The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has begun a new phase in its long-term, multi-dimensional military modernization process that began in the late 1970s as part of the Four Modernizations. The general outline for the current round of reforms was announced in November 2013 and forecast changes in the size and structure of the force; adjustments to command and control organizations, particularly for theater joint operations; creation of new types of combat capabilities; and reform of the military education system.
No further details were revealed until September 2015 when Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman Xi Jinping announced a 300 thousand personnel cut, mainly affecting “troops equipped with outdated armaments, administrative staff and non-combatant personnel, while optimizing the structure of Chinese forces,” resulting in an active duty force of two million by the end of 2017.
Two months later, modifications to the command and control system to take place over the next five years were announced. These included strengthening the CMC’s “centralized and unified” leadership and the establishment of a chain of command for joint operations separate from an administrative chain for “construction” work, such as organizing, manning, and equipping the force. The operational chain of command runs from the CMC to new theater commands to units, while the administrative chain runs from the CMC to service headquarters to units.
Starting on December 31, 2015 more changes were publicized to implement this new structure:
- The four General Departments (General Staff, Political, Logistics, and Armaments Departments, which served as a joint staff for the entire PLA and as the national-level Army headquarters), were abolished and their functions mostly assigned to 15 new functional departments, commissions, and offices subordinate to the CMC.
- Other elements of the four General Departments were transferred to a newly created Army headquarters and a new Strategic Support Force, responsible for aspects of cyber, electronic warfare, and space operations. Concurrently, the former Second Artillery, which commanded nuclear and conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, was elevated to become a fourth service, the Rocket Force, equivalent to the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
- The seven Military Regions were disbanded and five Theater Commands, namely Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central, were established. Each Theater Command has Army and Air Force components; the three coastal commands also have a Navy component. Theater Commands are responsible for “responding to security threats from their strategic directions, maintaining peace, deterring wars and winning battles,” and focusing on joint training.
These changes amount to a final break from the 1950s Soviet organizational model, but many more specifics must be revealed for a complete understanding of the new system.
A major objective of the reforms is to increase the PLA’s capabilities for joint operations and, as stated in the 2015 white paper on strategy, to abandon the “traditional mentality that land outweighs sea.” However, based on the leadership of the new CMC organizations, and the theater commanders and political commissars, the Army still dominates the PLA’s senior-most billets. It is unclear how many non-Army officers will be assigned to the new CMC organizations and theater headquarters to make them truly joint organizations. A more joint PLA will need to create career paths for officers from the other services to rise in greater numbers to the highest levels of leadership.
No details have been released concerning how personnel will be distributed among the four services or which units will be disbanded, restructured, or transferred to other headquarters. Based on prior reorganizations, some units could be transferred among the services to better balance the force.
While the new organization is closer to a U.S.-style command structure, many significant differences remain. For example, under the old structure, the Defense Minister and Ministry of National Defense were not in the operational chain of command; the Defense Minister has power because he is a member of the CMC, but the Defense Ministry’s duties are limited mainly to external coordination with other Chinese government entities and foreign countries. Under the new system, they still are not in the chain of command. Likewise, as in the past, command responsibility for every military unit from company to theater level is shared between a commander and a political commissar. This arrangement is intended to maintain Party control of the military from the grassroots to the highest levels. Notably, no national-level headquarters for special operations has been created.
This phase of the PLA’s modernization process is bound to cause anxiety, disruption, and even resistance among the ranks. Until everyone is comfortable with their new roles, operational readiness in some units could decline temporarily. The senior leadership has allotted five years to make adjustments; however, even after 2020, more reforms will be required. Their effectiveness will only be known when the PLA proves itself on a modern battlefield.
Senior PLA leaders understand that despite progress the force has made over the past decades, many obstacles remain. Shortly after being named new commander of the Army, General Li Zuocheng told reporters that the PLA, particularly the Army, still lags behind the world’s military powers. Many other leaders have made similar assessments of PLA capabilities, which support a deliberate approach toward modernization. Even as new generations of equipment and technology enter the force, the PLA leadership acknowledges that its organizations, people, and way of thinking must be modernized as part of a process that still has decades remaining before its scheduled completion in 2049.
