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OPINION — Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel this morning Saturday October 7, 50 years plus one day since the October 1973 war, has every national and global news outlet question Israeli intelligence failure. Unfortunately for Israel and the United States, this is not the first example of such a colossal intelligence blunder. US and Israeli intelligence also were broadsided by the October 1973 war and by the Hamas election in January 2006 in Gaza.
How did the goal of post-failure “lessons learned” reports to educate intelligence analysts to reassess their analytic assumptions fall by the wayside? Why did Israeli intelligence not internalize the lessons of the failure associated with the 1973 war or the 2006 Hamas elections? Today’s Hamas’s military attacks on Israel are a clarion call to Israeli and Western intelligence services to re-examine their approach to understanding other (non-Western) societies and their approach to war and peace.
Comprehending past failures is instructive to anticipating and imagining a different and hopefully a better future. Before addressing the October 1973 War, a few introductory remarks are in order:
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Lessons from the 1973 War
A reading of declassified intelligence reports, briefings, memos, National Intelligence Estimates or NIEs, and other documents included on the 1973 War CDs that are at the Nixon Library reveals that American, Israeli, and other intelligence analysts at the time did not expect President Sadat to initiate hostilities when he did. They generally dismissed his pre-war planning as routine military exercises.
Although context, expertise, and data mining were key to intelligence analysts’ efforts to figure out Sadat’s war plans, they were lulled into complacency by a mindset, which relied on several faulty signposts, including the following:
The Nixon Library declassified intelligence documents on the 1973 War reveal several illustrative statements in the months preceding the outbreak of hostilities on October 6:
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Hamas Elections in January 2006 were another intelligence failure for US and Israeli intelligence analysts. Our analysts at the time underestimated Hamas’s political and electoral strength in the Gaza Strip and overestimated Fatah’s electoral pull. Israeli and US policymakers at the time listened mostly to the rosy predictions made by Muhammad Dahlan who was the Palestinian Authority’s operative in Gaza.
Israeli and Us Intelligence analysts made several erroneous judgments at the time. They underestimated Dahlan’s personal and political ambitions. He was hoping to rule Gaza if the elections went his way and proceeded to brief Western analysts and policymakers that Hamas’s forthcoming electoral defeat was a done deal. Our analysts failed to question his assumptions and judgment.
The analysts also accepted at face value that Palestinians were mostly secular and therefore would vote for a secular party (Fatah) and not an Islamist party (Hamas). They equally misunderstood the power of political Islam and the Islamization trend that was gripping the Muslim world, including the Arab world. Hamas, of course, was an off-shoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the mother of most Sunni Islamic political parties across the Muslim world.
What Don’t We Know?
Stunning as they are, the Hamas attacks are only one day old. Many questions are yet to be answered, including how did Hamas plan such a sophisticated operation for so many months without being detected and how did they pull it off? How and where did Hamas manufacture the thousands of rockets that were fired into Israel and how did Israeli agents and informers in the Gaza Strip fail to detect such a military manufacturing operation? Did Hamas receive tangible support from any external actors—states and non-states—in planning for the so-called Al-Aqsa Storm?
Whereas Sadat’s objective in the 1973 War was ultimately political, it’s too early to assess whether Hamas’ assault on Israel has any objective beyond the “liberation of Palestine” rhetoric.
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