President-elect Donald Trump’s first meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appears to have gone smoothly, though it remains too soon to say what policies Trump will pursue to promote U.S. strategic and economic interests in East Asia. The Cipher Brief spoke with Mansfield Foundation President and CEO Frank Jannuzi to learn more about Trump’s most pressing policy considerations for the region.
The Cipher Brief: President-elect Donald Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently met in New York. How is this meeting being received in Japan, and how far did it go to assuaging some of Japan’s feelings about a Trump presidency?
Frank Jannuzi: I am hearing that individuals both in the Foreign Ministry as well as in the private sector are very pleased that Prime Minister Abe was the first foreign leader to meet with Trump in person after his election, and that the meeting went a long way—according to the after action reports—toward establishing a rapport between the two leaders. It also reassured the Prime Minister that Donald Trump respects the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and is committed to the relationship.
So I think it was a very positive step for Prime Minister Abe to reach out and pay respects to the President-elect. I do not think the meeting got into the nitty gritty that is going to have to be worked on, including Japan’s contribution to the support of U.S. forces in Japan, as well as the role Japan plays in Asia and around the world in concert with the shared interests and values between the two countries. I think there is a lot of work that needs to be done before the Trump Administration, and President-elect Trump himself, will have a full grasp of just how important Japan is to the United States and around the world.
TCB: One of the key factors in the U.S.-Japan relationship is the Trans Pacific Partnership. Donald Trump recently doubled-down on his pledge to withdraw the U.S. from TPP. How would the withdrawal by the Trump Administration affect Japan?
FJ: The key thing here is that Japan already enjoys terrific access to the U.S. market, and much of the impact of TPP was going to be removing some of the tariff and non-tariff barriers in Japan that are adversely affecting the United States’ ability to export to and access Japanese markets.
TPP also would have set a high bar in the region in terms of norms on environmental protection, intellectual property rights protection, movement of electronic information across borders, and such. The big impact for Prime Minister Abe is that he is looking for a way - through trade and investment - to give a little injection, a little boost, to Japanese economic performance. Without TOP, it will be harder for him to get his “third arrow” to fly straight and get the economy moving in Japan. It will be harder for him to work with the United States in the region in a leadership role, setting the norms.
This will be viewed as a pretty big step back for Prime Minister Abe - not catastrophic, but still a major setback. The key thing is going to be what comes next. Will Prime Minister Abe work with the other TPP nations, and maybe try to go it without the United States on TPP? Do an eleven nation TPP? Or will he proceed on a lot of what Donald Trump seems to prefer, which is a series of bilateral arrangements? Or will Prime Minister Abe look to China and RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) as an alternative for regional economic mechanisms?
He has some important decisions to make. I don’t think he will make any of these decisions until he knows who is on the Trump team—for example, who is going to be the U.S. trade representative—and gets a better sense of where Trump is headed on trade and investment.
TCB: What is the likelihood that Japan will push forward with the remaining nations in the agreement?
FJ: It seems like a long shot to be honest, because I think the TPP nations minus the United States don’t constitute the same sort of critical mass that they did with the U.S. economy on board. Having said that, it would be a pretty simple fix to negotiate, and a lot of other nations in Asia are eager to deepen their options; they don’t want to be dependent on China. They would love to have Japan playing a more active role in both trade and investment. We will see. I think it is more likely that there will be a pause, perhaps followed by a launch of bilateral discussions between the U.S. and Japan, on a bilateral free trade agreement.
TCB: Changing gears towards the security side of the relationship, what would the U.S. stand to lose if it withdrew or decreased the forces currently stationed in Japan?
FJ: We would lose our ability to defend our interests in the region and project power around the world – but I don’t think there is any risk of that happening. I don’t believe that Donald Trump is an isolationist. He has talked about expanding, not decreasing, the size of the Navy. I think that he understands the United States’ interest in freedom of navigation, in peace and security in northeast Asia, in deterring North Korean aggression, and working to roll back North Korea’s nuclear program—these things are done better with friends and partners. So, there is no chance that the United States is going to reduce its footprint in the Asia Pacific region.
I think the only question is how Donald Trump is going to work with allies to apportion responsibility and the financial burden, as well as define the roles and missions of the various partner nations. Again, it is too soon to say, but there is no indication that Trump would be an isolationist or that he would withdraw the U.S. from the region. There is a constant refrain of “Oh my gosh, what is going to happen if the United States pulls out of East Asia?” But the reality is that it is not possible for us to do that. There are hundreds of thousands of Americans living and working in East Asia, the United States has territory in the Pacific—not just Hawaii, but also Guam – we have alliance relationships, including our oldest alliance relationship with Thailand, so I think it is just not in the cards that the United States will ever cease being a Pacific nation.
TCB: Recently I saw that the U.S. plans to hand back some land on Okinawa back to Japan. Would that affect forces we are keeping in Okinawa?
FJ: The base realignment process on Okinawa has been underway for decades, and it is designed to make our position there more sustainable, less burdensome to the local population in terms of noise, inconvenience, and safety. Some elements of it—most specifically the future of the Futenma Naval Air Station of the Marine Corps —have been very controversial and difficult to negotiate with the people of Okinawa and the government of Japan. But that base realignment process is expected to move forward, and it doesn’t represent a diminution of the U.S. commitment to the alliance. It’s a well-planned, carefully thought out realignment of forces consistent with the goals of both fulfilling the missions of deterrence and maritime security, as well as reducing the likelihood of accidents or risk to the Okinawan hosts. It should not be misunderstood as some sort of a pullback.
TCB: Is there anything you think is not talked about enough or doesn’t get the attention it deserves?
FJ: Well I think there are two issues very much looming on the horizon that require careful nurturing in the U.S.-Japan alliance. One is the continued rise of China: this is not a threat to be contained, it is an uncertainty to be managed. The U.S. is going to need to work very closely with its Japanese allies and with China to forge a constructive, collaborative approach to security and economics in East Asia. And it won’t happen by itself - it is going to require careful stewardship. Obama tried, but the U.S.-China relationship is pretty rocky these days; there is a lot of mistrust in the relationship. Mistrust is fueled by China’s ambitious maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea and even in the East China Sea. The Trump Administration is going to inherit this from Obama, and it requires careful work.
The other issue that is looming, and is an immediate challenge that requires urgent attention, is North Korea. I think that President Obama has relayed this to President-elect Trump, and has warned him that this issue cannot wait. President Obama adopted an approach that has been referred to by observers as “strategic patience.” My take on this is that we need a little more strategy and a little less patience. This is also a challenge that needs to be managed not just by the U.S.-Japan alliance, but because it’s the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea needs to be front and center. But because of the political situation in Seoul today, it is not clear how much leadership is going to be coming out of the Blue House over the next 12 months on this issue.
So, there is going to be no time for spring training. Trump is going to go right into the major leagues, he is going to have to take his best swings, and we will see what happens. But this going to be a big year ahead with those two big issues looming—managing China’s rise, and doing something to rein in North Korean’s nuclear ambitions. These are tasks that cannot wait.
