BACKGROUND: Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida approved the new National Security Strategy on December 16, along with a new National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program. The new policies call for Japan’s most significant boost to military spending and acquisition in decades.
Landmark Military Expansion
The new NSS, which has been updated for the first time since 2013, says Japan is facing the “most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII”. It identifies China as Japan’s primary security challenge for the first time, due to increasing tensions over Taiwan. It also highlights long-time threats from North Korea, as well ongoing disputes with Russia.
The policies outline an increase in defense spending to 43 trillion yen ($314 billion) over the next five years, starting with a defense budget for fiscal year 2023 reaching $51.4 billion. The policy aims to increase Japan’s usual defense spending of around 1 percent of GDP to nearly 2 percent of GDP. This change will make Japan the third largest military spender after the US and China.
Officials say the funding will go towards the acquisition of military capabilities that Japan’s defense-oriented security forces have not previously had. Most significantly, the new defense strategy calls for counter strike capabilities, which will give Japan the ability to launch long-range precision strikes into adversaries’ territories. Tokyo has reportedly requested over $2 billion worth of US-made Tomahawk missiles to fulfill this goal.
Japanese media also says that Japan is developing its own long-range missiles with a range of 3,000 kilometers, which would be able to reach all of North Korea and parts of China.
The new defense policy also calls for the bolstering of Japan's missile defenses; drone capabilities; and cross-domain operational capabilities for space, cyber, and electronic warfare.
Japan's Safer Together Mentality
Japan recently announced it is jointly developing a next generation fighter jet with the UK and Italy. And Prime Minister Kishida toured Group of Seven nations — including France, Italy, the UK and Canada — to discuss ways they can enhance security cooperation with Tokyo.
Kishida capped his G7 tour with a visit to Washington where he met with President Joe Biden to underscore the alliance between the US and Japan. Their meeting was preceded by "two-plus-two" talks between their countries' top diplomats and security officials.
As Cipher Brief Senior National Security Correspondent Walter Pincus pointed out, these meetings covered ways for the US and Japan to strengthen military ties. A major point was the decision to shift more capabilities towards Japan’s southwest Nansei Islands to address concerns over Taiwan. The most significant step in this area is the US deployment of a Marine Littoral Regiment to Okinawa. The infantry unit will notably be armed with anti-ship missiles.
THE CONTEXT
- 1947 Constitution - Article 9: Following World War Two, Tokyo adopted the Constitution of Japan. Article 9 contains a "No War" clause, which states that Japan renounces war as a sovereign right and means of settling international disputes. It forbids Japan from maintaining military forces for offensive purposes.
- 1954 Self Defense Forces Act: Japan's legislators formally authorized Japanese forces to defend the country against direct and indirect aggression and maintain public order when necessary.
- 2015 Reinterpretation of Article 9: Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe leads an effort to reinterpret Article 9 to allow for "collective self-defense," which would allow Japanese forces to assist the US and other allies if they were attacked. Collective self-defense is applied under three strict conditions:
- The attack on the Japanese ally or partner poses an existential threat to Japan itself.
- There are no other means to repel the threat to Japan's ally or Japan itself.
- The minimum military force is used for collective self-defense.
THE EXPERTS
The Cipher Brief tapped Nicholas Szechenyi and Sheila Smith for their insights on what Japan's military expansion means for its future defense posture. Interviews have been excerpted and lightly edited for clarity and brevity.
Nicholas Szechenyi, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Japan Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Nicholas Szechenyi is deputy director of the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he is also a senior fellow. His research focuses on U.S.-Japan relations and U.S.-East Asia relations. Prior to joining CSIS in 2005, he was a news producer for Fuji Television in Washington, D.C., where he covered U.S. policy in Asia and domestic politics.
Sheila Smith, Senior Fellow, Japan Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Sheila Smith is John E. Merow senior fellow for Asia-Pacific studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CSIS). She is the author of Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power; Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China and Japan's New Politics and the US-Japan Alliance. She is also the author of the CFR interactive guide Constitutional Change in Japan.
EXPERT Q&A
The Cipher Brief: What is motivating this new defense strategy and boost in defense spending? And what is making it possible today?
