That prompted a response by a Kremlin spokesman, saying if that happened, then Russia would also develop new weapons in an effort “to restore balance in this sphere”.
Cipher Brief Expert Robert Dannenberg, who is also the former head of global security for Goldman Sachs, and a 24-year CIA veteran and Russia expert, takes a look at what the latest disagreement means for broader U.S.-Russia relations and how it might play out in the coming months.
Background: The INF Treaty is a legacy arms control agreement from the Ronald Reagan-Mikhail Gorbachev era. Many consider it to be obsolete with the development of new types of weapons systems, such as drones, the emergence of China as a strategic nuclear player, and in the context of the overall deterioration in trust and the closing of channels of collaboration between the U.S. and Russia.
President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty does not come as a particular surprise, as the U.S. has accused Russia for years, of violating the treaty’s provisions on the restriction of the deployment of conventional and nuclear ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5500 kilometers. The decision needs to be viewed in the context of the overall deterioration of U.S.- Russian relations over the past 15 years and especially since Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in March 2014.
Robert Dannenberg, Former Sr. CIA Officer and Head of Global Security for Goldman Sachs
"Russian President Vladimir Putin has made the clear strategic decision to try and reassert Russia’s relevance on the world stage through rebuilding its military power, cyber and intelligence capabilities as well as through arms exports."
Not to be lost in the discussion of the INF withdrawal, is the growing strategic relevance of China—not a party to the agreement—and whose aggressive development of short and medium range nuclear-capable missiles is of growing concern.
China has at least, in a military context, made the decision to grow closer to Moscow as demonstrated in the recently- concluded Vostok-18 military exercise. Clearly, despite the Helsinki Summit, the relationship with Moscow has continued to deteriorate. With the withdrawal from the treaty, and in the context of the “new normal” of economic sanctions from the U.S., Putin may feel he no longer has anything worth saving in the relationship, and may even step up Russia’s malicious activity in the cyber arena, as well as in other theaters of confrontation with the U.S.
When the U.S. officially withdraws from the agreement (the U.S. is obliged to give Russia six-months advance notice, which Bolton might already have done) Putin’s instincts, and the advice of his advisors, might suggest that relations with the U.S. are in free fall.
The Russians have protested the U.S. decision to withdraw from the agreement with suggestions that the U.S. wants another arms race, and that the decision destabilizes international security. The Russians have even suggested an emergency session of the UN Security Council to address the issue.
Russian criticism rings hollow to many though, in the face of their own actions in the nuclear arena in recent years, including the modernization of their strategic arsenal, the deployment of nuclear- capable Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, the heavy Russian R&D investment in and development of advanced weapons systems that include hypersonic and space-based systems, large-scale unannounced military exercises, and nuclear attack preparedness exercises in major cities.
Robert Dannenberg, Former Sr. CIA Officer and Head of Global Security for Goldman Sachs
"Let’s not forget that in the months after the annexation of Crimea, Putin publicly suggested Russia’s willingness to use nuclear weapons in Europe if NATO made an effort to reverse Russia’s annexation of Crimea through the use of force."
For their part, the Russians also claim that the U.S. has violated the agreement with its deployment of missile defense systems in Eastern Europe which the Russians claim, can be modified for offensive purposes. The Russians have even suggested that the U.S. deployment of anti-missile systems in Asia, which, when combined with systems in Eastern Europe, may be part of a “ring” of missile defense around Russia.
The Indicators: The U.S. decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty may reflect the growing influence of National Security Advisor John Bolton.
Bolton has advocated for a more confrontational approach toward those countries viewed as threatening to the United States, including Russia, China, and Iran.
In the case of Moscow, it is easy to come up with reasons for concern. Since March of this year, we have seen the failed attempt by operatives of the Russian military intelligence service (GRU) to use a chemical agent to attempt to assassinate a Russian defector in Salisbury, England. The poor tradecraft demonstrated by those officers and their subsequent “outing” has to be embarrassing to Putin.
Just this month, UK/U.S./Dutch and Swiss authorities unmasked GRU operations designed to penetrate and obstruct the work of the Spies Laboratory in Switzerland, as well as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, both responsible for investigating the use of a chemical/nerve agent in the Salisbury attack.
