After the fall of Aleppo, few would deny the influence that Russian President Vladimir Putin now wields in Syria and the Middle East - but this was not always the case. This February 18 article from the Former Head of Security at Goldman Sachs, Rob Dannenberg, offers a glimpse into the Russian mindset concerning Middle Eastern affairs, and a prescient argument for why Western commentators should not underestimate the Kremlin.
Recent press headlines about Syrian peace talks and a possible ceasefire reflect naivete and false hopes that come from thinking the world is the way we wish it to be and not the way it really is. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical gambit in Syria is poorly understood and generally underestimated in the West.
Putin is trying to achieve several complementary objectives. First, he is using the “maskirovka” (Russian practice of military deception) of fighting a truly loathed terrorist organization, ISIS, and to gain sympathy and support from those who have suffered harm from that group. Secondly, and critically, he is propping up the regime of his surrogate in the region, Syrian President Bashar al Assad, whose ability to continue the fight against ISIS and the anti-Assad Sunni militias seemed to be on the verge of collapse only a few short months ago when Assad addressed the Syrian people and admitted Syrian army capabilities were insufficient to continue fighting on all fronts.
Putin’s decisive intervention on behalf of Assad has dramatically changed the military and impacted the relationships between neighboring states. There is no question the Russian military intervention has changed the situation on the ground to the detriment of anti-Assad Sunni militia groups. Perhaps more importantly, Putin has sent a strong message to other leaders in the region, such as the Saudis, who are still chaffing from the perceived abandonment by their long time ally, the United States, in favor of their theological opponent in the region, Iran.
The blunt message Putin is sending—intended recipients being Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Saudi King Salman, and Jordanian King Abdullah—is that he learned the proper lesson from the Arab Spring; that great powers do not abandon their friends. He is quick to point out publicly as well as in private conversation that the Americans let their long-time ally, former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, rot in a prison in Cairo and their more-recent ally, Libyan leader Muamar Qadhafi, die in a ditch.
For Sisi—old enough to remember the years of Soviet patronage during the Cold War— a relationship with Moscow and access to Russian weapon systems is quite welcome after the U.S. turned a cold shoulder to Egypt. For Jordan’s King Abdullah, having recently been snubbed by Washington and dealing with a refugee crisis of epic proportions, the time might be coming to begin to pay attention to the power willing to commit military might to defend its interests in the region. Finally, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, feeling betrayed by the United States commitment to building a relationship with Iran and needing a relationship with Russia to get a dialogue on oil production cuts as crude prices sink towards $20 a barrel, might be reevaluating its relationship with Moscow (and in the interim has significantly strengthened its relationship with China).
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Putin’s military intervention in Syria has served to strengthen Russia’s relationship with its most important ally in the region, Iran. Some observers believe Russia’s participation in the P5 talks on Iran’s nuclear program was about making sure the deal was as favorable to Iran as possible. It didn’t take long after the deal was achieved for Russia to confirm the sale of the sophisticated S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Iran—delivery of which began mere months after Iran’s October test of a multi-stage ballistic missile in violation of a United Nations resolution. The series of recent economic and trade agreements signed between Russia and Iran, including the commitment to build more civilian nuclear reactors, are further indication of the criticality of this relationship to Moscow. Putin also understands quite well that it is Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and Assad’s soldiers who are the ground forces engaged in the fight in Syria. Russia is happy to provide air strikes and artillery support but is less enthusiastic about committing ground troops.
Looking beyond the current “ceasefire,” which should be viewed the same as the “ceasefires” in eastern Ukraine, Putin understands quite well that military power is relevant in the twenty-first century. Putin has used it to carve out a sphere of influence in eastern Europe and put pressure on NATO. And he is now using it to establish a sphere of influence in a region of the world he considers important and which was an area where the Soviet Union, before its collapse, had invested significant effort to build relationships as a counterpoint to Western influence in the region. At some point, the Russian military intervention will result in the destruction of the anti-Assad militias, and Putin will call again for peace talks, understanding quite well that the side with the most “boots on the ground” will get the most votes.
