Since its birth, modern Turkey has occupied a delicate position in the world. Straddling both Asia and Europe, the ancient Ottoman capital of Istanbul captures the blessing and the curse of Turkish geography. On the one hand, it sits at the center of the old world, bordered by western Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and Central Asia, with easy access to the Mediterranean and Black Seas. On the other, it is inextricably linked to the failings and ambitions of its neighbors.
Today, little has changed. Bordering the Syrian civil war to the south, a newly assertive Russia to the north, and an ambivalent Europe to the west, Ankara finds itself at the center of a web of competing geopolitical interests. However, this unique strategic position has also lent the AK party-led government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan new opportunities to exert leverage over its most important western allies, especially the United States and the European Union (EU).
This new leverage is particularly clear in Syria. Since 2012, the Erdogan government has stood against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad and made enemies of Assad’s allies in Iran and Russia. At the same time, Ankara has been reticent to involve itself too directly in the war, preferring to operate at a distance by supporting Syrian opposition groups and holding back from full participation in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. However, in 2015, Turkey began to allow American warplanes to fly out of the strategic Incirlik airbase located in the country’s east, and Turkish forces entered Syria last month to support the capture of Jarablus by allied opposition groups.
This new level of Turkish involvement in Syria has helped put significant pressure on ISIS, compounding territorial gains against the group in Syria and Iraq over the past year. However, Turkish assistance to the American-led campaign against ISIS does not come free, and it has been especially expensive since the attempted military coup against President Erdogan deeply strained Turkish-American relations this July. The issue of Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen’s extradition from the United States – the Erdogan government blames Gulen for the failed Putsch – has the Obama administration scrambling to mollify Ankara while the legal extradition process meanders.
Most importantly, the U.S. appears to have given in to Turkish demands concerning Kurdish elements of the American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Previously poised to take Jarablus, Washington reportedly convinced the YPG – a key U.S. ally against ISIS, which Ankara views as an extension of the militant PKK in Turkey – to retreat east of the Euphrates. At the end of the day, observes James Jeffrey, former Ambassador to Turkey and Cipher Brief expert, “there is simply no alternative for the West to project power in the region without Turkey. That is Ankara’s ultimate leverage over Washington,” and the Turks have successfully used that leverage to shape U.S. policy in Syria.
Turkish relations with the E.U. have followed a similar trajectory over the past year. However rather than military cooperation, Ankara’s trump card in European relations centers around the Syrian refugee crisis and the migration of those refugees to Europe through Turkey. More than three million displaced Syrians currently reside in Turkey, but since the country does not grant refugee status, many of these people decide to leave the country and attempt to enter the E.U. In February alone, 57,000 migrants arrived in Greece seeking refuge in the E.U., over half of whom were Syrian.
The seemingly unfettered flow of Syrian migrants has sparked a political backlash, and according to former Turkish Parliamentarian and Cipher Brief expert Aykan Erdemir, “the rise of populist parties running on anti-immigrant and anti-Islam platforms across Europe has presented Turkey a unique opportunity in its dealings with the E.U.” Stung by repeated delays in accession talks with the E.U. over the past decade, Turkey has taken this opportunity to both re-energize the accession process and extract some of the perks of E.U. membership in exchange for restricting refugee flows. In March this year, Ankara inked a deal with the Union that promised to stem migration in exchange for $6 billion in refugee assistance, visa-free travel to the E.U. for Turks, and a promise to renew accession talks.
Erdogan’s crackdown against suspected plotters after the coup attempt – over 45,000 military officials, academics, civil servants, and journalists have been arrested or suspended so far – has now soured that agreement. E.U. high commissioners Frederica Mogherini and Johannes Hahn have expressed concern that the purge gives Erdogan’s government “far reaching powers to govern by decree.” At the same time, Turkish officials have said they will not implement the deal until visa-free access to the E.U. is granted. Refugee arrivals in Greece have started to rise again after a sharp drop following the deal.
Nevertheless, the refugee issue remains a powerful tool in Ankara’s diplomatic arsenal, and in Erdemir’s opinion, “the E.U.'s hands seem to be tied… many European politicians feel the need to turn a blind eye to Ankara’s egregious breach of fundamental rights and freedoms.”
Does all this mean that Ankara has achieved some kind of immunity in its dealings with the west? Hardly. The U.S. is still a vital security partner for Turkey, and despite recent efforts to patch relations with Russia, the country’s membership in NATO underpins its place in the international order. At the same time, the so-called ‘Anatolian Tiger’ desperately needs the economic opportunities offered by further access to the E.U. common market in order to bolster flagging growth.
Turkey may enjoy new leverage in its relations with western partners, notes Ambassador Jeffrey, “but there is no real peace or prosperity for Turkey without the west.” There is a natural limit to how far either side will push the other.
Fritz Lodge is an international producer at The Cipher Brief.
