Expectations are high for the second summit of President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jung-Un. Most people assume that there wouldn’t be a second summit if the principals weren’t confident that the summit would be a success. So, how do we define a successful summit?
The first summit was historic, in that this was the first time a sitting president met with a leader from North Korea. The symbolism was powerful, although the Joint Statement of June 12, 2018 was criticized for lacking detail. What the Statement did include, however, was: A commitment that the U.S. would establish a new relationship with North Korea; that both countries would establish a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula; and North Korea would work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. During the eight months after the June Summit, there was no substantive movement on any of these commitments. In fact, until just a few weeks ago, the U.S. Special Representative, Steve Biegun, tried, but was unable to meet with his North Korean counterpart. Fortunately, this recently changed when Biegen was finally able to meet with Kim Hyok Chol.
For this second summit to be successful, there needs to be movement on the core issue: Complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It’s not enough for North Korea to unilaterally declare sites for dismantlement and inspection. What’s initially necessary is for North Korea to agree, as they did in the Six Party Talks, that complete denuclearization is defined as: The complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons facilities. If North Korea has a different definition of complete denuclearization, then it should be discussed at the summit, because complete and verifiable denuclearization should be a drop-dead issue.
Indeed, if North Korea isn’t prepared to completely and verifiably denuclearize, then further negotiations would seem to be futile and, in fact, could embolden North Korea to think that eventually the U.S. will relent and accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. This has been North Korea’ s ultimate objective since at least 2003, when the Six Party Talks commenced and North Korea argued for being accepted as a nuclear weapons state, while establishing normal relations with the U.S., as the U.S. did with Pakistan. Over the years, North Korea has been told that the U.S. would never accept the North as a nuclear weapons state, citing nuclear proliferation as the principal reason for this firm U.S. position.
Assuming North Korea clearly agrees with the U.S. definition of complete and verifiable denuclearization, then the onus will be on the U.S. to explain the process of eventual normalization of relations with North Korea and plans for ending the Korean War with an eventual peace treaty. Indeed, movement on a peace treaty and normalization of relations would contribute significantly to North Korea’s demand that, in return for denuclearization, they need security assurances and also economic development assistance. A normal bilateral relationship with the U.S. –and others, of course – will give the North international legitimacy and access to international financial institutions for loans and direct investments.
A successful summit should address all of these issues. And in the spirit of greater trust and confidence building, Chairman Kim should clearly define what he means by “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”, since South Korea has no nuclear weapons. Kim could also agree to a verification protocol permitting nuclear monitors to visit non-declared suspect nuclear sites, while offering to cease the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
The U.S., in the spirit of “actions for actions”, could offer to declare an end to the Korean War and the establishment of liaison offices in the respective capitals and a willingness to discuss economic humanitarian assistance, possibly with the provision of energy assistance to hospitals, orphanages and schools in North Korea that are adversely affected by U.N. Security Council sanctions. Also, a waiver permitting South Korea to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea would be another deliverable to a North Korea in need of economic development assistance.
These and other issues obviously will be discussed at the upcoming summit. However, the implementation of any decisions and directives taken by the leaders at the summit will require considerable study and discussion. Thus, charging the lead negotiators from both countries to routinely meet and within a certain period of time, to craft a road map that addresses complete and verifiable denuclearization and security assurances that encompass the establishment of normal bilateral relations and a peace treaty to end the Korean War, would be logical deliverables from this historic summit.
Cipher Brief Expert, Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, was the former Special Envoy for Negotiations with North Korea. The views are the author’s and not any government agency or department.
