What surprised me most during recent discussions in South Korea with academics and others was their guarded optimism over recent developments with North Korea. All said they were pleased with the leadership summits and the halt of missile launches and nuclear tests as well as the prospect of the complete denuclearization of North Korea. Many were equally concerned, however, that North Korea would work hard to retain some nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons infrastructure, regardless of stated commitments.
This is a valid concern considering that:
- Previously, North Korea was not forthcoming with its Uranium Enrichment program, which they denied having when we presented evidence to them starting in 2002. In 2010, they admitted having the program.
- To this day, North Korea denies assisting Syria with the construction of a nuclear reactor in Al Kibar, Syria, despite the overwhelming amount of evidence documenting their technical assistance.
- And in late 2008, North Korea refused to sign a Verification protocol permitting nuclear monitors to inspect non-declared suspect nuclear sites, a pro forma practice for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear monitors in other countries. This led to the demise of the Six Party Talks process and the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement.
This series of disappointments, when the prospects had originally looked promising, has understandably conditioned many to doubt North Korea’s sincerity in regard to denuclearization promises made to Presidents Moon Jae-In, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping.
What I tried to explain to my concerned South Korean interlocutors was that the U.S., pleased with recent developments with North Korea, was not ignorant of the past. That the U.S., in consultation with South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, would ensure that North Korea commits to a Verification protocol that permits nuclear monitors to inspect non-declared suspect nuclear sites.
The process begins in earnest once North Korea provides a comprehensive Declaration listing the number and location of nuclear weapons, plutonium and enriched uranium facilities and its personnel and the number and location of mid and long-range ballistic missiles and facilities. With the Declaration and Verification protocol in hand, nuclear monitors could then be expeditiously deployed to North Korea to commence with the process of dismantling North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. I also reminded my South Korean colleagues that the U.S. has good insight into these North Korean programs and a Declaration from North Korea that’s incomplete will be obvious – and unfortunate. Also, the scientific tools available to nuclear monitors are impressive, as is their ability to discern if a country is less than forthcoming with its Declaration.
Joseph DeTrani, Former Director, National Counterproliferation Center
"For these obvious reasons, I would hope that Kim Jung Un’s senior advisors who may consider hiding nuclear weapons and facilities in the reported thousands of underground tunnels in North Korea, realize that the U.S. will know if they’re cheating. Hopefully, Kim Jung Un is sincere in his commitment to complete denuclearization, which he knows is complete, along with the verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons facilities and personnel. Anything short of this will be unacceptable."
A number of my concerned South Korean colleagues also questioned why Kim Jong Un would be motivated to completely denuclearize, after North Korea spent billions of dollars over recent decades to acquire formidable nuclear and missile capabilities. I shared my views, based on over fifteen years of experience working with North Korea on these issues.
First and foremost: North Korea wants security assurances and the establishment of normal relations with the U.S. Such a relationship would give North Korea international legitimacy and, for economic reasons, access to U.S. and international financial institutions for foreign direct investment purposes. Indeed, Chairman Kim Jung Un has made it clear that his focus now is on North Korea’s ailing economy and his commitment to economic development and a better life for the twenty-five million people living in North Korea. A normal relationship with the U.S., which would also require verifiable progress on human rights and illicit activities, would also result in the eventual lifting of sanctions, a principal goal of Kim Jung Un.
Ideally, North Korea wants both: a normal relationship with the U.S. and nuclear weapons. And as they told me starting in 2003, the U.S. should treat North Korea as we treat Pakistan, a nuclear weapons state with normal relations with the U.S. North Korea knows that the U.S. will never accept them as a nuclear weapons state. And if North Korea wants normal relations with the U.S., with the significant economic benefits that will accrue from such a relationship, then they have to dismantle their nuclear weapons and facilities.
Personally, I believe Kim Jung Un is being honest in his strategic decision to denuclearize in return for security assurances and a normal relationship with the U.S. Any effort by Kim’s senior advisors to deceive the U.S. and attempt to retain some nuclear weapons and infrastructure would be ill-advised and discoverable. Hopefully, Kim Jung Un knows this and moves forward smartly to completely denuclearize in return for security assurances and a path to normal relations with the U.S.
Joseph R. DeTrani was the former Special Envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea. The views are the author’s and not any government agency or departments.
