Supporters of the deal though, say it will lead to greater cooperation on a number of fronts including investment and security.
The Cipher Brief spoke with our Middle East expert and former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI, Norm Roule about the regional implications of the agreement.
The Cipher Brief: Let’s talk nuts and bolts first. What is your take on what the agreement spells out?
Roule: As a result of the direct U.S. involvement, the United Arab Emirates and Israel agree to undertake a series of actions meant to establish diplomatic relations. In exchange, Israel will drop its plan to annex those parts of the West Bank that Palestinians claim as part of a future state. The two counties agreed to cooperate to “achieve a just, comprehensive and enduring resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”
Delegations from the UAE and Israel will meet in the coming weeks to sign bilateral agreements that enable cooperation on investment, tourism, direct flights, security, telecommunications, technology, energy, healthcare, culture, the environment, and the establishment of reciprocal embassies. In a sign of the times, the two countries will also cooperate in developing a vaccine for the coronavirus. All of this will take time, and it shouldn’t come as a surprise if some elements take more time than others.
Two more points. I understand there has been an agreement that the U.S. will loosen restrictions on advanced technologies sought by Emirati military officials but previously denied due to the U.S. long-standing commitment to preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge over its neighbors. Such requests also followed the establishment of Israel’s relations with Egypt and Jordan. Also, since the two countries are not in a state of war, this deal should not be called a peace agreement.
The Cipher Brief: Not everyone calls the deal a win, but those who do are focusing on the benefits of direct ties. What are the upsides to the deal?
Roule: There are many winners here. Let me focus on a few. Old problems may have new solutions. Economically, direct ties between countries that are both close U.S. partners and two of the region’s most dynamic and technologically advanced societies offer new options for cooperation and technical solutions to pressing problems. Diplomatically, we now have another Arab voice speaking with Israel on Russia, Syria, Turkey, and Lebanon. Our close relations with both countries mean that we can leverage these players to assist in our diplomacy. The Emiratis can join the Egyptians and Jordanians in pressing the case for a solution to the Palestinian issue.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
The agreement gives the Peace Process (yet) another chance. Annexation has been frozen although the language on this point is cast in terms that only a diplomat would appreciate. But Israel will now stand down on annexation of West Bank land it captured in the 1967 War. The Peace Process requires a complete restart. There is simply no evidence that the current path and positions can achieve success. Although Abu Dhabi may have no more success here than Amman or Cairo, this relationship gives new hope to that possibility.
The United Arab Emirates scored multiple wins through bold diplomacy. Abu Dhabi can rightfully claim to have prevented annexation while enhancing its international stature and claim as a regional champion of interfaith relations. It has also opened ties with the region’s most technologically advanced actor, bolstered the regional architecture against Iran (and Turkey), and made it easier for other Arab countries to establish similar ties to Israel. Abu Dhabi has provided the Trump administration with an undeniable diplomatic victory while simultaneously removing the annexation problem from a potential Biden administration’s list of problems. The deal also should improve Abu Dhabi’s relations with Congress.
Prime Minister Netanyahu can claim a historic victory that gives him a place in the history books without making deep concessions. Israel can now boast of diplomatic relations with four members (Egypt, Jordanian, Mauritania, and now the UAE) of the Arab League, along with hopes that this number will grow in the relatively near future. Annexation would have invited diplomatic and financial costs that would have distracted from such real problems as the coronavirus, Lebanon, Iran, and Syria. Although the deal has infuriated settlers and the pro-annexation bloc, the accord leaves Netanyahu in a better political position domestically. It also allows him to escape the international opprobrium that would have accompanied annexation. In theory, he could always return to the annexation idea in the future, but this is unlikely if it would cost him a relationship with the Emirates.
The deal saves Palestinians from the consequences of Palestinians. Although Palestinians have condemned the accord, the UAE move has ended– at least for the foreseeable future – the annexation campaign. It is difficult for me to see how a peace process aimed at a two-state solution could exist if Netanyahu went through his annexation commitments. Also, we should remember that neither Egypt nor Jordan ceased their advocacy for Palestinians after they established relations with Israel. I don’t want to overstate this point, but the Emiratis now have a formal diplomatic channel to use with Israel on Palestinian issues.
