EXPERT ANALYSIS — Since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine began, Europe has embarked on a purge of Russian spies that has been described as “the largest mass diplomatic expulsion in history.”
Just this week, Russia’s foreign ministry expelled 34 French diplomats in retaliation for France expelling 35 Russian diplomats and declaring six Russian agents – that Paris says were posing as diplomats - “persona non grata” back in April.
A number of European countries responded to evidence of Russian military atrocities in Bucha, Ukraine by coordinating the expulsion of almost 270 Russian diplomats accused of carrying out intelligence activities.
When added to the number of spies expelled before the Bucha revelations, more than 400 Russian diplomatic personnel have now been ordered home. Significantly, a number of these actions have been taken by countries that have long tried to avoid confrontation with Moscow.
Not surprisingly, Russia has reacted to the West’s counter-espionage moves, and is continuing its tit-for-tat expulsions of Western diplomats from Moscow and consular posts elsewhere in Russia as it announced the departure of a total of 85 French, Spanish, and Italian diplomats.
Experts say that Russia may seek to scale back and refocus its intelligence collection in the near-term, but agree there is little doubt that Moscow will seek other remedies to current personnel losses, perhaps through expansion of non-official-cover (NOC) operations or activating in-place “illegals.”
Bottom Line: For its part, the West’s actions against Russian intelligence-gathering are expected to have significant impact. HUMINT collection will be complicated across Europe and possibly crippled in certain countries, such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, where expulsions of officials have coincided with the outright closings of Russian consular posts. Some observers suggest that opportunities may increase for the West to recruit assets from among disgruntled Russian personnel who remain in Europe. And, in a related blow to Russia, resources and platforms for acts of subversion and sabotage – such as the suspected GRU bombing of a Czech arms depot in April 2021 – will be hampered and restricted.
We asked Cipher Brief experts John McLaughlin and Nick Fishwick, both well versed in Russian intelligence operations, to help us put this massive shake up in the espionage world into perspective.
John McLaughlin, Former Acting Director, CIA
John E. McLaughlin served as Acting Director of Central Intelligence from July to September 2004 and as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from October 2000 to July 2004. He is currently the Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
Nick Fishwick, Former Senior Member, British Foreign Office
Nick Fishwick CMG retired in 2012 after nearly thirty years in the British Foreign Service. He did postings in Lagos, Istanbul and Kabul. His responsibilities in London included director of security and, after returning from Afghanistan in 2007, director for counter-terrorism. His final role was as director general for international operations. Nick Fishwick also spent three years on a secondment to UK Customs, specialising in international drug enforcement and tax evasion issues.
The Cipher Brief: Last year former MI6 chief and Cipher Brief Expert, Sir John Sawers, said that only a tenth of Russian spy operations in Europe have been uncovered. If true, that suggests that even with the sizable expulsions of suspected spies, Russia maintains a formidable espionage capability in Europe. What is your assessment of overall Russian capabilities in Europe, and how might they be degraded by recent Western actions?
Fishwick: We need to remember that the capabilities and resources of western European security services for the past 15-20 years have been to a large extent, focused on monitoring terrorism and stopping terrorist attacks. So, that is 15-20 years when hostile state intelligence services like the SVR would have had more freedom to operate in Western countries, building and developing their capabilities - agents, illegals, contacts, channels for funding and communication. The political climate in the West has also changed in ways that have made it easier for the Russians to establish intelligence capabilities - relationships and know-how.
We have an establishment in the UK that has been compromised by the lure of Russian money; we saw more than half the votes of the first round of the French presidential election being cast for pro-Putin candidates; we have a former U.S. President acting as a cheerleader for Mr. Putin. This has been fertile territory for the Russian intelligence services to operate in. So sure, Western governments should not allow any person they believe to be a spy to operate under diplomatic cover in their country. But it is going to require a lot more than that to roll back Russian influence. One hopes that Ukraine will provide the political will that has been lacking.
The Cipher Brief: What opportunities are created for Western intelligence by the wave of expulsions, both defensively and offensively? Can a significant and lasting advantage be created for the West in the competition with Russian intelligence services?
McLaughlin: These expulsions do not create direct opportunities for U.S. intelligence, but if Russian intelligence officers share the widespread abhorrence of what Russia is doing, some may be looking for opportunities to protest and may see such an opportunity in working for U.S. intelligence as agents.
Fishwick: Expulsion of Russian spies obviously disrupts Russian networks, in some cases for good. And in the past, impending expulsion has led Russian spies to ask themselves whether they really want to go back to Russia or whether it would be better to sell their services to the West; whether this will happen under present circumstances is a good question. But I don’t think most Russian activities are conducted by the traditional use of diplomatic cover by SVR officers. I think Russia will be using illegals; online operations for all sorts of purposes (potential cyberattacks, political influence and subversion, etc.); what we used to call “useful idiots” of which there is a seemingly inexhaustible supply; covert funding; and so on. Don’t be fooled into thinking that booting a few Russian diplomats out is making us much safer. I think it’s encouraging that Western security services are probably cooperating better against the common Russian threat, but against that, the increasing fractures in the political will of the West are problematic for us and helpful for Russian intelligence.
The Cipher Brief: How would you expect Moscow to respond? What options are open to them to reconstitute or compensate for lost intelligence assets and platforms?
McLaughlin: Chances are that Russia has more deeply embedded assets (known by U.S. intelligence as "illegals") and can fall back on them to an extent — although most of these are not high-producing assets.
Fishwick: Russia will respond aggressively to all Western attempts to curb the activities of their intelligence services. If we kick their spies out, they will kick our diplomats out (not that that should deter us). If we make it harder for them to operate in certain countries, they will get more active in other countries that have, for example, taken a soft line on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They still have desperation options of redoubling online subversion and destructive cyberattacks. But there are some encouraging points for us. One, it takes a lot longer for Russian spies to build up a channel, covert relationship, or network than it does for a Western security service to disrupt one. Secondly, while Russian spies have been having a lovely old time under Mr. Putin, their resources are not unlimited and as long as the West keeps its resolve, Russia may blink first.
The Cipher Brief:In the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, how might Western military and intelligence support to Ukrainian forces be enhanced and expanded by the disruption of Moscow’s intelligence activities?
McLaughlin: Without these assets, Russian intelligence will be less informed about Allied policies toward Ukraine, which provides Kviv with the potential to surprise Russia with its operations, both offensive and defensive.
The piece includes research, analysis and reporting by Cipher Brief Analyst Ken Hughes
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