Cipher Brief Expert and retired CIA Senior Executive Mark Kelton took part in a Russia panel during the recent Cipher Brief Threat Conference, along with Cipher Brief Experts Robert Dannenberg and Paul Kolbe, that was focused on Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-term strategy and new alliances. One of those alliances, is with China.
EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Chinese President Xi Jinping kicked off the Chinese Communist Party Congress this week by saying China reserves the right to use force to effect, what he calls the ‘reunification’ of Taiwan with the mainland. It’s a statement that should underscore the possibility that Xi, like Putin, is driven by an actuarial calendar that will cause him to move against the island much sooner than many have assumed.
It’s worthwhile to consider what lessons Chinese President Xi Jinping might be taking from his fellow autocrat Vladimir Putin’s ongoing war.
Those lessons might include:
- Act before the target has time to harden his defenses. Western - and particularly American - military assistance provided to Ukraine in the seven-plus years between Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea and parts of Donbas and Russia’s February 2022 invasion, has been crucial to Ukraine’s ability to thwart Moscow’s plans for a rapid defeat of the Kyiv government. China cannot grant Taiwan sufficient time for it to turn itself into a ‘porcupine’ capable of inflicting great damage on, if not defeating, a Chinese invasion force.
- Once a decision has been taken to act, move immediately to interdict the delivery of military arms and assistance to the adversary. Absent the military materiel provided to Ukraine post-invasion, Russia would surely have long since won this war. For Moscow, geographic and strategic realities have made interdiction of it impossible given Ukraine’s lengthy border with Poland and concern that strikes on supply lines beyond or along that border could precipitate direct conflict with NATO, something Putin has thus far sought to avoid. Taiwan, on the other hand, offers the possibility of a Chinese naval and air blockade before and during armed conflict.
- Decapitate the target’s leadership at the outset of hostilities. Moscow’s inability to kill, capture or otherwise neutralize Ukraine’s leadership in the person of President Volodymyr Zelensky on initiation of its invasion, allowed the Kyiv government to rally its own people and to launch very effective appeals for international assistance. China cannot allow Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen to duplicate that performance.
- Dominate, or at least contest, the information realm in advance of, and throughout, any conflict. Moscow’s inability to neither prevent nor counter Ukraine’s dominance of the information arena, and social media in particular, has allowed Kyiv to effectively shape global understanding of the war to its advantage. Once it has resolved to move against Taiwan, Beijing will seek to step up its already effective information and influence operations to counter propagation a truthful accounting of Chinese aggression by Taipei and those sympathetic with it.
- In that vein, limit - if not sever – the target’s ability to communicate both internally and with the outside world. As evidenced by Ukraine’s ability to get its message out and to use existing or emergency means (e.g. Starlink) to military advantage, the Russians have not done this and have paid a steep price for not doing so. (A corollary to this point might be do not use your cell phone to communicate on an adversary’s network. But those Russians who did so have already learned that lesson.) China will surely seek to limit or prevent use of such systems by Taiwanese defenders.
- Threaten to use nuclear weapons against any outside power evidencing the capability or willingness to intervene directly in the conflict. Perhaps the only aspect of Russia’s strategy in attacking Ukraine that has been manifestly effective has been its threats to use nuclear weapons should any outside power involve itself in the war. Those threats – sometimes direct, sometimes less so – have not only obviated the possibility of direct NATO intervention in the conflict zone (e.g. by establishing a no-fly zone). They have also caused western nations to circumscribe the quantity and quality of weaponry they have provided to Ukraine, as well as the pace with which those weapons systems have been delivered, for fear of the conflict could spread beyond Ukraine’s borders.
- Once a decision to fight has been taken, employ overwhelming force from the outset. Moscow’s attempt to defeat Ukraine with ground forces totaling an estimated 200,00 men signaled an arrogance and misapprehension of the actual situation that doomed the invasion from the start. A prolonged conflict such as that in which Moscow now finds itself – wherein Russian forces have been unable to counter western conventional weaponry fielded by Ukrainian leaving Moscow with no escalatory options other than a threatened or actual resort to tactical nuclear weapons - is something China will surely do all it must to avoid.
- Check, and re-check, intelligence and assumptions regarding both your proximate and far adversaries; and listen to those who have the courage to tell you what you don’t want to hear. Russian intelligence apparently failed miserably in its assessment of Ukrainian will and capacity to resist. Perhaps influenced by the disastrous US Afghanistan withdrawal and American political and societal rifts, Moscow also apparently failed in its appreciation of the anticipated response by Washington and its allies to its invasion of Ukraine. I say ‘apparently’ because one can never be sure - as was the case with Stalin’s refusal to believe reports from his spies in Spring 1941 that Hitler was about to launch Operation Barbarossa - that some Russian intelligence officers did not warn their boss that his planned invasion would not end well only to have him reject their views. This should be an obvious lesson-learned from this war. But one suspects there is not much ‘speaking truth to power’ going on in Beijing either.
- Obfuscate, to the extent possible, your intent. For all the doctrinal discussion that has gone on over the years in the intelligence and military services of Russia and its Soviet predecessors about using ‘Dezinformatsiya’ and ‘maskirovka’ to deceive an adversary strategically and tactically respectively there is little evidence Russia has attempted, much less succeeded, at either in Ukraine. Given US willingness to make public intelligence it possessed to warn of Russian intent to attack Ukraine, we should anticipate that Beijing will do better in this regard. Good intelligence on its plans and intentions will, consequently, be of critical import for the US.
- Prepare your economy to the extent possible for the impact of sanctions; but know that sanctions alone are insufficient to thwart your designs. Russia has shown surprising resilience in coping with the economic, political and societal impact engendered by the sweeping sanctions imposed on it by the west. Moreover, the threat of sanctions did not deter Putin from attacking Ukraine. China, with its vastly larger economy should be better able to weather any sanctions imposed on it in the wake of an assault on Taiwan.
Indeed, we ought to consider the possibility that Xi will move to settle the Taiwan issue while the US engaged in what amounts to a proxy war with Russia. With that possibility in mind, I would note that I considered adding ‘Have an exit strategy’ to the lessons-learned set forth above. But, as Putin’s the recent partial mobilization and annexation decisions make clear, the Russian leader has no exit strategy other than hammering out something he can call victory.
When Xi moves on Taiwan his mindset will surely be the same as that of this Russian counterpart.
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