Szechenyi: I think first and foremost is the shock from Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the realization that similar circumstances could unfold in East Asia and that consequently, Japan has to really invest quickly in more advanced defense capabilities.
The new national security strategy and the defense strategy talk extensively about changes in the regional security environment around Japan. Obviously, Japan is on the front lines of the challenge posed by Chinese coercion, primarily in the East China Sea. You have North Korea with its latest round of provocations and ballistic missile tests. And increasingly, you have coercion from Russia, which is pressuring Japan around the disputed northern territories.
So when Japan looks at this situation, fundamentally, I think strategists came to the realization that Japan really has to double down on defense. Hence, you see majority public support for this dramatic increased investment in defense capabilities, which really is fundamentally about strengthening deterrence in a more severe security environment.
Smith: Since the end of the Cold War, the military balance in East Asia has been shifting. First North Korea’s stated ambition of acquiring nuclear weapons and the means to deliver created several security vulnerabilities: the DPRK’s missiles gained range and accuracy, Pyongyang acquired critical capabilities in utilizing both plutonium and uranium for weapons development, and Kim Jong-il has tested repeatedly to further refine the DPRK’s ability to threaten not only Japan and South Korea but potentially the United States also.
Similarly, over the past two decades China has invested considerable resources in its maritime forces and has begun to use those forces to challenge the status quo in the East and South China Seas. Beijing has also developed its technological capabilities in space and cyber domains, and this too makes U.S. forces in Japan and the region into increased vulnerability. The outburst of a Japan-China territorial dispute in the 2010s creates a direct source of contention.
Moreover, the extended deterrent offered by the U.S. relied largely on US offensive capabilities, and this deterrent is increasingly entangled in the strategic competition with Beijing. Tensions across the Taiwan Strait demonstrate the reality that Japan would become involved in a major power conflict should a crisis escalate to the use of miltiary force.
Japanese political leaders and the public have become increasingly concerned about this shifting military balance. Moreover, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has brought the possibility of war home to many in Japan. For much of the postwar era, Japanese like so many others believed that this type of major power conquest was behind us. Today the world is looking increasingly ominous, and Japan’s ability to shape its environment has come under question.
This moment of investment in military capabilities should not be seen as Japan’s only response, however. For over a decade now, Japan has become far more engaged in the Indo-Pacific and across the globe in shoring up the institutions and practices that it sees as vital to a rules-based order. Similarly, Japan has begun to develop its own economic security levers to help mitigate the economic vulnerabilities created by Chinese coercive practices. This new National Security Strategy thus embraces all of the levers of Japanese statecraft.
The Cipher Brief: What are the remarkable changes to military hardware that you're tracking?
Szechenyi: Counterstrike is definitely one of them. Japan has been investing in so-called standoff capabilities for the last several years. But counterstrike was raised, again, as an element of deterrence.
The national security strategy lays out the justification for this in a clear way by saying that fundamentally, it's about the self-defense of the nation and therefore, is certainly legal and justified.
Tokyo argues that, “a long-range strike is constitutional because it's for the defense of Japan. We will only use this capability according to the three conditions that the government has already introduced for a collective self-defense. And by the way, this is not preemptive or preventive capability; it's strictly in response to an attack.”
The NSS also talks a lot about integrated air and missile defense, which obviously, in the context of the North Korean threat, is critically important. So connected to that, you have a desire to invest in new intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, a lot of satellites. You have a declared interest in uncrewed systems, UAVs, UUVs. Then also, investing more in areas where Japan traditionally has had advanced capabilities, such as submarines and the maritime component.
Then also, investments in next generation aircraft. Japan has already purchased many of the F-35s, for example, and has that allocated as well. So air, maritime, new domains, and the unmanned component, uncrewed component I think is also quite significant.
I think that's really the most impressive aspect of this collection of strategies that came out, is that the Japanese government is not speaking in euphemistic terms. It's laid out very clearly for the Japanese public to understand. And I think because of that, this strategy is going to be enduring.