Jordan avoids the consequences of annexation. Israel’s annexation of the West Bank risked catastrophic consequences with Amman. Acceptance would have threatened significant instability. But opposition might have entailed suspending the peace treaty King Hussein signed in 1994 or other actions that could have also threatened the gas deals he has developed with Israel and other neighbors. Now, Jordanian diplomats can call on Emirati counterparts (in Israel) to make joint representations to Tel Aviv.
The Cipher Brief: Palestinians are not happy with this agreement and promptly recalled their Ambassador to the UAE. What is it you think that the Palestinians are missing in this?
Roule: Palestinian leaders have expressed deep anger at the deal in a series of bitter statements and angry headlines. Mahmoud Abbas called for an immediate emergency session of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to condemn the deal. I expect neither organization is likely to respond to his request.
Palestinian strategy is based on the principle of using diplomatic isolation to compel Israel to make concessions, the accord messages that their hold on the foreign policy of the Arab world has ended. Arab countries may not pressure them to make a deal with Israel, but nor will they subordinate their many other foreign policy requirements to the Palestinian issue. But no one should think this move came as a complete surprise to Palestinians. Palestinian relations with Arab countries have followed a downward spiral since the end of the cold war. Palestinian support for Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait may have been a turning point. With the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran’s expansion in the region, the tectonic developments following 2011, the collapse of Arab states, the rise of Turkey and its support for the Moslem Brotherhood, and the growing demands on smaller Arab coffers, the Palestinian issue increasingly seemed like an unprofitable distraction.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
Gulf supporters have increasingly voiced unhappiness with Palestinian infighting and corruption at a time when these former Arab supporters found common cause in a growing number of issues. HAMAS’ ties with Iran and Turkey have infuriated former Gulf donors. After years of generous donations, the Emirates ended funding to the Palestinian Authority around 2014. Abu Dhabi also allowed Mohammad Dahlan, a political opponent of Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas to live in the Emirates.
Palestinian leaders haven’t done much to help their case. The Palestinian Authority’s rejection of 16 tons of humanitarian assistance from the UAE in May was a revealing example of how political decisions impact the living standards of Palestinians.
Once the heat of the moment passes, I anticipate more internal debate within the Palestinian leadership on the direction of their cause. Jockeying is already taking place among the rising generation of Palestinian leaders. Some may well see the changing regional winds as a chance to inject life into a decision-making structure that many believe is constrained by a stale narrative.
The Cipher Brief: What does the agreement say about U.S. involvement in the region?
Roule: We should recognize that this is a significant diplomatic achievement that wouldn't have taken place without the United States' direct intervention, including involvement by the White House. In an increasingly fragmented world, the United States has brought two parties together. No matter one’s political views, we should applaud this success and those who made it possible.
It comes on the heels of U.S. efforts to calm tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, a unified Gulf Cooperation Council statement on the Iran arms embargo, and a quiet, but aggressive, push for a political settlement in Libya. I think this has been an impressive few weeks for U.S. diplomacy in a year that has seen extraordinary challenges.
The Cipher Brief: The announcement still came as a surprise to many. How did it come about?
Roule: Outside observers have long anticipated this development, so I don’t think anyone can say it was a surprise. But the timing of the decision was dependent on factors that only developed in recent years, and even in recent weeks, that allowed the process to move forward.
There are four broad drivers that formed the foundation of this decision. The first is Iran’s adventurism and the international community’s unwillingness to hold Tehran accountable. That has caused victims of this aggression to consider new models to protect their interests.
Second, the region itself has changed. In a world where Libya, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and even Iraq are vying for attention as failed states, regional leaders with the resources and willingness to tackle these problems likely perceive a need for a different regional architecture. This decision is only reinforced by the region’s youth, which has little connection to past pan-Arab ideologies that once served to frame political decision making.
