The December 2nd phone call between President-elect Donald Trump and Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen is the first such communication between a U.S. president or president-elect and a Taiwanese president since 1979. This poses major questions about the foreign policy direction of the incoming administration and how far it is willing to deviate from established U.S. policy. The Cipher Brief spoke with former Senior Director for East Asian Affairs for President George W. Bush, Dennis Wilder, about the context of the phone call and its regional ramifications.
TCB: President-elect Donald Trump’s call with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen deviates from decades of precedent for either a president or president-elect. Since then, Chinese officials have been in contact with the transition team. What do we know about Trump’s engagement with the U.S. State Department and intelligence bureaus?
DW: All signs are that President-elect Donald Trump has had little contact with the U.S. Department of State or the intelligence community. This may be because of the press of his schedule as he chooses his cabinet. I would predict that, once in office, like every recent President, he will become a faithful reader of the President’s Daily Brief, because there is world-beater intelligence reporting and analysis in that book to help him do his job that he cannot afford not to know—particularly in regard to terrorism and the activities of such major countries of concern as China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Syria.
TCB: Who is informing his decisions at this time?
DW: It is impossible to know from outside Trump Tower, but his decision to accept a phone call from President Tsai seems to have been informed by several key players in the transition. Former Senator Bob Dole, whose law firm does business with Taiwan’s unofficial office in Washington, reportedly helped broker the call. Chief of Staff Reince Priebus has good rapport with Taipei officials and has made two visits to Taiwan. Dr. Peter Navarro of the transition team has written extensively about the need to support Taiwan’s democracy. Moreover, the two senior officials pictured with Tsai during the call were both former Taiwan representatives in Washington, who were well known for actively soliciting support from Republicans.
TCB: What is China’s stance on the phone call, and how could this affect bilateral relations as Trump takes office?
DW: China was caught off-guard by the phone call and has sent many diplomats and academics to New York and Washington in the past few days trying to understand the implications. Beijing probably has concluded that this is an opening salvo by those advisers around Trump who are advocating a “get tougher” policy with China. Beijing, through editorials in its state-controlled media, is signaling the President-elect that any attempt to relitigate long-standing U.S.-China understandings on the “one China” issue is out of the question and playing with fire, but it is restraining itself from threatening specific consequences.
China will look carefully at other senior appointments, particularly Trump’s choice for Secretary of State, before drawing any broader conclusions. Trump’s announcement that he will appoint Governor Terry Branstad of Iowa to be the U.S. Ambassador to China has been well received in Beijing, because the Governor has a long-standing friendship with President Xi Jinping.
TCB: Trump’s follow-up comments cited his disagreement with China’s monetary policy and its military buildup in the South China Sea. What do we know about Trump’s policy direction for China and Taiwan at this time?
DW: Somewhat similar to the early stages of the U.S.-China relationship under President George W. Bush, we are going to see a time of testing between Washington and Beijing over which major power can be tougher. The Trump team has clearly signaled that they believe the lack of toughness on the part of President Obama allowed China running room to manipulate trade and act aggressively in the South China Sea. However, as with the Bush Administration, there will almost certainly come a point when President Trump realizes that competition with China needs to be leavened with cooperation. President Bush came into office in 2001 declaring that China was not, as the Clinton Administration claimed, a strategic partner but rather a strategic competitor on the world stage. President Bush’s approach to China changed sharply after the 9/11 attack, when he needed to align international support for the war against al Qaeda.
TCB: What are the regional ramifications of Beijing and Washington beginning a Trump administration on the wrong foot?
DW: East Asians like stability and continuity and are unsettled by the potential implications of greater tension between the world’s two largest economies. Most East Asian countries highly value the U.S. presence in the region as a counterbalance to growing Chinese economic, military, and political power, but they abhor the idea of tensions reaching a point where they are forced to choose sides. They will hope for a short period of testing between the new Administration and Beijing and a return to the status quo as soon as feasible.
