The U.S. has both a Duty to Warn and a Duty to Ask

By Glenn Corn

Glenn Corn is a former Senior Executive in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who worked for 34 years in the U.S. Intelligence, Defense, and Foreign Affairs communities.  He spent over 17 years serving overseas and served as the U.S. President’s Senior Representative on Intelligence and Security issues.  He is an Adjunct Professor at the Institute of World Politics.

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — In the aftermath of Hamas’ horrific October terrorist attacks on Israel, many in the media were quick to criticize the Israeli Intelligence and Security services and accuse the Israelis of suffering from an “intelligence failure.” 

Some experts have also asked important questions about the U.S. Intelligence Community’s (USIC) performance prior to the day of the attack, although few in the media have asked the types of hard questions that should be raised after such a tragic event like this one, that resulted in the death of over 30 U.S. citizens, and the kidnapping of over a dozen more Americans. 

The Hamas terrorist attack has brought the Middle East to the brink of a wider large-scale conflict and forced the U.S. Administration to refocus its attention on this region after hoping to re-direct U.S. attention to other domestic and international issues. 

While it is hard to say what intelligence the U.S. collected prior to the attacks, and/or whether U.S. Intelligence assessments of the threat from Hamas were accurate without having direct access to the information obtained by the U.S. Government (USG) before the attack, (and details on how that information was handled) based on media reporting, it appears that the USIC and USG did suffer a “failure” in the period leading up to the attack.  


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CNN reported that in the weeks prior to the October 10 attack, the Government of Israel did collect intelligence on increased threat activity related to Hamas.  The Israelis reportedly shared this intelligence with the USIC, which wrote two assessments, but USIC officials viewed the reporting as “routine”, according to media sources. 

Other important questions that need to be answered include who else in the USG had access to the USIC analytic assessments, how was the reporting handled and was there discussion within the USIC and USG about putting out a Public Notification to U.S. citizens regarding potential increased threats associated with travel to Israel in October 2023?

Per an article posted in the Times of Israel in June, the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem issued a warning to U.S. citizens about the security situation in Israel and Gaza, claiming that “The security environment remains complex in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, and U.S. citizens need to be aware of the risks of travel to these areas because of the current conflict between Hamas and Israel. The notification also reminded U.S. citizens of the threat of rocket attacks by Hamas against Israeli cities and population centers.   

Unfortunately, a review of the Embassy’s website reveals no updated warnings about Hamas threats between late June 2023 and October 7, 2023, the day of the horrific attack.  Knowing that Israel would be a destination for many U.S. and foreign travelers planning to attend the “Peace Festival” held near the Gaza border and during Jewish holidays, it is concerning that the USG did not appear to update its warning to U.S. citizens after receiving information from the Israeli authorities about an increased level of threats.   

For background, according to the policy of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the U.S. Intelligence Community’s member organizations have a “Duty to Warn” targets of planned attacks that could impact the lives and safety of intended targets.


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There are exceptions to the “Duty to Warn” policy that can result in the USIC deciding not to issue a public notification or warning when threat reporting is received by a USIC component, and there may be a logical and reasonable explanation as to why not updated travel warning was issued by the USG.  But it is also reasonable for Americans to ask which U.S. Intelligence organization received the threat information from the Israelis prior to the attack, whether the Israeli intelligence was deemed credible and specific, and if the reporting met the “Duty to Warn” threshold.  If not, did IC leadership decide to issue an exception to the policy?  Of course, Americans can also ask whether another element of the USG outside of the USIC failed to act on the reporting after being alerted to the information by the USIC. 
The goal of asking hard questions of our Intelligence Community after an event like the Hamas terror attack is not an effort to embarrass or undermine anyone in the Community.  It is to ensure that any “lessons learned” after such a horrific event are studied and if deemed appropriate, changes are made to ensure the same mistakes are not repeated in the future.

Given the classified nature of much of the USIC’s work, it is likely that such questions are already being asked within the Community and “after action reviews” are being conducted. But it is the job of the media in the U.S. to ask questions about the Intelligence Community and U.S. Government’s performance in the period leading up to October 7, although there seems to be a limited appetite among many journalists to ask these types of questions. 

The Hamas attack is a stark reminder that a motivated and well-trained non-state actor can conduct large scale attacks against their enemies, a lesson we learned the hard way on September 11, 2001.  Unfortunately, the U.S. is considered a primary enemy of many non-state actors and their state sponsors, and it would be naïve to assume that our enemies will not continue to plan to conduct attacks against U.S. citizens and interests both in the U.S. and abroad. 

It would also be a mistake to fail to ask the tough questions of those who are tasked with identifying and disrupting these threats to ensure that we – as a community – are capable of stopping the next one. 

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. 

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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