure to be placed on those countries that interact with Iran. Also, for many years, opponents of broad sanctions claimed that the United States needed to focus its sanctions in a way that would hit the IRGC or the supreme leader, and not the Iranian people. Finally, and despite the heavy sanctions on the IRGC, it would be hard for me to say that the current approach is constraining their actions. This last point deserves unpacking.
Since around 2013, the non-Quds Force IRGC personnel have been involved in regional conflicts and now IRGC companies are hoping to profit by acquiring contracts in Iraq and Syria. Also, IRGC-related missile companies are responsible for delivering components which enable the Houthis to fire on Riyadh. And while it receives little notice, the 219 missiles they have fired on Saudi Arabia are just as much a threat to the 10 million + expatriates in country – including Americans – as they are to Saudis. All the while they were under heavy sanctions. There is a legitimate force protection problem here which the international community has ignored. Finally, I am not sure I am comfortable with Iran being able to hide its terrorism behind the guise of a military force to avoid any international action. In that case, Iran uses our own rules against us. So, it isn’t unreasonable to say that we need a different approach and to those who would oppose this, I would ask what ideas they might bring to the table.
The Cipher Brief: Norm, you spent the bulk of your career helping the U.S. Intelligence Community understand how Iran might respond to U.S. actions. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council has already said that it will in fact, reciprocate with a terrorist designation against CENTCOM. How else might Iran respond to sanctions both in the long and short term?
Roule: I think we'll see three things. First, we can expect defiant rhetoric, likely focused on a possible restart of their nuclear program. Then, Iran's parliament designation of CENTCOM is no surprise. They usually mirror our own actions. Perhaps we might see an uptick in missile tests or small boat and drone harassment against our ships in the Gulf. But then, I think they will fall into wait and see mode. Does this really change their environment in any way? In one way, this might work to Iran’s favor if no real action is taken but it becomes another wedge between the U.S. vs Europe, China, and Russia on Iran. I do worry that Iran will declare any former CENTCOM member foolish enough to travel to Iran a terrorist, and issue them a long sentence.
The Cipher Brief: So overall, how do you see this playing out?
Since the designation has little sanctions impact, we are unlikely to turn down many visa requests, but if this is applied to everyone who has worked for the IRGC or one of its entities, that will mean a lot of Iranians will be banned from travel to the U.S. Will we deport someone who withheld IRGC affiliation when they applied for a visa? I doubt we will find there are many Americans to prosecute for supporting the IRGC. At this point, I wonder, what does this mean abroad? The Qods Force leader, Qassem Soleimani famously bragged in a message to General David Petraeus that Soleimani assigned his Quds Force officers as ambassadors to Baghdad. Will we seek their removal or punish Iraq for not doing so? Will we sanction Iraq or Qatar for dealing with Iranian companies associated with the IRGC? Will the U.S. be able to push an Iranian ambassador out of Baghdad? How will Europe respond if we sanction anyone who funds or cooperates with the IRGC construction company Khatam al-Anbia in Syria? If the ‘wait and see’ mode produces no real change in Iran's threat calculus, then I don't think there will be much of a response.
But if history is any guide, if we do press hard on the IRGC, they will at least initially pull back. But they are also likely to try to test our fortitude through a retaliation attack by one of their militias, through a terrorist strike, or perhaps even the seizure of a U.S. official or military personnel. But Iran’s military are professional. For all their bluster, they know that when push comes to shove, they only have a fraction of our capability.
Read more from Norm Roule in The Cipher Brief