Third, it’s been increasingly hard to ignore the potential benefits of partnership in a region with problems that can only be solved with more efficient investment and technology. Trade with Israel has been growing, and Tel Aviv maintained a small presence at the International Renewable Energy Agency in Abu Dhabi.
Finally, the region has lost patience with the Palestinian leadership, but I think it would be wrong to say that this means they care less about the Palestinian people. Regional actors routinely provide humanitarian aid to Palestinians. Arab leaders have grown increasingly frustrated with the Palestinian leadership's inability to demonstrate good governance, undertake political and anti-corruption reforms, overcome the toxic relationship between the Palestinian Authority and HAMAS, and play a meaningful role in the peace process.
The UAE also took a number of steps in the last two years to socialize the concept of relations with its people. These things included playing the Israeli national anthem at a sports tournament in November of 2018, appointing the Emirate’s first chief rabbi in May of 2019, confirming Israeli participation in Dubai’s Expo 2020, the UAE announcing joint work with Israel on a COVID-19 vaccine in June of this year, and numerous engagements between Emirati officials and American Jewish organizations.
But the main precipitant for this agreement was the urgent imperative to halt Israel’s plans for annexation of West Bank territory. The Emiratis took the rather bold decision to have their Ambassador to the United States, Yousef al-Utaybah, publish an op-ed in Hebrew in an Israeli newspaper, warning that annexation would come at the cost of better relations with its Arab neighbors. This move required considerable finesse. It was extraordinarily rare for an Arab country to take its case to the people of Israel and reflects the new world of diplomacy.
A series of quiet diplomatic engagements between Washington, Abu Dhabi, and Tel Aviv followed the op-ed. Eventually, the three sides agreed that Israel would halt annexation, and in return, the Emirates would establish diplomatic relations. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made annexation a significant element of his vision for Israel. Convincing him to change this view couldn’t have been easy. The deal gives him a political victory without appearing to have capitulated to international pressure.
The Cipher Brief: What are the other broader perspectives we should take into consideration when understanding the impact of this deal?
Roule: As I have often said, the region is changing in remarkable ways. We should do everything we can to ensure that it does so in a way that respects our interests and values.
The Cipher Brief: Bahrain and Oman welcomed the deal. Should we expect other Arab states to follow?
Roule: In general, the regional response has been positive, although (as of this writing) many regional states have yet to comment officially. Egypt, Bahrain, and Oman have praised the move while reiterating their support for Palestinian rights. The Saudi press coverage has been quite favorable.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
There has been much speculation that other Arab states will follow the Emirates in opening relations with Israel. Certainly, Bahrain would be a candidate and possibly Oman as well. Leaders of these countries already have good informal ties with Israel. But I think they will want to watch how this plays out before making a decision of this consequence. They will also want to get a sense of their own population’s views. Palestinian matters may no longer be as politically significant as they were in the past, but that doesn’t mean many Arabs don’t still have strongly held personal views on the issue.
The Cipher Brief: What about countries like Iran and Turkey, that have opposed the agreement?
Roule: It will come as little surprise that Iran, Turkey, and their proxies have joined the Palestinians in denouncing the deal. Ankara and Tehran are increasingly jockeying to lead the resistance against Israel, but neither is likely to achieve the strategic influence outside their existing partners. Tehran’s ideology has little currency in a Sunni street that - even when sympathetic towards Palestinians – sees Iran as a regionally destabilizing actor. Turkey has robustly condemned the agreement, but its criticism rings hollow in that it maintains both an embassy and trade ties with Israel. Pakistan has issued a cool statement.
The Cipher Brief: What happens next?
Roule: A lot of work. The many agreements to be worked out will take some time but face-to-face discussions between the two countries will begin immediately. Businessmen and tourists will wonder when COVID-19 restrictions will allow them to visit each country. I anticipate that Israel will upgrade its informal presence at the International Renewable Energy Agency to an embassy. We should watch how investors and businessmen build connections between the two countries, especially in the healthcare, energy, cyber, and military sectors.
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