As the G20 summit in China came to a close, something far more worrisome than Air Force One’s stairway gaff overshadowed the summit. The Philippines announced that eleven Chinese dredging vessels and barges had been observed in the waters off of Scarborough Shoal. This, Manila suggested, is an indication China intends to commence land reclamation at the shoal as it has done in several other instances.
This is especially troubling given the shoal’s history at the center of regional tensions. In a meeting in March, President Barack Obama warned President Xi Jinping not to build on Scarborough Shoal, while Xi stated that he would continue to protect China’s sovereignty and maritime rights. The impasse, it seems, remains firmly entrenched.
This development, and its numerous precedents, raises the questions, “why is the South China Sea so important?” and from that, “what is China prepared to do to defend its claims?” For the U.S. and its many regional allies, the latter question is more worrisome. Like its incremental progress in reclaiming reefs and shoals for the construction of militarized air strips and ports, China may be inching toward declaring the South China Sea as a “core interest.” Naming it as such, in the same way it defines Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang, cements it as an issue that Beijing will not negotiate over and is prepared to go to war to defend.
In 2010, Chinese officials stated that the South China Sea was indeed a core interest before recanting the assertion. In 2015, after Xi became president, a new security law broadly defined core interests as “the political regime; the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the nation; and people’s livelihoods, sustainable economic development of society, and other major interests.” This definition appears to afford a greater degree of flexibility but also ambiguity. While the law would appear to encompass the South China Sea, it is not definitively so until Beijing states it as such.
This complicates the task for regional neighbors of determining the lengths China is prepared to go to in the South China Sea. Beyond the diplomatic statements, China’s observable movements remain ambitious. Its fleet of dredgers have reclaimed some 3200 acres of territory, and yet the biggest dredger is expected to enter service next summer. China currently has the world’s largest coast guard fleet and often uses the vessels in altercations with ships of other countries. Construction of reinforced airplane hangars on several islands suggest they will someday house military aircraft. The next provocation in the eyes of the U.S. and many others would be to station military aircraft on these islands and above that, to begin the same process at Scarborough Shoal.
Chinese and U.S. interests in the South China Sea will continue to intersect. The U.S. remains committed to upholding the status quo in the South China Sea, as outlined by The Hague’s ruling against Chinese territorial claims, because of the implications for global trade and for its own strategic interests. An estimated $5 trillion in trade moves through these waters every year, much of it being oil and other energy resources that power regional economies. The U.S. is also committed to freedom of navigation in these waters for its own naval vessels and those of other countries. Its response has been the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) and reconnaissance flights through Chinese territorial claims, actions seen as provocative in Beijing’s eyes.
Image: The Cipher Brief
Whether this intersection is to each country’s mutual benefit or detriment will depend on the future of bilateral relations. Former U.S. Ambassador Joseph DeTrani told The Cipher Brief that: “It is important for China to understand that the U.S. will not negotiate its access to international waters in the South China Sea. It is also important for the U.S. to work harder at convincing the Chinese people that the rebalance to Asia was not an effort to confront and isolate China.”
Both China and the U.S. have been aggressive in the South China Sea. Each side has been forced to evaluate actions as a substitute for effective communication on intentions. Gordon Chang, author of The Coming Collapse of China, told The Cipher Brief that “Many view the Chinese state as powerful, but its continual provocations of maritime neighbors suggest a curious—and dangerous—combination of self-perceptions of both strength and insecurity.” Any U.S. policy faces the difficult task of accommodating the former perception and reassuring the latter while still holding a strong position on U.S. interests in order to find success.
Will Edwards is an international producer at The Cipher Brief.