Smith: The two major shifts are in what Japan’s Ministry of Defense refers to as “stand off” capabilities. The longer range missile acquisition (Tomahawks) are part of this focus on ensuring the SDF can fight beyond the territory of Japan to meet aggression offshore. Beefing up air and naval firepower is the aim here. The purchase of cruise missiles will increase naval lethality. There are other missiles to be added for air assets as well. A second and important upgrade is in Japan’s cyber capabilities. Here the MOD is hoping to recruit up to 20,000 personnel over time, and to deepen Japan’s military engagement with private sector cyber efforts.
Finally, it is important to note that this new defense plan, and the five year procurement effort that kicks it off, has an important emphasis on developing Japan’s indigenous technologies and weapons systems. The emphasis for both of these new capabilities is linked to a longer term effort to develop Japan’s indigenous capabilities. Technological innovation will be emphasized in both civil and military applications. Moreover, Japan will lead a new consortium for a support fighter with UK companies to move the needle on its ability to decrease reliance on off the shelf purchases from the U.S.
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The Cipher Brief: What are the implementation concerns for this new defense strategy?
Szechenyi: If you're going to engage in long-range counterstrike, you have to have much better situational awareness. You have to have better information security to share information with the US. You have to have infrastructure. Does Japan have the capacity to do targeting, battle damage assessments? These are all things that Japan does not have as much experience in. So the operational hurdle is quite high, and they'll have to work through that.
The other question linked to that is, is Japan going to pursue this capability independently or under the construct of the US-Japan Alliance? And I don't think this will be controversial either, but it's interesting in the sense that there are some conservatives in the defense policy debate in Japan who think Japan should use defense capabilities independently to be less dependent on the United States for its security. But that could, in turn, raise questions in the US about whether such decision-making would draw the US into a conflict.
Smith: There is so much in this new defense plan to watch going forward. But two important implementation aspects will dominate. The first is how Japan pays for this expansion in defense spending. While not all of this strategy relates to the MOD’s budget, there will be considerable outlays initially. The debate in the years to come will be over what mix of financing (bonds, taxes, diverted funds from existing government revenues) will meet the needs of the $316 billion price tag over the next five years.
A second and important aspect of implementation will be how this new Japanese investment in capabilities and operational upgrades is integrated with the U.S. forces in the region. The US-Japan alliance frames Japanese defense planning, and especially with the rising concerns over tensions across the Taiwan Strait rising, how Japan’s planning will align with US planning will be critical to the successful outcome.
The Cipher Brief: How is Japan thinking about escalating tensions over Taiwan, especially in regards to the Okinawa islands?
Szechenyi: With the shock from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Japanese leaders, including the prime Minister himself, came to the realization that such a scenario could apply in East Asia. So the current Prime Minister Kishida famously said that “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow.”
And by that, he mean that if China decides to invade Taiwan, Japan as an ally of the US would presumably provide some form of rear area support to the US in the event of a Taiwan contingency.
But there's also the prospect that China would apply similar tactics to defending its sovereignty claims over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which China claims and Japan administers and considers its own territory.
And if you look at your geography, Japan's southwest island chain, it's called the Nansei, includes Okinawa, of course, but also comes very close to Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. So a main driver of this strategy is the need for Japan to better protect its territory.
So in addition to the things I mentioned earlier, Japan is also continuing to invest in more amphibious capabilities to defend this chain of small islands that come right up to Taiwan. They're also placing assets on those islands, mostly for ISR. But again, also to deter and to improve their islands' defenses. So yes, the defense of the southwest island chain, including Okinawa, is a primary motivation for this.
Smith: Japan’s southwestern islands will be the first to feel the impact of any crisis between the U.S. and China over Taiwan. Last summer’s tensions as Speaker Pelosi visited Taiwan reveal this keenly. Some of the islands were within the PLA’s missile test range. Those who live on the far flung islands were immediately asking what the Japanese government would do in case of a real conflict to help them. Proximity will make Okinawa, with all of its many islands, a front in any type of military engagement. But residents there have paid a high price in the past for being caught in a war. There is strong antipathy towards being the locus of military bases that will also color any Japanese government effort to bolsters its defenses there.
Cipher Brief writer Ethan Masucol contributed to this report.
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