Cipher Brief Expert Tim Willasey-Wilseyserved for over 27 years in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He is now Visiting Professor of War Studies at King’s College, London.
One can imagine the intense discussions in Beijing, primarily within the Central Military Commission (CMC) but also at the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), about whether and how to respond to India’s increasing muscularity in the Himalayas.
The main event under debate would be the Indian operation during the night of 29th/30th August in Ladakh. Indian troops seized some unmanned heights to the south of Pangong Lake in the Kailash range. Most of these peaks were on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) which had been taken by China during the 1962 war. However two positions, known as Helmet and Black Top are claimed by China and provide important tactical benefits; notably control of roads upon which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rely for troop movements.
It would be possible for some party officials to play this down as a minor operation of little significance. No Chinese troops were killed or wounded because the posts were unoccupied. Most of the action took place on the Indian side of the LAC. The Indians may now have to hold these peaks during a bitterly cold winter. Experience on the Siachen Glacier (between India and Pakistan in Kashmir) shows how costly such positions can be with helicopters operating at their maximum height restrictions and troops often having to resort to oxygen. Famously a piece of roti bread delivered to troops in Siachen was estimated in 2016 to cost 2 rupees to make and 200 to deliver.
PLA representatives might take a different view. Black Top, in particular, is too important to lose. Furthermore this was not a minor operation. It involved a brigade of about 3,500 men and would have been supported by helicopters, artillery and intelligence. Fast jets would have been on standby, possibly including the newly delivered Dassault Rafales. The whole manoeuvre was of sufficient scale to have been signed off by Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself.
Furthermore, the PLA might suggest that the operation demonstrates a shift in Indian attitudes similar to the pre-emptive attack against Balakot in Pakistan in February 2019. The days of India’s much-proclaimed (and exaggerated) pacifism during Congress Party rule seem to be over. If India were allowed to get away with the Kailash operation they would inevitably be encouraged to do it again. Indian Army morale has been given a fillip and there has been a note of triumphalism. Retired Indian General HS Panag wrote “we have caught the PLA by the jugular and we must not let go of it”.
China might also speculate whether Washington is supporting India’s approach and whether there is a bigger game at play involving Tibet, Xinjiang and the Aksai Chin. Some Indian political observers have already suggested that the recent operations in the Himalayas could inspire all 18 countries in Asia with territorial disputes with China to begin a collective resistance.
The PLA will have one argument to deploy which is of miniscule tactical importance but of considerable emotional resonance. India has admitted the involvement of the Special Frontier Force (SFF) also known as Establishment 22 and as the Vikas Regiment. It was formed in 1962 after the disastrous defeat by China with the express role of operating behind Chinese lines. It is not an army unit but comes under India’s external intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW). The regiment was originally composed of Tibetan refugees but increasingly comprises other ethnicities including Gurkhas from Nepal. The decision to employ Vikas in the operation must have had top-level Indian political support. R&AW comes under the Cabinet Secretariat and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). In that sense it could be seen as deliberately provocative.
All will depend on the view of Party General Secretary (and President) Xi Jinping. Does he see the present global COVID crisis as a perfect moment to secure some important territorial gains whilst the rest of the world is distracted? Or is he more concerned by the reputational damage which his nation has suffered globally since the end of its own brush with the pandemic?
Xi has a firm political grip over the PLA but must understand their frustration at being held back from demonstrating their capabilities at a time when other armies have gained operational experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria and Libya. Instructions to the PLA (as late as 7th September) to use clubs, machetes and spears instead of their firearms must be unpopular. There has already been substantial criticism in India that the government did not sanction the use of firearms during the brawl in the Galwan Valley on 15th June during which 20 Indian soldiers died.
One Chinese recourse would be particularly dangerous; to ask Pakistan to apply simultaneous pressure in Kashmir. This would be easy to request; Pakistan is exasperated at the failure of the international community and the Islamic world to come to the aid of the Kashmiris following New Delhi’s revocation of Article 370. Furthermore Islamabad is more financially dependent on Beijing than ever before. But fortunately, (in this context only) Pakistan’s main foreign policy aim at present is to usher the United States towards the exit of Afghanistan.
India too needs to be careful. Pre-emption can be essential on occasions but is often hard to distinguish from aggression, especially when it involves crossing international borders (Balakot) and lines of control (Black Top). Furthermore the press frenzy for more action and the army’s enthusiasm for more tactical gains need to be subordinated to a cool, rational analysis of the national interest. On the other hand, while China may speak the language of diplomacy, India should still be ready for a vigorous military riposte.
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