EXPERT Q&A – As The Cipher Brief has reported, North Korea recently unveiled evidence that it is building what its state media called a “nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine,” a new capability for the reclusive regime, and a revelation that caused high anxiety among some long-time North Korea watchers. Reports suggest the 6,000–7,000-ton submarine could carry 10 nuclear-capable missiles, significantly enhancing the North’s ability to launch underwater attacks.
In 2021, The North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un made public a list of major weapons he wanted in the country’s arsenal – a list that included ICBMs, hypersonic weapons, and spy satellites, as well as a nuclear-powered submarine.
The Cipher Brief spoke with Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, a former Director of East Asia Operations for the CIA, about the development and its implications for the Korean Peninsula, the broader region, and U.S. policy vis-a-vis North Korea. Amb. DeTrani also spoke about the submarine as a likely benefit to Pyongyang of its burgeoning collaboration with Moscow; last year, North Korea sent more than 10,000 troops to help Russia defend territory in its Kursk region against a Ukrainian incursion. The quid pro quo for the military aid was widely understood to involve Russian military and technological assistance to North Korea.
Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski spoke with Amb. DeTrani. Their conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
The Cipher Brief: Where on the alert level of concern does this news of the nuclear submarine land with you?
Amb. DeTrani: Unfortunately, almost everything that North Korea does, we sort of yawn. It’s a one-day news event, and we move on. And obviously we have to move on, but we also have to prepare because there are significant developments, not only with North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. We see it now when [Kim Jong Un] is talking about a nuclear-powered submarine, but we also see it with his work with the Russian Federation. So yes, I’d be very concerned.
The Cipher Brief: On the submarine itself, how does it change the strategic or military dynamic? Assuming that they complete the building of this vessel and others, how does it change the equation?
Amb. DeTrani: It’s a significant change. But I think equally important, or more important, was Russia’s willingness, to provide this assistance to Kim Jong-un, to give him these capabilities. And as we saw with his successful satellite launch, and we saw with the Hwasong-19 [ICBM], I believe Kim got some of that technology and some of that expertise from the Russian Federation. It’s a quid pro quo, and I think Russia’s helping.
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The Cipher Brief: Given that help that they’re getting from Russia, does it change another equation – namely, one of the things that we have always assumed the North wants and needs is economic help, hard currency, and so forth. Presumably they’re getting that now from the Russians as well. Does this remove some leverage that anybody who wants to deal with the North might have had before?
Amb. DeTrani: Yes, you’re absolutely right. It’s moved a significant amount of leverage we had in the past, where North Korea was seeking a normal relationship with the United States, and international credibility. I think one of the major diplomatic blunders we made was not seeing Kim Jong-un moving closer to Putin and the Russian Federation. Whether it’s diplomatic, whether it’s intelligence-wise, this is significant. And while I’ve written in the past that this was largely symbolic – what the North Koreans were doing with their 10-12,000 troops in Russia, in the Kursk region – I stand corrected on that. I’m correcting myself, because I now think this is very strategic. This is very significant assistance from the North to permit Putin to continue with his war of aggression in Ukraine, and very significant assistance in turn to North Korea. So, yes, we’ve lost a lot of leverage, but I still believe we have some leverage.
The Cipher Brief: You mentioned that somebody missed the fact that this was coming, the new rapprochement between Pyongyang and Moscow. But what could the United States have done, if we had seen it? What could the United States have done, or what can the United States do to mitigate or reverse any of this?
Amb. DeTrani: For four years, we had no contact with the North Koreans. For four years, we said, We’ll meet you anywhere, any place. And that was the extent of it. We didn’t talk about sanctions relief. We didn’t talk about a path to normal relations. We didn’t talk about joint military exercises. We didn’t talk about many of the things that President Donald Trump talked about in Singapore in 2018.
So I think we lost four years. And I think those four years were crucial. And it’s within those four years that Kim Jong-un made a strategic decision to give up on the United States. And he told us that. He memorialized it in the Constitution of North Korea, where the U.S. and South Korea are now designated as “principal enemies.” He had given up. So I think we could have done more within those four years. And I think in retrospect, I think when the historians look at the events that transpired during that period, and certainly subsequent to that period, I think we will realize that we missed an opportunity.
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The Cipher Brief: And what about now? If you were on the North Korea desk at State or the CIA, is there any counsel you’d give to this administration, given all these developments?
Amb. DeTrani: Reach out to North Korea. Don’t give up on North Korea. Reach out to them, because I still think Kim Jong Un still believes a normal relationship with the United States is the way to go as his father, Kim Jong Il, and his grandfather Kim Il Sung believed. I think he still believes in a normal relationship. If the Trump administration gets a message to them – We’re prepared to talk about sanctions relief, we’re prepared to talk about lifting certain sanctions, we’re prepared to talk about actions for actions, we’re not going to ask you to denuclearize completely before we sit down with you and give you anything in return.
We had the Six-Party Talks. We have a joint statement of September 19, 2005. There’s a lot of history there. And we had Russia at the table with China, obviously with our allies in South Korea and Japan. And North Korea was prepared to go that way in 2005. So yes, I think there’s a lot to propose to Kim Jong-un. But I think it’s going to be much more difficult now.
I will caveat that by saying that it depends on President Donald Trump’s relationship with Vladimir Putin. Because in this regard, Putin and North Korea now have a mutual defense treaty where each will come to the defense of the other.
If President Donald Trump has this relationship [with Russia], could he be encouraging Vladimir Putin to encourage Kim Jong Un to come to negotiations with President Donald Trump and his team, and telling him it’s a different equation? In the past, we’ve just been reaching out to China. We’ve been saying China, help us with this. And the fact is China hasn’t helped with this because of the tension in the relationship. In this case, maybe we go to Russia, as President Donald Trump is doing with Ukraine. And we say, look, we need to sit down because we may do something of a kinetic nature. This man, this North Korean leader, this dictator is threatening our allies in South Korea and in Japan and even becoming an existential threat to the United States. So we may have to do something. So could you help us, Vladimir Putin with this equation? Get them to sit down with us and we’ll propose some things for them and it will be there in their interest. My personal view is that President Donald Trump has credibility with Kim Jong Un and this could work again. But we have to have something to put on the table.
The Cipher Brief: Go to one dictator to get help with another dictator. All right. Last question for you, involving China and that new nuclear submarine itself. How does that look from China?
Amb. DeTrani: This is all unsettling for China. I think what Kim Jong Un has done with Vladimir Putin and the Russian Federation, the mutual defense treaty and so forth, this is all unsettling to China. China knows they have a lot of leverage over North Korea: 90% of the trade, the crude oil, petroleum products from China, a lot of that. North Korea is getting a lot of that now from Russia. They’re getting the food aid, they’re getting the crude oil, they’re getting energy assistance, and they’re even getting ballistic missile assistance and satellite assistance. So this is very unsettling for China. And I think in some ways, Xi Jinping and his team have to look back and say, maybe we should have done more during the past four years to get North Korea to sit down with the Biden administration and talk about some of the issues. Because I think now China is not only concerned with Putin and Kim, but they are also concerned now that we have a new president and there’s a new dynamic.
And China is looking at some of these issues and saying, are we in command here? Do we know the particulars? And do we have leverage? I think they have to realize they do not only have economic problems, but they have geostrategic problems.
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