Chinese and Western interests in Africa—in other words, what these countries want from Africa rather than what they can do for Africa—are surprisingly similar. They all want access to African raw materials, the political support in international fora of as many as possible of Africa’s 54 countries, and the ability to expand exports to Africa’s 1.1 billion population and growing middle class. China and the Western countries also want to avoid a plethora of potential negative issues that might harm their interests in Africa or the homeland. These include acts of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, international crime, piracy, and illegal immigration.
Some Western countries, for example the United States and France, want to ensure naval access to African ports and the ability of military aircraft to overfly African countries and land at African airports. While China does not yet have this as a significant interest, that time may be fast approaching. Between one and two million people of Chinese origin now live in Africa, and they increasingly find themselves in harm’s way. China had to evacuate 36 thousand Chinese nationals from Libya in 2011.
Since 2008, following its participation in the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, China has significantly expanded calls by People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships in African ports. It is in discussion with Djibouti for some kind of regular access for PLAN vessels.
Judging by numerous accounts in both the Western and Chinese media, the two parties are engaged in intense competition in Africa. One must distinguish between commercial competition and that in other sectors. In the case of trade, investment, and large African contracts, there is strong competition, but there is also intense commercial competition among Western countries. This is normal behavior in the free market.
China has attracted so much attention because it passed the United States in 2009 as Africa’s largest bilateral trading partner, and today its trade with Africa is more than double that of the United States. Chinese companies are also winning most of the bids for large infrastructure projects in Africa because they come with attractive government-supported financing—something Western companies are rarely able to match. On the other hand, Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa remains modest and is less than that of a number of Western countries, including the United States.
When it comes to geopolitical security, there has actually been more cooperation than competition between China and the West in Africa. It is true that China played an unhelpful role in the early days of the conflict in Darfur, although it eventually was key in convincing Sudan to accept the hybrid African Union/United Nations peacekeeping force. China is the largest source of arms transferred to African governments. Some of these weapons, along with Western and Russian equipment, find their way into conflict zones. China also has a hands-off approach to improved governance and human rights practices in Africa, which is contrary to the policy of most Western governments.
On the other hand, China has worked collaboratively with Western countries in the United Nations in an effort to achieve peace in Somalia. It has joined Western initiatives to improve relations between Sudan and South Sudan, where it has significant oil interests in both countries, and to end conflict in South Sudan. China contributes more than 2,600 troops, police, and experts to seven of the nine UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, an engagement welcomed by the West. It is a professional partner in the anti-piracy campaign in the Gulf of Aden.
Except for commercial competition, Africa is not a zero sum game for China and the West. It is a huge continent, and there is plenty of room for everyone, especially to engage in activities that benefit Africans.
