Beijing Goes Boldly into Anti-Satellite Weapons Frontier

Bottom Line: China is aggressively pursuing capabilities such as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that could diminish the U.S. military’s reconnaissance, navigation and communications in case of war in the South China Sea or on the Korean Peninsula. But while China’s ASAT capabilities threaten U.S. assets in space, it’s still unclear how they fit into Chinese military doctrine, and how or in what instances they would be deployed. The U.S. also lacks a clear path for reining in the proliferation of these capabilities because of its own reliance on ballistic missile defense systems that are viewed similarly as potential ASAT weapons.

Background: China has spent more than a decade exploring technology for interfering with foreign satellites. Non-kinetic means have included directed energy or cyber capabilities, while kinetic approaches include direct-ascent missiles and co-orbital platforms travelling alongside satellites in orbit. Much of this counter-space research has taken place with dual-use capabilities that provide a level of deniability. That could be hiding Chinese intent to develop ASAT capabilities for deployment during a time of crisis.  

• The U.S. and Russia have pursued counter-space capabilities since the onset of the Cold War. But it wasn’t until January 2007 that China demonstrated its kinetic anti-satellite capacity by shooting down its oldest meteorological satellite, Fengyun 1 (FY-1C), at 800 km in low Earth orbit. It did so by using a direct-ascent SC-19 missile that essentially rammed into the satellite and created more than 3,000 pieces of space debris that continue to endanger the world’s assets in space.
• China also conducted mid-course missile defense tests in January 2010 and 2013 that could have been dual-purposed for ASAT capabilities. Again in July 2014, Beijing conducted a missile defense test that the Pentagon has openly characterized as an ASAT-capabilities test.
• Not all missile defense systems – categorized based on which phase of missile flight they target – have latent ASAT capabilities. Those that seek to intercept incoming ballistic missiles during their initial boost phase or during their atmospheric re-entry terminal phase – such as the Terminal High Altitude Defense (THAAD) systems – have limited ASAT utility, because they do not reach high-enough altitudes to touch many satellites. But those that intercept missiles in midcourse are designed to target objects moving through space in low Earth orbit (2,000 km and under), where many governments’ remote-sensing ISR satellites reside.
• The U.S. Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) ballistic missile interceptor, for example, was launched in February 2008 to take out a faulty U.S. intelligence satellite, the USA-193. The maneuver demonstrated that midcourse ballistic missile defense systems could also be used for ASAT purposes.

• In May 2013, China launched a mission that Beijing said was intended to reach an altitude of 10,000 km to release a barium cloud for scientific research. The U.S. government, however, said that the launch “appeared to be on a ballistic trajectory nearly to geosynchronous Earth orbit,” or somewhere close to 36,000 km. It is possible the mission had a scientific cover with a dual-use ASAT capabilities test theoretically able to reach much of the U.S. communications and navigation satellites in medium Earth orbit. In November 2015, China tested another missile, suggesting Beijing continues to refine its direct ascent hit-to-kill ASAT capabilities under the guise of ballistic missile defense tests.
• Beijing has also been pursuing “co-orbital” anti-satellite capabilities, whereby a Chinese satellite maneuvers through orbit until it nears enemy satellites to disrupt their use through both kinetic means, such as ramming into it or targeting it with explosives, and non-kinetic, directed-energy means, such as lasers or radio frequency jammers. In June 2016, China launched the Aolong-1 spacecraft with a robotic arm that it said was intended for collecting man-made space debris. But it also could be used as an ASAT weapon.
• China has long been acquiring ground-based satellite jammers and has targeted space-affiliated organizations with cyber attacks. The consolidation of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) space, cyber and electronic warfare missions under the Strategic Support Force (SSF) in late 2015 suggests an emphasis on a coordinated use of these capabilities moving forward.

Issue: China’s pursuit of ASAT capabilities clearly indicates a desire to threaten U.S. space infrastructure. The Chinese military may consider that especially useful during the initial moments of a conventional conflict in what Beijing considers its region of influence, such as on the Korean Peninsula or in the South China Sea. But even if ASAT capabilities provide a deterrent as part of Beijing’s anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, it remains unclear how advantageous the targeting of U.S. reconnaissance, navigation and military communications satellites would be in a time of war.

