There are several considerations to keep in mind when assessing the sustainability of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s leadership: his sense of paranoia, his nostalgia for the influence Russia used to hold globally as a superpower, and his desire for “stability” in Russia. Significantly, the popularity of these aspects of Putin’s leadership style are shared by the average Russian and are reflected in the astonishing level of Putin’s popularity ratings and their long term duration. Such levels of popularity would be the envy of any leader in the West. Equally significant is the popularity of Putin’s activism in the near abroad and the Middle East, as well as his re-building of Russian military capability and the military exercises held near the airspace and territorial waters of the United States and NATO members in Europe.
Putin’s monitoring of the Internet and use of impressive propaganda tools make it difficult to build any meaningful opposition. And the efficacy of the institutions of political control and repression have essentially eliminated any meaningful democratic opposition. Finally, many in the West look with anticipation to the end of the Putin era, assuming the administration that follows will be more democratic and pro-Western. That may not be the case.
Putin is an angry and paranoid man. He represents a generation of former military, intelligence, and security service officers who feel Russia was betrayed by Gorbachev, humiliated by Yeltsin, and taken advantage of by the West—particularly the United States in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This cadre has been gradually asserting its prominence in Russia since Putin entered office in 2000. The sense of grievance is a key motivating factor for this group and an essential element in their governing philosophy and execution of national security and foreign policy. For instance, Putin and his key advisors genuinely believe that in the mid-1980s, and again in 2014, the United States conspired with Saudi Arabia to drive down the price of oil in order to effect regime change in Moscow.
The West’s response to the annexation of Crimea and conflict in the Don Basin has been twisted by the Russian leadership to reinforce the sense of conspiracy against Russia. Russian National Security Council Secretary, Nikolay Patrushev, is quoted in Rossiyskaya Gazetta as saying, “The Americans are trying to drag the Russian Federation into an international military conflict, and with the help of events in Ukraine, bring about regime change [in Moscow] and ultimately dismember our country.” Unfortunately, this sense of paranoia and general sense of conspiracy by the West to keep Russia weak is largely shared by the average Russian. This is a key element in Putin’s popularity and his strategy for maintaining power.
When Putin first came to office in 2000, he had a very definite plan for reversing the “indignities” suffered by Russia in the preceding decade:
- Reassert control domestically, starting by bringing the new oligarchal class in line
- Constitutional reform to reduce the independence of regional governors who, in Putin’s view, had started to become too independent of Moscow
- Exaggerate the threat of Chechen terrorism in order to provide justification for another invasion of Chechnya, sending a powerful message to other possible insurrectionist movements on Russia’s southern “Arc of Instability”
- Revamp and modernization Russia’s armed forces—having learned valuable lessons from observing U.S. military performance in Afghanistan and Iraq
- Remodel and reinvest in Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal and resume strategic bomber and nuclear submarine patrols off the U.S. Eastern Seaboard and elsewhere
- Re-assert itself in its former sphere of influence and beyond (the 2007 cyber attack on Estonia, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and support to separatists in eastern Ukraine, and the current intervention in Syria).
In short, Putin began taking the steps for Russia to regain its status as a world power and is now acting in a manner which reflects that belief.
Despite fierce criticism from the West and some sporadic opposition inside Russia, this program is enormously popular with the average Russian, as well as the hard line “siloviki”—representatives of the security, intelligence, and military services—who are key elements of Putin’s administration.
Putin has also taken steps to ensure Kremlin control of the public media in Russia, which is why the media reflects the anti-Russian, Western conspiracy themes so deeply held by his administration. Under a decree issued in October 2012, the Russian government maintains a blacklist of internet sites that give it broad authority to restrict anything considered “subversive.” SORM, a system for Russian law enforcement agencies to monitor electronic communications including the Internet, has been in place since 1998, making it very difficult to form any meaningful opposition to Putin without coming to the attention of the security services.
Everything, from the FIFA soccer corruption investigation to the recent charges from the World Anti-Doping Agency of drug use by Russian athletes, are characterized in the Russian media as part of a broad conspiracy to weaken Russia and reduce its prestige. Journalists critical of Putin have been murdered, branded as traitors and threatened. Their ability to independently represent their views largely eliminated. The murder of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in the immediate vicinity of the Kremlin serves as the capstone of a chilling message previously delivered to members of the Russian media. Now prominent members of the opposition must consider their physical security is threatened by the government or its agents.
A key tool in shaping political stability and sustainability from Putin’s perspective is empowerment of the primary instrument of repression in Russia, the Federal Security Service (FSB). The FSB is solidly in the hands of a Putin loyalist, Alexander Bortnikov, who was a senior general in the FSB when Putin was its director. In the past year, the Duma has passed anti-subversive legislation, which essentially empowers the Russian FSB to investigate any entity that receives any funding or direction from outside Russia.
Another powerful institution in Russia is the Security Council headed by another Putin loyalist, Nikolay Patrushev. The Security Council has recently become more engaged in the management of Russia’s economy. Declining commodity prices, principally oil, combined with western sanctions are having a detrimental impact on Russia’s economy. At the moment, Putin’s popularity and Russian nationalism are sufficient to weather economic hardship. But Putin is a student of history and understands the contribution economic problems made to the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is not surprising he is leaving nothing to chance and has directed the Security Council to play a role in the management of Russia’s economy.
For many Russians, Putin has returned Russia to greatness, and if that has meant disengagement with the West, it is a price worth paying. Russians remember the economic hardship and lack of public order, criminality, and chaos that occurred during the administration of Boris Yeltsin, coupled with the blows to prestige coming with the loss of empire. Very few Russians want a return of that era. In short, for all the loss of personal liberties, most Russians consider themselves and their country in a better position after 15 years of the Putin era. Absent some unexpected event, it appears Putin will win another six-year term when the next Russian presidential election takes place in 2018.
