North Korean President Kim Jong Un announced Wednesday the successful test of what he claimed was a hydrogen bomb outside Pyongyang, and in doing so, angered the international community, including its closest ally, China. Mike Chinoy, Senior Fellow at the U.S.-China Institute at USC, discussed with The Cipher Brief China’s likely response to the nuclear test and why North Korea took such a provocative action.
The Cipher Brief: What are North Korea’s motives in detonating this bomb and announcing it to the public? What is the significance of this test if in fact North Korea detonated a hydrogen bomb?
Mike Chinoy: All the indications are that the test was not a full-fledged hydrogen bomb. Still, it nonetheless marks a significant step in Pyongyang's efforts to enhance its nuclear capabilities.
There are several possible explanations for the test. North Korea sees possession of a nuclear arsenal as the key to its survival. Kim Jong Un is well aware of what happened to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, who did not have the bomb and was toppled by the U.S., or Libya's Muammar Qadhafi, who gave up his nuclear program and was overthrown and killed. Kim is determined not to let that happen to him.
But for a nuclear program to achieve its political goals, it has to be credible—and one way to boost its credibility is to test, and let the world know. In addition, this move gives Pyongyang greater leverage in its dealings with the U.S., South Korea, and China. There is also a domestic component. Overseeing this test boosts Kim Jong Un's credibility within the elite and among the populace at large, and strengthens his position in the run-up to a crucial congress of North Korea's ruling party in May—the first such congress in 36 years.
TCB: What can the U.S. and other countries in the region do to counter the threat? What role does China—who has the closest ties to North Korea and once again was not given advance notice of the test by the North Koreans—need to play in responding to the test?
MC: Much attention is now focused on how China will respond.
The nuclear test is a huge slap in China's face, not least because Beijing has in recent months adopted a more conciliatory and accommodating approach to Pyongyang. Chinese leader Xi Jinping is certainly furious, and I would expect China to support a UN resolution condemning the test and some sort of new sanctions regime. However, it is unlikely that Beijing will be prepared to take measures of sufficient severity to compel Kim Jong Un to change his behavior for the simple reason that China is more worried about instability or collapse in North Korea than it is about the nuclear test.
For its part, the U.S. will likely consider imposing new and tougher sanctions. The problem is that sanctions in the past, even if they have inflicted pain on North Korea, have not forced a change in Pyongyang's behavior. I suspect any new sanctions now will have a similar result. The North has likely calculated that it can survive any heightened pressure and will not allow new sanctions to deter it from further enhancing its nuclear arsenal.
TCB: Does North Korea have the capability to launch a bomb that would reach the U.S. mainland?
MC: The North Koreans have displayed, but not tested, a mobile missile called the KN-08, with a range potentially long enough to reach the U.S. The nuclear test will be a significant step in Pyongyang's efforts to miniaturize a warhead. If the KN-08 works, and the North can deploy a miniaturized warhead, then it may well have the ability to hit the continental U.S.
TCB: South Korea is under the U.S.’s nuclear umbrella of protection. Should the North bomb South Korea, what would be the U.S.’s options for response?
MC: The odds of North Korea using a nuclear weapon to attack South Korea are extremely remote. For Pyongyang, the nuclear program is as much for political purposes as military ones. If a new Korean War were to break out, the U.S. and South Korea would almost certainly prevail. But that scenario is very unlikely. More worrisome is the possibility of an accidental confrontation, either through a mistake or a small-scale incident escalating, or the North overplaying its typical tactic of brinksmanship. The next potential flash point could come in March, when the U.S. and South Korea stage their annual joint military exercises. North Korea has always bitterly objected to these exercises, and every year tensions rise at this time. In the current, already heated climate, the danger of an accidental clash will be higher.
