After a 30 day review, the Department of Defense has delivered to the White House a preliminary plan to defeat ISIS. While this is an admirable goal, defeating ISIS will only be a short-term fix to the problem of Islamic terrorism, just as defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) only saw it reconstituted and return with a vengeance as ISIS. Here are a few considerations based on what worked in the development of the 2006 Anbar Awakening—the Sunni Sheik led alliance with Coalition forces that fostered the defeat of AQI, first in Anbar province, then across Shia and Sunni parts of Iraq.
First, sign a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Government of Iraq both to protect the rights of American troops serving in Iraq, and more importantly, laying the groundwork for the broader security arrangement between the United States and Iraq for the decades to come. The inability to obtain a SOFA agreement with the Iraqi government contributed to the security situation in Iraq immediately beginning to unravel following the ill-advised pull out of U.S. forces at the end of 2011. Then-Prime Minister Nori Maliki accused his Sunni Vice President of terrorism, forcing Tariq al-Hashimi to flee the country. Maliki gave in to his party’s demands and purged the government of Sunnis. He then sent the Iraqi Army in to Anbar province over the coming months to root out terrorists. The Sunnis, who had served for years in a coalition government with Maliki’s Shia Dawa party since the forming of the Anbar Awakening, found themselves in the zero-sum situation that prevents consensual government in the Mideast. Forced to choose between a government that was persecuting them and the religious extremist they rejected six years earlier, they returned to the latter. While many tribal fighters stayed loyal to the Awakening movement, others turned to the Sunni-supremacist ISIS—the rebranded Al Qaeda in Iraq. Without a SOFA, the U.S. will return to a similar situation in a few years; without any leverage to influence an Iraqi government on which we spent billions of dollars and thousands of lives to stabilize, only to leave and have those gains reversed.
Second, make support of the Iraqi military contingent upon governmental reforms for an inclusive government. Work with the Iraqis to develop a timeline of reforms and base military support on meeting those gates. Sectarian divisions run deep in Iraq, but until a power sharing agreement is reached, the fighting will never stop. From the start of the Awakening movement, Sunnis and Shia began working together to stop the terrorist in Iraq. This, combined with the Surge in 2007 gave Iraq a chance for a peaceful and stable future, which seemed attainable until the U.S. withdrawal.
Americans were embedded as advisors in Iraqi government ministries, and security forces and were seen as the honest brokers, preventing Iraqis from acting upon their worst, most extreme desires. This balance was lost upon our 2011 departure, but it can be regained and maintained during the years it will take for reconciliation to take hold. Without a representative government that includes Shia, Sunnis, Kurds and other ethnic groups, the fighting will continue for decades and will eventually burst into a wider regional conflict.
The question that must be answered is, "what will make the Sunnis in Iraq stop fighting?" Dividing the country into Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish regions may sound good as a theory discussed in the faculty lounge but will result in disaster in practice. On the macro-level, which group controls Baghdad? Mosul? Baiji? On the micro-level, how are the borders drawn so that family and sub-tribal boundaries are respected? Our military and economic support of the Iraqi government must hinge on their ability to reform into a representative democracy.
Third, develop a long-term strategy to deal with Islamic extremists similar to American diplomat George Kennan’s Long Telegram and National Security Council Report 68, both of which spelled out a policy of containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unfortunately, dealing with Islamic terrorists needs to take a different approach. Whereas containment was effective in dealing with Soviet communism, it is not a viable option against today’s terrorists because of the relative ease of travel and the ability for extremist propagandists to radicalize individuals through social media. ISIS currently has at least 40 affiliate groups in over 20 countries and a growing cadre of veterans of Syria’s civil war returning to Europe and North America. Defeating ISIS is too narrow of a goal. Even when ISIS appears to be defeated", a new group that is more lethal and more willing to launch headline-grabbing attacks will spring up in its place. Remember, just as ISIS was kicked out of al Qaeda for being too violent; the next generation of Islamic terrorists will make ISIS look civilized in comparison.
The international coalition that is currently fighting ISIS needs to broaden its mandate to fight Islamic extremism worldwide with both hard and soft power. With Muslim nations in a leading role, both the terrorist capability to launch attacks, and the ideas behind them must be defeated. Within the United States, Muslim groups need to increase their denunciation of the extremists infiltrating their communities.
Sheik Sattar abu Risha, founder of the Anbar Awakening, often said, "The streets will run red with the blood of terrorists." It took that kind of determination from leaders to break the terrorists' grip over the population in Ramadi. The same kind of clarity and directness is needed in the west. While extremist groups need to be hunted around the globe to reduce their capacity to commit terror, their ultimate defeat will come from within the Muslim community through denunciation of violent ideas. We in the West need to hasten their defeat along both military and intellectual lines through support to our allies in the Mideast.
Colonel (Retired) Tony Deane, is a published author and adjunct professor. He is an Army veteran of the Cold War, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Operation Joint Guardian (Kosovo), and Operation Iraqi Freedom. He served in numerous armor and cavalry leadership positions for over 28 years, including commanding the 1st Battalion, 35th Armor Regiment—Task Force Conqueror. His Battalion fought in the Battle of Ramadi during the summer and fall of 2006, and was instrumental in not only defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq, but in forming the Anbar Awakening, where tribal leader vowed to support the Coalition and the Iraqi Government.