Particularly embarrassing for the GRU, was the discovery of a taxi receipt in the pocket of one of the detained suspects, for a ride from GRU headquarters in Moscow, to Shermetyevo airport. Moreover, his car registration was linked to a known GRU cyber facility. A bit of open source research was able to reveal other GRU-linked vehicles and individuals associated with that same facility, some 305 in fact. Apparently, the advantage to being on that registered address included allowing the vehicle owners to avoid taxes and get preferential treatment from traffic police.
In recent weeks, Finnish authorities have undertaken the largest military-police operation in modern times, a massive investigation of 17 properties in the Finnish Archipelago purchased under suspicious circumstances by Russian entities. Finnish police say they have also found advanced non-civilian communications equipment, millions of euros in cash and massive amounts of digital materials that led to the arrest of two people. Russia responded with cyber attacks and flew two strategic nuclear bombers straight through the Gulf of Finland. Without even mentioning the considerable evidence of continuing Russian efforts to manipulate social media in the U.S. and the coming mid-term elections, and similar efforts in Europe and elsewhere, it is easy to see why Bolton’s point of view is making inroads with the President.
By the Numbers: In the bigger picture, Putin faces several challenges concerning the impact that more aggressive U.S. sanctions would have, and the economic picture in Russia is growing more troublesome. According to a recent report from the Russian Analytical Credit Rating Agency (ACRA), their base case scenario assumes that additional U.S. sanctions are coming, and that at some point in November, the U.S. will introduce some form of a ban on Russian Government Debt. In this scenario, Russian GDP growth is seen at 1.4% in 2019, and then 1.4-1.5% until 2022, well below global growth rates.
Robert Dannenberg, Former Sr. CIA Officer and Head of Global Security for Goldman Sachs
"In the worst-case scenario, according to ACRA, the assumption is not only the imposition of sanctions on government debt, but also serious U.S. sanctions imposed against Russian state-related banks. In this scenario, they can see Russia’s GDP dropping -2.5% in 2019."
The IMF’s new Russia forecasts are quite similar to ACRA’s: 1.8% GDP growth for 2019, then a decline to 1.2% by 2023. As if this isn’t enough, the Russian Central Bank reports an increase in net capital outflows of 2.3 times (or $32 billion) in the first three-quarters of 2018 over the same period last year.
The analysts at ACRA and the IMF are right, there are certainly more U.S. sanctions coming after the mid-term elections, no matter what the results show.
There are two areas of significant bipartisanship: Russia and Saudi Arabia. There are number of draft bills in play: DASKA (Graham/Mendez sponsorship), DETER (Rubio/van Hollen), and others sure to come. In play already, are the Global Magnitsky Act 2016, CAATSA from August 2017, Trump’s September Executive Order on cyber electoral interference, and the CBW Act of 1991. Moreover, Putin’s approval rating is dropping at an alarming rate, from 59% in November 2017 to 39% in November 2018.
Is Putin going to back down? This seems unlikely. We have been waiting for him to “come to his senses” since Crimea in March 2014, and we’re still waiting.
Robert Dannenberg, Former Sr. CIA Officer and Head of Global Security for Goldman Sachs
"The most likely scenario is that Putin doubles down and increases tensions in the Ukraine (particularly the Sea of Azov), Syria, and in the Middle East more broadly."
Despite the bruises from GRU’s demonstrated incompetence in recent months, the other Russian intelligence services are unlikely to counsel restraint, and are more likely to undertake their own initiatives to demonstrate that they can do the job better.
Looking Ahead: Putin likely believes at this point, that he has little to lose. As his National Security Advisor Nikolai Patrushev, has publicly asserted, “the U.S. is engaged in economic warfare against the Russian Federation with the objective of effecting regime change. We have no choice but to use whatever tools we have to avert that outcome. The U.S. succeeded in 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the biggest geopolitical calamity of the 20th century. It will not happen again.”
Expect Russia to claim the moral high ground with its circle of allies for the U.S. withdrawal from the INF. This theme will be replayed by Russian cyber trolls in the coming weeks and beyond. Certainly, the U.S. withdrawal will have implications for other arms control agreements such as the new START Treaty. However, as in the Reagan era, a renewed arms race cannot work to Russia’s advantage given its own economic challenges.