• Due to their presence in low Earth orbit, U.S. remote-sensing intelligence satellites are likely the most vulnerable to Chinese ASAT capabilities. Targeting these ISR satellites could blind the U.S. military, should it seek to invade North Korea or forcefully take control of disputed islands in the South China Sea. But the U.S., unlike China, has numerous alternate ISR platforms. The options, which include manned and unmanned aircraft, could substantially limit the tactical advantages China could gain from targeting U.S. intelligence satellites during a time of war.
• Targeting reconnaissance satellites also has significant escalatory risk for China. Should Beijing seek to surprise the U.S. by taking out some ISR satellites prior to military maneuvers in the region, it could invite miscalculated responses from the U.S. These U.S. satellites are early warning systems for incoming ballistic missile strikes – including nuclear-armed warheads. That means blinding them could make military leaders conclude a nuclear attack is imminent and that nuclear retaliation is warranted.
• Targeting U.S. navigation satellites and military communications satellites presents a larger practical problem for Beijing, given their higher altitudes, than the lower-altitude ISR satellites. Direct-ascent ASAT weapons would take hours to reach the higher-altitude satellites, possibly providing time for the U.S. to maneuver its assets out of the way. But the higher satellites also are larger and less numerous, so taking out one could have a significant impact.
• But again, the risk of escalation is high when targeting strategic military communications. These satellites effectively enable over-the-horizon communications from U.S. military commanders to their forward-deployed battle groups, but forward-deployed units don’t need them for tactical communications among their own forces. Should communications between the Pentagon and a battle group operating in the Pacific be cut by Chinese ASAT capabilities, Beijing would essentially be gambling that the battle group would stand down rather than act more rashly without guidance from higher-ranking commanders.

Response: The U.S. military and intelligence community clearly understands the threat of China developing advanced ASAT capabilities, and is taking steps towards countering it. At the same time, the U.S. is hindered from publicly condemning Chinese ASAT tests conducted in the guise of ballistic missile defense tests, given that missile defense capabilities also are crucial to U.S. security strategies.

• Following the May 2013 Chinese ASAT test, the Pentagon laid out its strategy for countering emerging counter-space weapons. In March 2014 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Doug Loverro advocated for building and reinforcing norms of responsible behavior in space, making resilient U.S. space infrastructure, deterring aggression against its space assets, and improving space situational awareness.
• But the U.S. has typically shied away from arms control discussions seeking to rein in anti-satellite weapons. The U.S. has opposed an agreement advocated by China and Russia, the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, generally referred to as PPWT. Ambassador Robert Wood, the U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, cited various reasons in 2014, including a lack of restrictions on developing and stockpiling ASATs on the ground.
• There are two likely reasons for this. First, an arms control treaty prohibiting ASAT capabilities could limit missile defense systems that have de facto ASAT applications. Given the increasing nuclear and ballistic missile threat from North Korea, it is unlikely the U.S. would give up its ability to intercept incoming missiles; a credible ballistic missile defense would lower North Korean certainty that an attack would succeed and that it would avoid retaliation, and thus potentially deter them from launching at all.
• A second reason for the U.S. to resist such arms control discussions is that China is significantly more vulnerable to U.S. ASAT capabilities than vice versa, according to a study by RAND. Should the U.S. seek to undermine Chinese A2/AD strategy or launch a conventional offensive against Pyongyang, targeting either North Korean or Chinese satellites early on could both blind and deafen their defenses. The Obama administration’s decision to push for U.S. ASAT capabilities for active defense deterrence reflects this push.

Anticipation: Conventional militaries rely increasingly on space-based ISR, communications and navigation, and ASATs threaten those systems. But because of the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, states will pursue ballistic missile defense systems that have latent ASAT capabilities, regardless of whether ASAT weapons are explicitly prohibited. Since limiting the proliferation of ASAT capabilities remains a significant challenge, a more productive route might be to encourage good behavior in space through diplomatic avenues.

Levi Maxey is a cyber and technology analyst at The Cipher Brief. Follow him on Twitter @lemax13.