Saudi Arabia and its crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, (MbS) are confronting a crisis. How they manage to extricate the kingdom will have potentially long-term consequences for the kingdom, its relationship with the U.S. and for its image worldwide.
It is tempting to exaggerate such situations. In this case, the drip, drip, drip of information coming from Ankara and Riyadh seem to all but confirm that this was no less than an officially orchestrated mission to snuff out the life of widely known opposition Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, and then cover it up. So, this situation is different, and the only question remaining is who ordered the hit.
The Saudi government would have the world believe that it was a rogue operation, carried out by intelligence, security and military officials using government resources without the crown prince’s knowledge. Even President Trump appeared to want to accept the notion of this being a rogue operation, initially. But the President’s comments of late, and since being briefed by CIA Director Gina Haspel last week, all but confirm that he too, believes the Saudis are lying. The Saudis most recent effort to show that it is taking the matter seriously by arresting or fingering a number of Saudi security and intelligence officials, and subsequently confirming that Khashoggi’s murder was, in fact, premeditated, represents only the latest in a series of contrived explanations that convince no one.
Anyone familiar with Saudi Arabia and its political culture, and with the behavior and personality of MbS, will know that such an operation could not have been planned – much less carried out – without the knowledge and authorization of the most senior level of Saudi leadership. Political initiative is not a part of this country’s ethos or modus operandi. Given his governing style, MbS, in spite of unconvincing protestations and condemnations, remains the prime suspect in my mind.
If convincing evidence surfaces that he is indeed responsible, is it possible that MbS might be forced out? Hardly, and for one clear reason: not since Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the founder of the modern Saudi state, has there been a Saudi leader who has so successfully concentrated power in himself.
The kingdom’s armed forces, National Guard, security and intelligence agencies, and national economic policy (including the oil industry) all fall under the control of this one prince. The crown prince has managed to fuse all of the kingdom’s domestic intelligence and counterterrorism institutions under the newly organized Presidency of State Security, reporting directly to him and headed by officers loyal to him. Likewise, in his capacity as head of the Defense Ministry and National Guard, he has appointed commanders and senior officers loyal to himself (and removed those of questionable loyalty), as has indeed happened in many other ministries and agencies. Perhaps most important, his father, allegedly suffering from pre-dementia, is dependent on him for many key policy decisions.
Futhermore, the crown prince has marginalized – or neutralized, in the case of potential challengers and opponents – the rest of the Al Saud family. Without a power base in any of the aforementioned security establishments, or a critical mass of royal family supporters, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which any one or group of royals, could unseat the ambitious crown prince. He has similarly nullified the religious establishment. So, a repeat of the 1964 forced abdication of King Saud bin Abdul Aziz (by his brother and eventual successor King Faisal) is highly improbable.
Nevertheless, while chances are exceedingly slim, they are not nil. In fact, his fate may lie in the hands of just two individuals, who could genuinely impose accountability on MbS – his father, King Salman, and Donald Trump.
The Trump administration’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is based primarily on the President his and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner’s, personal relations with the king and most especially with MbS. As a result, the administration has given MbS an effective blank check in the region: the Yemen civil war, a pointless blockade of Qatar and consequent decline of the GCC, the bizarre detention and forced public resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, the round up and house arrest of more than 300 high-profile Saudis (including military officers and even royals) on trumped-up charges of corruption, and the senseless lessening in Saudi-Canadian ties over a tweet calling attention to the kingdom’s human rights policies. The administration has either said little to nothing or, supported MbS in these reckless actions, especially in the disastrous and costly Yemen civil war.
That blank check was doubtlessly interpreted by MbS as free license to take action against even prominent opponents and dissidents like Khashoggi. The inconceivably ruthless nature in which the murder was carried out, illustrates an autocrat approaching out-of-control status.
That’s dangerous to America’s interests and to Saudi Arabia’s. If MbS survives this outrageous incident without the harshest U.S. condemnation and insistence on full and transparent accountability, we should expect him to become even more emboldened. It’s not too difficult to imagine how that could play into the single-minded prince’s hands, given his visceral hatred of Iran, obliviousness to the human suffering next door in Yemen, or his desire to set policy for all the countries of the Gulf.
The U.S. has two core interests in Saudi Arabia: the kingdom’s stability and a strong and cooperative relationship. They happen to be identical to the kingdom’s interests as well. Everything the U.S. has historically done in the kingdom, from U.S. policy toward Iran, to terrorism or oil, derives from those two overarching principles. Both are jeopardized by MbS and his rash, intemperate and blindly callous behavior. The administration must weigh its personality-focused relationship against one more traditionally focused, i.e., preserving U.S. interests.
Mr. Trump and his senior aides assert that the U.S. cannot risk the critical importance of the kingdom to U.S. Iran policy, and value of U.S. weapons systems sales to Saudi Arabia. But we should keep in mind that regardless of the outcome of this tragedy, Saudi Arabia isn’t about to change its policy toward Iran. Indeed, U.S. support for its policy is far more critical to the kingdom than the kingdom’s is to America’s Iran policy. As for weapons deals, Saudi Arabia has been tied to the U.S. defense establishment for decades. Virtually all of its major weapons systems are either U.S.-made or purchased from European companies that manufacture NATO-compliant systems. Shifting to new systems, e.g., from Russia or China, would entail massive financial and logistical costs and require an enormous transition for its largely U.S.-trained armed forces and National Guard.
So, despite the administration’s portrayal, Iran and defense sales represents considerable leverage for the president. He shouldn’t hesitate to use them. U.S. interests are at stake.
There are domestic reasons as well for a reassessment of the administration’s relationship with MbS. There is a long-running, barely concealed anti-Saudi sentiment among the American people. It dates back to the oil shocks of the 1970s and includes 9/11, the kingdom’s atrocious human rights record, its uber-conservative and intolerant Wahabi religious views, and perceptions of Saudi ties to terrorism in the Middle East. For most Americans, the relationship is seen as a necessary evil and U.S. administrations over the decades have strained to justify it, usually on grounds of security and oil.
To understand how Americans really feel, however, one need only look at the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which passed over President Obama’s veto in September 2016. The law amends the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and allows Americans to file civil claims against governments involved in terrorism. It passed with strong majorities in both houses because Americans strongly felt that they should be able to make such claims in U.S. courts. Many specifically, they had Saudi Arabia in mind. Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia was among JASTA’s most strident opponents, lobbying mightily to defeat it.
Given the increasing American skepticism, if not outright eye-rolling, of official Saudi claims of innocence in the Khashoggi murder and the laudable campaign of the U.S. and international media to highlight it, further revelations – e.g., evidence of MbS’ direct involvement – are only likely to raise the U.S. public’s animus toward the kingdom and the untethered brutality of its effective leader, MbS. The former patently undermines our interests in the kingdom and may require directly addressing the latter.
The current administration’s deprecating attitude toward human rights is well known. However, values like human rights still matter to most Americans. In their minds, Saudi actions have already crossed the line. If MbS is directly implicated, we should expect a strong public reaction, even straddling the right-left, Republican-Democrat, conservative-liberal divide that characterizes American politics today. That would be a public reaction that Mr. Trump could not ignore without jeopardizing the U.S.-Saudi relationship.
MbS’ future lies in the hands of his father – who may not be able to decide unilaterally – and Mr. Trump, who alone could force the issue as a U.S. interests-preservation move. And even if Mr. Trump does not act now, he may be forced to do so later. MbS’ proclivities toward dangerous, high-risk, impetuous action are certain to continue. Should he survive Khashoggi, we should count on it.
