Drones have traditionally been used by Western militaries as a tool in counterterrorism efforts, but insurgent and terrorist groups are increasingly turning to small hobby drones to bolster their own efforts. The Cipher Brief spoke with Robert Bunker of the Strategic Studies Institute on how insurgents can incorporate this new limited form of airpower into their operational playbooks.
The Cipher Brief: How common is it for non-state groups to use unmanned aerial systems (UAS) technology?
Robert Bunker: Insurgent and terrorist groups have been looking into and experimenting with UAS since the early 2000s. The Aum Shinrikyo cult even looked into using remote controlled helicopters to spray the sarin nerve agent in the pre-June of 1994 period. Quite a number of notional and ill-conceived al Qaeda UAS plots then took place with little to show for them but the arrest of some of its affinity members in the United States.
The main groups initially attempting—or actually utilizing—UAS were Fatah, Hamas, and Hezbollah, with the latter having the most success. Hezbollah—drawing upon its ties to Iran—utilized military grade UAS rather than commercial systems employed by the various Sunni Jihadi groups. UAS use by Jihadi insurgents has steadily increased since 2010, with the Islamic State dominating the scene since 2014.
Russian separatists in the Ukraine—undoubtedly backed by Russia—are also heavily invested in UAS. They have been using them primarily for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) purposes in order to coordinate artillery and rocket strikes on Ukrainian forces.
TCB: What are some innovative ways insurgents have incorporated UAS into their tactics?
RB: The Islamic State (IS) and some of the other Jihadi groups provide great case studies of how insurgent groups has utilized UAS over the last few years. These systems were originally used in the May-August 2014 by IS for reconnaissance and mission planning as well as propaganda/information operations purposes with Jihadi video production. By April 2015—at the oil refinery offensive in Baiji, Iraq—UAS were being used for real time surveillance for troop command and control as well as targeting for artillery and rocket strikes, and battle damage assessment.
Since December 2015, in Kobane, Syria, IS has been using UAS carrying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for direct attacks against opposing Kurdish and other troops. In October 2016, emerged the first confirmed deaths resulting from a booby-trapped UAS near Erbil, Iraq against Kurdish forces. Since August and September 2016, there has been primitive bombing activity by Hezbollah and Jund al Aqsa (Al Qaeda) in Syria, where small bombs and munitions are being dropped from UAS. Additionally, in February, there have been pro-Russian separatist forces in the Ukraine engaging in UAS-enabled nighttime firebombing—dropping white phosphorous—against two Ukrainian military warehouses.
TCB: How can other technology complement insurgent use of UAS technology?
RB: Smart phones are now globally available and represent pocket-sized computers with numerous applications that can readily support UAS weaponization. Such apps can support GPS mission targeting, propaganda video streaming, and night vision capability for after dark operations (once an infrared camera attachment is added to a phone). Down the road, we will see facial and pattern recognition targeting and more advanced personal assistant derived capabilities—initially expert systems and possibly followed on by crude artificial intelligence (AI).
Basic commercial UAS and smart phone combinations may later be enhanced by two other developing technologies. The initial one is additive—that is 3 dimensional—manufacturing in plastics and metals that can be used to create tailored and specialized UAS airframes, or at least system modifications, for specific insurgent missions. 3D printing has already been utilized to create camera gimbals for UAS and will likely be used for simple bomblet release mechanisms at some point. Additionally, such printers could produce customized weapons attachments such as firearm, grenade, and warhead designs.
There are also concerns over the use of direct attacks from UAS—utilizing firearms and IEDs—integrated and deployed with insurgent ground assault forces. The real game changer, however, may eventually be—in a decade or more—the networking of UAS into larger groupings or swarm waves that share some sort of neural or collective intelligence for command and control to coordinate and optimize the speed, timing, and approach of their attacks on defending troops.
TCB: What are the implications of insurgent use of UAS technology for militaries, particularly those operating in increasingly complex and often urban environments?
RB: IEDs—which are essentially static and passive booby-traps activated by initiating a trigger mechanism or are command detonated—will increasingly be mounted on UAS that will actively hunt troops down. No longer will IEDs simply be hidden in wait along the roadside, they will now fly into compounds at the most opportune moments for devastating effects. Traditional static IEDs in the past have caused an immense amount of casualties for counterinsurgency forces. The concept of mobile IEDs that will chase after troops is rather chilling.
The next threat perception relates to emerging UAS use in Ukraine. The Russian separatists—and covert Russian personnel—use UAS to coordinate devastating artillery and rocket strikes on Ukrainian forces. Therefore, UAS do not only represent a direct attack danger to small groups of troops, they also threaten entire battalions due to their near real time ability to coordinate opposing force artillery fires.
Additional threat perceptions stem from the interplay of UAS use with other systems, such as insurgent remotely operated sniper rifles, machine guns, and vehicles now emerging in Iraq and Syria. This represents a broader shift from human operated weapons to semi-autonomous and fully autonomous systems over time.
TCB: How can governments seek to rein in the threat emerging from insurgent use of UAS?
RB: The effects of globalization make reining in this threat difficult. Governments are simply unable to limit the sales of commercial UAS to insurgent groups. Millions of these systems are sold annually, and the Chinese manufacturer DGI, which makes a number of popular UAS lines, is even said to have sales distribution in Syria catering to the warring factions.
Since proactive measures are off the table in foreign operational environments with active insurgencies, the fallback strategies for governments will have to be reactive. This means that emphasis will be placed on countermeasures under the umbrella term of C-UAS (Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems). Quite a number of active countermeasure programs of this type exist in the United States and among allies. They are drawing upon older fielded systems, initially built as artillery and incoming missile countermeasures, as well as new industry ones specifically designed to contend with UAS threats.
The views expressed in this interview are those of the author and not of the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.
