Turkey’s damaging crisis with Europe is self-generated in large part – a tactic sometimes used by Ankara to create a problem and then hold the other party responsible. Acting the victim also deflects domestic attention from the government’s own accountability and justifies revenge. Turkey is stirring a crisis with the European Union principally to generate support among European Turks, and citizens living in Turkey, for its effort to win an April 16 referendum which would give President Recep Tayyip Erdogan virtually unlimited power. This tactic comes with a heavy price, however, to Turkey’s long term and strategic interests. Turkey’s recent actions and diplomatic disputes with Germany, the Netherlands, and, by extension, other countries in the EU, are not bolstering the country’s long term interests and do not reveal any visible long term positive strategy.
Relations between Turkey and the EU have often been uneasy. Turkey’s views of the EU rest on an understandable and undeniably humiliating national frustration: the EU’s unwillingness to grant Turkey membership. But rather than address this issue on European terms, Turkey demands entry on its own terms by portraying its quasi-Islamic political theory, based on Muslim Brotherhood governance principles, as a genuine example of democracy.
The EU’s popular disinterest in Turkish membership has been pushed further into negative territory over the past 15 years by the aftermath of 9/11, economic losses and debt crises of the Great Recession, terrorism, the Syrian refugee crisis, and the awareness that Turkey would be the most populous EU member if it joined. The EU has offered Turkey half measures politically while adding beneficial economic ties. Anchored to its determination to be treated as an equal, Turkey has refused to settle for this half loaf.
Now, separate elements have rolled into a single interconnected crisis with possible long term consequences. President Erdogan’s extreme language towards the EU signals his clear abandonment of Turkey’s EU project for the foreseeable future. Turkey threatens to unleash a massive new refugee exodus into Europe. Ankara sees its new Russia ties as leverage against the NATO alliance. Turkey’s government is resorting to xenophobia to win its referendum on April 16. Regrettably, none of these gambits offers a clear prospect for a more stable and prosperous future for Turkey.
In fact, Turkey’s moves in the EU crisis, and elsewhere, may have weakened its ability to operate at home and internationally with greater influence. Turkey’s war aims in Syria – Turkey’s foreign policy priority – have come up against both U.S. and Russian decisions to maintain ties with the Syrian Kurds. Turkey’s war in its southeast against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK, has resulted in widespread destruction, with no visible signs of victory. Rumors in Ankara about the Turkish military’s concerns have been met with a harsh government reaction, reflecting Ankara’s nervousness.
At home, Turkey’s economy is somewhat fragile. The government launched a campaign recently against converting lira to dollar accounts. Foreign investment from Europe could now fall because of the current crisis. The government prevents the central bank from raising interest rates and now has merged the country’s holdings in national economic institutions into a sovereign fund. These investments were made originally to provide stability to the economy, but they now give rise to uncertainty, as the government intends to borrow on them. Tourism, which is key to foreign exchange earnings, is low and struggling. Rising inflation and a persistent high unemployment rate are worrying. Money from Gulf states helps balance the accounts for Turkey but is not a long-term solution. Doubts are rising about Turkey’s ambition to be a top 10 global economy by 2023.
Releasing a new flow of refugees to Europe would also be a tactic without a strategic purpose. The Europeans would be better prepared this time, and they could spend the money they promised Turkey to maintain migration flows on their own solutions; European backlash may actually encourage a greater sense of EU nationalism. Visa-free entry for Turks to Europe would be an early victim. One hopes that Ankara might pause to consider the images of children sent to sea to perish and the risk of complicity in a drama using human victims as its chief weapon.
Would courting Moscow offer greater leverage against the EU? Since last summer, Ankara has assiduously sought Russian economic and diplomatic favors. A high-level meeting in Moscow this month occurred simultaneously with the expanded EU-Turkey crisis. In actuality, Moscow has offered very little in Syria. All Russia’s economic favors to Turkey aid Moscow too. Turkish desires to purchase a Russian anti-missile system may founder over Russian worries about downstream threats to Syria. The Russians want to expand influence elsewhere in the Middle East – with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran – and not rely only on Ankara. Moscow seeks to create turmoil in Europe and with NATO but may not have to overcommit to Turkey to achieve its aim.
Turkey’s referendum campaign has revealed the government’s nervousness. Ankara labels any citizen opposing the referendum as a terrorist. It has purged thousands of people from jobs and continues to operate under a decree that overrides parliamentary or judicial restraint. Ankara has been unable to stop a steady stream of terrorist attacks by either ISIS or the PKK. The main opposition, the CHP, has focused on the consequences of granting one person – President Erdogan – unlimited power instead of directly attacking the government. The government wants its staunchly anti-Kurdish ally, the MHP, to support its nationalistic goals, while it simultaneously courts conservative Turkish Kurds with hints of new initiatives post-election. In this charged atmosphere, Turkish voters in Europe look like a godsend to seal Mr. Erdogan’s victory.
Will Mr. Erdogan be the winner in this imbroglio anyway? By calling Europeans “Nazis” and “fascists,” he is campaigning to bolster support among Turks residing in Europe and those at home. His political strategy is to sharpen divisions and consolidate his base with nationalistic and religious messages, understanding how to stir old frustrations and hurts. His one goal now is victory on April 16. The long-term harm he may cause to Turkey’s future seems far down his list of priorities.
